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Abstract 
This thesis explores Congress's influence on America's post-cold war involvement 
in UN peace operations. It examines how while both the Bush and Clinton 
administrations envisaged greater participation in UN peace-enforcement operations 
in the early 1990s, due to congressional opposition, this new thinking (referred to 
throughout as `UNPE') did not develop into a lasting doctrine. The first chapter 
defines UNPE as a foreign policy approach and contextualises it in US history. 
Arguing that Congress is not deferential towards the executive branch in foreign 
policy issues, the second chapter illustrates statistically that the post-1989 Congress 
was conservative, partisan and assertive in foreign policy and use of force issues. The 
third chapter considers how lawmakers create collective outcomes. It discusses how 
the case chapters will examine claims that congressional policy is left to a handful of 
policy specialists and what factors influence lawmakers' voting decisions. 
Considering both institutional and individual behaviour, the thesis focuses analysis 
on the US response to three 1990s crises: Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. That each case 
demonstrates that lawmakers are prepared to challenge presidential attempts to use 
force abroad is used to question the two presidencies interpretation of interbranch 
foreign policy making. The case chapters also find that most lawmakers were not 
especially active in dealing with the cases. Rank and file members were typically 
more active than their party leaders, but House and Senate foreign policy committee 
members were responsible for the more onerous legislative tasks relating to the cases. 
The evidence also suggests that representatives typically supported bills introduced by 
party colleagues and senators with similar ideological viewpoints tended to vote 
together. In explaining how collective outcomes are reached, the thesis avoids 
attempting to construct a theoretical perspective that exclusively aligns with a party or 
committee government theory. It explores what role foreign policy committees and 
party leaders and whips played in the cases, and concludes that Shepsle and 
Weingast's recommendation that selecting insights from seemingly incompatible 
party government and informational perspectives helps build a realistic depiction of 
the congressional decision making process. 
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The US Congress and United Nations Peace-Enforcement Operations 
During the First Clinton Administration 
Introduction 
This introduction is arranged into thematic and cases sections. The thematic part 
outlines the rationale for the thesis, explains the main hypothesis, identifies the 
institutional protagonists, and discusses what themes will be explored. The second 
part summarises what the case chapters reveal about foreign policy in the 1990s and 
details what each case uncovers about the themes raised in the first three chapters. 
The thesis focuses on the early to mid 1990s, which represents a major transitional 
period in US foreign policy. For over forty years US foreign and defence policy had 
been set up to contain communism, but by the early 1990s America had to find a new 
global function. One indication of what this role could be was the unexpectedly easy 
victory in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, which demonstrated that: 
1) America can lead effective multilateral military forces. 
2) The UN Security Council (UNSC) is convenient for both legitimising military 
action and assembling coalitions. 
3) The use of force abroad can be popular within Congress and among the public. 
4) Checking human rights abuses and protecting US interests are not always mutually 
exclusive. 
These factors inspired the Bush administration to talk about a `new world order' 
(NWO), in which America, legitimated through Chapter VII of the UN Charter, would 
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lead multilateral peacekeeping forces in defence of global human rights. Such rhetoric 
was also espoused by the Clinton administration, which envisaged similarly close 
relations with the UN. The intention of this thesis is to shed light on why this 
sentiment failed to evolve into a durable doctrine. Whether this thinking (referred to 
throughout the thesis as United Nations Peace-Enforcement or UNPE) was a policy, a 
doctrine, or just a tentative reassessment of a very narrow facet of foreign policy is a 
moot point, but it failed, and the underlying rationale for research is an exploration of 
Congress's culpability in this failure. The central hypothesis is as follows. The Clinton 
administration's initial enthusiasm for a workable UNPE policy was impaired and 
ultimately wrecked by opposition from Congress. The research examines and 
evaluates the various tools used to undermine Clinton's efforts to establish a UNPE 
policy and looks at how decisions were reached in the House and Senate. The case 
chapters assess the key influences on lawmakers' voting choices, the relative 
importance of parties and committees in driving congressional policy, and whether 
many lawmakers were even interested in the particular crisis. 
The thesis's temporal frame begins with the mission to Somalia in December 1992, 
and ends with the IFOR operation to Bosnia in December 1995, and will be 
constructed in the following manner. The first three thematic chapters set out the 
issues explored in the cases. In these chapters, the issue area will be defined, the 
institutional framework set out, the methodology discussed, and the cue-taking 
variables explained. More generally, these chapters are used as a means to begin 
determining Congress's impact on the three cases. 
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Thematic Chapters 
Chapter one introduces the key themes relating to the broad policy issue studied in 
the thesis: UN peace-enforcement. It defines Clinton's UNPE approach, argues that it 
was intended as a serious conflict resolution model, and contextualises it within US 
history. It states that both the UN's expanded influence in conflict resolution and 
George Bush's post-Gulf War speeches formed a fledgling model of humanitarian 
policing in regions of peripheral political, economic and strategic importance. 
Combining this with the Clinton administration's rhetoric, the chapter identifies new 
thinking on conflict resolution in which human rights abuses would be stopped by a 
US-led, UNSC-mandated coalition force. It is also suggested that the supposition that 
human rights abuses threaten peace and stability was actually a variation on cold war 
communist containment. UNPE was a bid- reminiscent of the Truman Doctrine- to 
create a US-led global coalition to curb instability. Chapter one further argues that 
UNPE-style operations (small, punitive actions) have been part of military practice for 
two centuries. Hardly stiff generis, minor policing actions and a yearning to promote a 
global morality are a traditionally American way of fighting wars. 
After defining, justifying and contextualising UNPE's key attributes, the 
institutional framework is introduced in chapter two. Through a literature review and 
a range of statistical voting measures, it explores one of the key themes of the 
research- Congress and the presidency's foreign policy making relationship. 
Challenging the `water's edge' interpretation of foreign policy, the statistical measures 
find that legislators were more conservative, partisan and confrontational towards the 
presidency during the post-cold war era. The chapter does not claim that Congress 
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dominates in this policy area. It accepts the argument that the chief executive has a 
freer rein in foreign than domestic policy, but, consistent with the view that Congress 
became more assertive after the cold war, it is maintained that the legislature is more 
important than Hinckley's two presidencies interpretation of interbranch foreign 
policy making allows. To establish Congress's role in foreign policy making, the 
chapter looks to the new institutionalist approach described by Lindsay et at., which 
assumes that there is more to congressional assertiveness than binding legislation. 
The chapter contends that even symbolic resolutions can be effective in pressuring the 
executive branch, and discusses the significance of anticipated congressional 
opposition. In exploring the quantitative level, the chapter modifies the Congressional 
Quarterly presidential support scores. A series of calculations based on 1987-2000 
foreign policy votes are used to assess and contrast the extent of congressional 
partisanship, ideology and assertiveness during the 1992-95 UNPE era. The 1992-95 
voting measures reveal a time when Congress was generally partisan, ideological and 
likely to challenge the president on the use of force, which helps explain why UNPE 
struggled to develop. 
Chapter two looks at the influence of party and ideology on a wide number of 
foreign policy votes, but its emphasis on how Congress at the institutional level 
impacted on foreign policy decision making ignores much about how lawmakers 
reach collective decisions. To rectify this, chapter three introduces another theme of 
I Barbara Hinckley, Less Than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive 
Congress. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994. For the seminal article on the two presidencies, 
see Aaron Wildavsky, `The Two Presidencies, ' Trans-Action, vol. 4,1966, pp. 7-14. 
2 James M. Lindsay, `Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters, ' Political Science Quarterly, 
vol. 107, no. 4,1992-93, pp. 607-628. James M. Scott, `In the Loop: Congressional Influence in 
American Foreign Policy, ' Journal of Political and Military Sociology, vol. 25, no. 1, Summer, 1997, 
pp. 47-75. 
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the research by discussing decision making at the individual level. It explains how 
through observable behaviour and empirical data, the cases will examine how rational 
legislators made voting decisions and how collective outcomes were created. Chapter 
three tackles firstly the question of whether many lawmakers were even involved in 
the cases beyond floor voting. The thesis refers throughout to Hall's argument that 
due to restraints on time and resources, lawmakers are only seriously interested in a 
few issues at any given time. 3 Chapter three explains how the cases adapt Hall's 
method to measure the amount of legislative, committee, floor and media activity 
among all those who served during each crisis. This is done to see if the majority of 
lawmakers did nothing but vote on the crises and whether those most involved were 
either foreign policy committee members or party leaders. Chapter three then sets out 
how the cases will identify which factors most influenced voting decisions in each 
chamber. It describes the range of electoral, committee, party and ideological 
variables and explains how the cases use the binary logistic regression statistical test 
to measure the comparative ability of these variables to predict voting choices. 
The main purpose of chapter three is to explain how the cases will show that 
Congress's response to the crises was shaped by a few legislators and how non- 
specialists made final voting choices. It considers party government and committee- 
centred informational explanations of congressional decision making. It sets out a 
decision making process that takes up Shepsle and Weingast's recommendation that 
elements of informational and partisan perspectives of the third generation of 
positivist analysis offer credible insights into congressional behaviour. 4 In particular, 
3 Richard Hall, Participation in Congress, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1996. 
4 Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry Weingast, `Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions, ' Legislative 
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the research borrows aspects from seemingly conflicting scholars such as Krehbiel 
who argues that committees act as organisations of specialists who disseminate 
information of use to all non-members and Cox and McCubbins who argue that 
5 partisanship is the main influence in creating collective outcomes in the Houses 
The first three chapters outline the rationale for exploring the response of Congress 
to the 1990s UN peace-enforcement operations and set out a framework that is 
explored in the cases. Each highlights competing views in the relevant literatures and 
presents evidence that in the broad matter of foreign policy while Congress was 
partisan, ideological and assertive, most members (including party leaders) did not 
participate greatly in efforts to address the crises. The following explains how the 
cases approach the examination of congressional foreign policy in relation to the 
reassessment of the US's contribution to 1990s humanitarian conflict resolution. 
The Case Chapters 
To test the validity of the hypothesis, the three main crises in which US troops were 
deployed during the first Clinton administration- Somalia (1992-94), Haiti (1991-94) 
and Bosnia (1991-95)- are investigated. All involve a humanitarian catastrophe, are in 
regions of minimal security interest, and have a victim-perpetrator characteristic that 
could feasibly have been checked by decisive US action. As they led to the 
deployment of troops, they are also informative about attitudes to UNPE within the 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 2, May 1994, pp. 149-181. 
5 Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organisation, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 
1991. Gary Cox & Matthew McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House, 
University of California Press, Berkley, 1993. 
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executive and the legislature. All entail disputes between both branches about 
humanitarianism, troop deployments, and the linking of US objectives to UN goals, 
and therefore are used to make observations about broader phenomena. 
Case studies are not a perfect approach when analysing the development of a policy. 
For one thing, the three cases did not develop in isolation of each other. The decision 
to stall on troop deployments to Haiti and Bosnia was arguably influenced by the 
Somalia debacle. However, foreign policy is an area in which case studies are not 
entirely inappropriate. Foreign policy is often framed in an ad hoc manner and so is 
arguably better understood case by case. The thesis is not pursuing a comparative 
approach in this instance. Each crisis is examined in the same way and subjected to 
the same tests, but focus is on the congressional response to each case, rather than on 
drawing comparisons between the cases. 
As it was ostensibly ignored in Washington, the 1994 Rwandan genocide was 
considered as a contrasting case study. It was, however, rejected as it prompted no 
draft legislation and virtually no statements from either branch. The reaction to the 
Rwandan genocide could have been used to show that almost nothing happens on 
Capitol Hill when no specialists push for action. However, there is almost no scope 
for statistical analysis and so setting up and explaining the circumstances of the 
Rwandan crisis would add too little to the thesis to justify the word space. 
The secondary academic literature and specialist news journals- especially 
Congressional Quarterly- are used to detail the events of each crisis. To explain 
Congress's actions, committee hearings, floor debates and elite interviews are also 
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consulted. Each chapter also undertakes a series of statistical tests to measure voting 
cues and the extent of participation among individual lawmakers, party leaders and 
foreign policy committee members. More generally, each crisis is examined for what 
it reveals about the congressional stance on US-led UN peace operations. Attention is 
directed at the interbranch relationship; investigating how proficient lawmakers were 
in overseeing executive branch policy. Each highlights the breadth of opposition to 
using force for humanitarian purposes and the extent of distrust towards the UN. 
Overall, they show that legislation and committee and floor debates pertaining to be 
about the national interest were party and ideologically motivated and peppered with 
challenges to the president's foreign policy powers. 
Chapter four discusses America's 1992-94 intervention into the Somalia crisis. Part 
one explains that UNITAF was a chance to operationalise UNPE as a foreign policy 
doctrine and the second part focuses on the impact of the deaths of eighteen US troops 
on the commitment to UNPE. It argues that the mission may have ended 
ignominiously, and impelled Clinton to proclaim a more cautious stance that would 
prevent interventions slipping into nation-building, but it was not suggested that 
UNPE would be totally abandoned. The US would still lead coalition forces, and 
humanitarianism would remain a justifiable reason for military action. 
America's experience in Somalia shows evidence that Congress is not deferential 
towards the president in foreign policy. Lawmakers originally pressured Bush to act to 
divert the famine, and then forced Clinton to evacuate the troops after the October 3 
disaster in Mogadishu. After looking at the institutional level, the chapter examines 
voting cues on floor votes relating to the Somalia crisis. The regression tests find that 
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partisanship in the House and ideology in the Senate are the best predictors of voting. 
Supporting Hall's claim, the chapter also finds that most lawmakers did little more 
than vote on the issue over the two-year crisis. This does not undermine notions of an 
assertive Congress as certain foreign policy committee members acted as policy 
specialists. These specialists supplied almost all the legislation relating to the Somalia 
crisis, and, less so in the Senate, lawmakers supported the bills introduced by party 
colleagues. 
Analysis of the Haitian case begins with the 1991 coup and ends with the US troop 
deployment in September 1994. In part one, the Bush and early Clinton 
administrations' reaction to the coup is discussed. Part two then explains the process 
leading to the deployment of 20,000 troops to the island in September 1994. Part three 
considers the argument that as the threat of force against the junta was made a month 
after troops were evacuated from Somalia, military interventions to restore democracy 
in troubled regions were still part of foreign policy thinking after the Somalia debacle. 
Although the eventual action in Haiti met little resistance, it involved a US-led 
multilateral force sent to ensure that the junta was removed from power. Also, the 
damage to the UN's prestige after the failure in Somalia recovered somewhat with the 
Haitian crisis. It did not play a major part in the negotiations, but that the long-term 
peacekeeping responsibility was handed over to the UN demonstrates some faith in 
the organisation. The chapter also considers the view that as three years elapsed 
between the ousting and reinstatement of Aristide, the reaction to the Haitian crisis 
shows that Clinton's enthusiasm for taking swift action against aggressors was 
dwindling. 
Introduction 11 
Congress's response to the Haitian Junta was motivated by party and ideological 
concerns and assertive towards the president. Congress never led US policy in Haiti, 
but lawmakers influenced executive actions. For most of the crisis it seemed that the 
US still preferred military governments as guarantors of US interests in Latin 
America. Perceived as a left-leaning troublemaker, Aristide was not considered a 
suitable civilian leader. By April 1994, however, Aristide's congressional supporters 
had helped pressure the administration to take a tougher line with the Haitian Junta. 
Conversely, while those opposed to action failed to prevent attempts to station troops 
in Haiti, their influence on the postponement an invasion for three years is evidence 
that the administration was cautious about congressional opinion. After addressing the 
institutional level, the chapter shifts attention to how decisions are reached in 
Congress. In this section; statistical measures of Haitian floor votes show that 
partisanship is high among representatives and ideology was the main variable in the 
Senate, and, despite the crisis lingering for three years, almost half of all 
representatives and senators did nothing more than participate in floor votes. 
Chapter six looks at peacekeeping policy and the 1991-95 war in the Balkans. 
Concentrating on 1995, the chapter is divided into three parts: congressional attitudes 
towards UNPE, the Balkans arms embargo, and the stationing of NATO peacekeeping 
troops in the region after the peace deal was ratified. Part one uses mostly journalistic 
sources to argue that Republican control of both chambers ensured Congress was 
becoming more aggressive towards both UNPE and Clinton's general foreign policy 
powers. To show this, the section analyses the fate of the Peace Powers Act and the 
National Security Revitalization Act. These bills were blatant attacks on the UNPE 
approach to conflict resolution and contained measures curtailing the president's 
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ability to deploy troops abroad. The bills admittedly failed to pass in the Senate (more 
to do with not constraining the president than supporting UNPE), but the committee 
and floor debates were indicative of what many lawmakers were thinking. 
The analysis in part two of the mid-1995 attempt to force the administration to lift 
the UN-imposed arms embargo is used to examine the attitude of lawmakers to 
presidential power, humanitarian interventions and the UNSC's authority. The section 
details the 1995 floor and committee debates on the embargo, examines the House 
and Senate bills designed to force the president to lift it, and discusses the 
circumstances surrounding the veto. Almost resulting in the overriding of a 
presidential veto, the chapter argues that attempts to break an internationally 
recognised embargo demonstrate how intensely Congress was undermining the 
president's foreign policy making power. 
Part three traces the process towards the December 1995 IFOR deployment to 
Bosnia. The chapter focuses on 1995 because this was the year when the 
administration concluded that only a meaningful threat of military force would check 
Serb aggression. The chapter looks at how this prompted Republicans to redouble 
efforts to prevent the president from sending troops. Also, to bolster the case for an 
assertive Congress, the section argues that the decision to launch a NATO 
peacekeeping, and, crucially, not a UN peace-enforcement, operation was made after 
consultation with lawmakers. Although there was an eventual deployment of US 
troops, Congress and the presidency's reaction to the Bosnian war serves as an 
example of how the UNPE approach discussed in chapter one failed in practice. 
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As with the other cases, the regression tests on key votes on the deployment of 
troops in Bosnia find that partisanship was the strongest variable in the House and 
knowing how conservative a senator was is enough to predict voting behaviour. 
Unlike the other cases, the chapter does not find that most lawmakers did not react to 
the Bosnia crisis. It does, however, find that most did little and that foreign policy 
committee specialists undertook the time-consuming tasks. The chapter then shows 
that representatives were more likely than senators to support Bosnia-related bills 
introduced by party colleagues. 
The thesis concludes by relating the findings in the three case chapters to the main 
themes of the research. It explains that while Congress did not lead US policy, it did 
have an impact on each case: undermining two presidencies interpretations of the 
interbranch relationship. The conclusion also discusses how the cases confirm Hall's 
claim that most lawmakers do not participate in any given issue, but whether 
lawmakers rely entirely on policy experts is questioned. Following on from this, the 
conclusion argues that foreign policy committee specialists framing legislation that is 
supported by party colleagues in the House and those with similar ideological views in 
the Senate goes far in explaining voting behaviour during the three crises. Supporting 
Krehbiel's argument that institutions create committees to improve the division of 
labour, committee specialists supplied most of the legislation around which voting 
majorities converged. 6 This division of labour that emerged with Congress's response 
to the three crises helps explain how lawmakers were able to assert an influence on 
policy when most of them were hardly involved. The research also shows that the 
party leaders and whips were hardly involved in the cases, which, while it does not 
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undermine entirely Cox and McCubbins's argument about leaders encouraging unified 
party voting in the House, leaders and whips were evidently not spending time 
policing the UNPE issues and were instead dealing with matters of more importance 
and interest. 7 
As no explanation is either empirically wholly reliable or worthless, the research 
findings endorse Shepsle and Weingast's suggestion that positive theories of 
congressional behaviour that blend information, committee and party elements each 
offer valuable insights and depict an environment close to the legislature's actual 
policy making process. 8 The conclusion argues that in what Shepsle and Weingast 
refer to as `third generation' theories, Cox and McCubbins's party and Krehbiel's 
committee-centred informational models can both explain much about how collective 
dilemmas are solved through cooperation. 9 
This introductory chapter establishes a rationale for researching Congress's impact 
on UNPE policy and outlines the themes through which the research will test the 
influence of Congress. How UNPE failed to become a lasting aspect of US foreign 
policy reveals much about both the nature of the interbranch relationship and the 
behaviour of individual lawmakers. Each of the case chapters notes hawkish elements 
within the National Security Agency and State Department, and the comparative 
isolationism of the Pentagon, but decision making within the executive branch is not 
systematically analysed in the thesis. However, each case contributes to the 
6 Krehbiel, K, 1991. 
7 Cox, G& McCubbins, M, 1993, p. 83. 
8 Shepsle, K& Weingast, B, 1994. 
9 Ibid. p. 153. 
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understanding of congressional behaviour by uncovering how effective lawmakers are 
in challenging the president, how lawmakers see their foreign policy role and what 
motivates voting decisions on the use of force for humanitarian purposes. 
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Introduction 
As this thesis examines the impact of Congress on the Clinton administration's 
approach to greater US involvement in UN peace-enforcement (UNPE), it is necessary 
to explain UNPE's origins and defend its credibility as a foreign policy tool. In tracing 
its origins, the chapter explains how in the late 1980s the UN both expanded the 
number and type of missions it took on. Also, citing President George H. W. Bush's 
`new world order' (NWO) speeches, it argues that the notion of US-led operations in 
nations peripheral to traditional US interests had already been much-discussed by the 
start of the Clinton presidency. What could be seen as Clinton's version of the NWO- 
assertive multilateralism- was based on the US forming international coalitions to 
reinforce UN efforts to uphold global peace and security. 
The remainder of the chapter defends and contextualises UNPE as a substantive 
phase in foreign policy history. With only a few statements pertaining to it, it is 
difficult to prove that the notion of expanding US involvement in UNPE operations 
was anything more than post-cold war triumphalist rhetoric. However, while foreign 
policy speeches are invariably full of overblown rhetoric, that both Bush and Clinton 
spoke publicly about this new style of conflict resolution lends it some credibility. In 
placing UNPE in historical context, it is argued that the belief that mass human rights 
abuses are a threat to peace and stability was a continuation of cold war principles. 
Forming coalitions to check the spread of instability is analogous to the five-decade 
effort to contain communism. Adapting cold war strategies implies continuity, but, 
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citing Max Boot, section one further asserts that UNPE-style operations- small, 
punitive policing actions- have actually been part of US warfare for two centuries. ' 
Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, Basic Books, 
New York, 2002. 
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Section One: UNPE Policy 
Adopting UN peace enforcement as an approach to conflict resolution was first 
mooted after Desert Storm in 1991 and arguably ended with IFOR in 1995. The UN's 
function and the use of US-led multilateral peace-enforcement for humanitarian 
purposes distinguish this approach from other eras in US foreign policy. The US has 
been connected in some fashion with the UN, global human rights, promotion of 
democracy and the rule of law since 1945 so it would be misleading to portray UNPE 
as an entirely new policy experiment. The US has maintained a role in UN conflict 
resolution since 1995, and there was talk of US-led UNPE actions prior to Desert 
Storm, but it was during this era that a new vision of foreign policy was debated. 
A key factor in framing a UNPE policy in the 1990s was the UN's expanded conflict 
mediation role. With five missions sanctioned between 1988-89, UN peacekeeping 
was increasingly seen as a viable and inexpensive form of policing. 2 In Cambodia, for 
example, the UN was instrumental in securing a peace agreement in October 1991. It 
created the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which had 
the heretofore broadest mandate of any UN operation. UNTAC had mixed fortunes, 
but, with the 1991 Gulf War, the UN attained an unprecedented level of influence 
over global affairs. 
As it was no longer prepared to obstruct the US from carrying out its objectives in 
the UNSC, the decline of the USSR was critical in creating the conditions for 
multilateral interventionism. This is due to two key reasons. First, its economic and 
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political problems forced it to turn inward, permitting the US `far more latitude than 
earlier administrations enjoyed. '3 Second, the withdrawal of Soviet assistance, 
coupled with the latter's escalating debts, eroded the opposition to US power that 
Third World countries had exercised in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). 
Therefore, the end of the cold war provided the UN with opportunities to expand its 
responsibilities beyond the boundaries set by East-West rivalry. As Bush told the 
UNGA, `Not since 1945 have we seen the real possibility of using the United Nations 
as it was designed: as a center for international security. '4 
As well as raising the number of UN missions, this era saw an expansion in the 
types of operations the UN managed. The much-heralded 1992 report, An Agenda for 
Peace, is the UN's most detailed document relating to post-cold war conflict 
resolution. 5 It mentions the creation of a UN standing army and talks about peace- 
enforcement as a function distinct to traditional peacekeeping. The distinction is 
important, but has been discussed more fully elsewhere. 7 Peacekeeping is based on 
Chapter Six of the UN Charter. Here conflicts are settled through pacific negotiation. 
Troop deployments are only carried out after hostilities have ceased and with the 
approval of the formerly warring sides. Its function is to prevent fighting resuming 
long enough to permit implementation of a peace plan. Peacekeepers do not engage 
enemies, but are used to monitor ceasefires and, as in Cambodia and the Golan 
2 For an insider's view of the missions: Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger, John Murray, London, 2002. 
3 Richard Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Force in the Post-Cold War World. Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington D. C. 1999, p. 6. 
4 President Bush, UN General Assembly, October 1,1991. 
5 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace- 
keeping, 1992, http: //w%vw. un. org/Doe/SG/agpeace. html 
6 Ibid. paragraphs 43-44. 
7 For example, Boutros-Ghali, B, 1992. `From Peace-Keeping to Peace-Building' Address by Boutros 
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Heights, control buffer zones. Peace-en forrcenient deployments are sent prior to 
ceasefires, with powers to engage in fighting regardless of the consent of belligerents. 
UNPE was emulating Chapter Seven of the UN Charter in which the UNSC- 
sanctioned force can take any action `as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. ' State sovereignty is sidelined to impose a peace. 
Peace-enforcement is the focus here, with occasional references to peacekeeping and 
UN peace operations (signifying all UN missions) where appropriate. 
Bush and the `New World Order' 
A starting point of Clinton's UNPE policy is Bush's 1990-1993 `new world order' 
speeches that anticipated an expanded commitment to global human rights-8 Although 
Clinton never used the phrase in this context, one cannot explain UNPE without 
reference to his predecessor. Admittedly, analysing the foreign policy styles of two 
administrations as if they were the same is problematic, but, as will be argued, 
continuity is evident. Bush's NWO is distinct from the term used by the anti-federal 
Christian Patriot movement. The phrase is also commonly used to describe the 
changing global system post-1989. It alludes to the triumph of capitalism, economic 
interdependence, technological integration and democracy over command economies, 
as well as sanctioning the rule of international law, peace and prosperity. It points to 
the time since the cold war and does not have any `particular normative content, ' other 
than to distinguish the new order from the old. 9 Although this and Bush's version of 
Boutros-Ghali, Ninth Annual David M. Abshire Lecture, May 13,1992. 
8 The main NWO speeches are: UN General Assembly (1/10/90): State of the Union (29/1/91): 
Maxwell Air Force Base (13/5/91): UN General Assembly (23/9/91) West Point (511/93). 
9 Anthony Arend, `The United Nations and the New World Order, ' Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 18, 
March 1993, pp. 491-535, p. 492. 
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NWO are linked, the latter relates to both a new `correlation of forces' and a new 
form of conflict resolution. 1° It refers to a promise to engage military forces in 
checking aggression in regions of minor strategic interest through UN-sanctioned 
collective security. 
Bush's NWO was an attempt at global management in which the rule of law 
prevailed. " International standards of behaviour enshrined in the UN Charter and the 
1948 Convention on Genocide would be upheld, but how much the US would subject 
itself to these standards was unclear. However, it was promised that America would 
`do its part to strengthen world peace by strengthening international peacekeeping. ' 12 
The `new emphasis on peacekeeping, ' in which the US would `strengthen [its] ability 
to undertake joint peacekeeping operations, ' was an acknowledgement of a moral 
responsibility to work multilaterally through the UN to halt the spread of aggression. 13 
Central to the NWO was the UN's ability to guarantee peace through multilateral 
security. 14 Due to the problems of cold war paralysis in the UNSC, and since the 
proliferation of Third World independent states in the UNGA in the 1960s, the US 
had never found the UN membership to be deferential. But, after the cold war, for the 
`first time in a long time' the United States `assumed the mantle of hegemon' in the 
UN. 15 Bush's `invocation of the [NWO], ' implied that the UN would play a role `not 
10 Ibid., p. 493. 
it See President Bush, `Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf 
January 16,1991. ' US Congress, September 11,1990. 
12 President Bush speech to the UNGA, September 21,1992. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Bruce Russett & James Sutterlin, `The U. N. in a New World Order, ' Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 2, 
Spring 1991, pp. 69-83, p. 75. Multilateralism is defined as political relationships concerned with 
traditional state relations that may or may not include interstate organisations. Robert Cox, 1992. 
15 Robert Gregg, About Face: The United States and the United Nations. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1993 
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only in US foreign policy but in global management generally. ' 16 It was about closer 
US-UN relations and tackling conflict resolution for humanitarian, rather than 
strategic, purposes, but what form the UN would play was never clarified. 
A catalyst was the unexpectedly easy victory against Saddam Hussein, which 
demonstrated that the US could win wars by leading international coalitions, and 
`opened up a new era in UN activities. ' 17 Ultimately, Bush did not win the Gulf War 
solely to strengthen the UN, but the success of the US-led coalition signified that the 
model could be applied elsewhere. It set a precedent for speedy victories, low in costs 
and US casualties. 
Clinton and UNPE: Assertive Multilateralisni 
How committed both administrations were is assessed later, but a slight shift in 
priorities within the Bush administration and an empowered UN set a new tone in 
international conflict resolution in the early 1990s. Opportunities to construct global 
alliances with more emphasis on humanitarianism presented themselves, and this fed 
into the Clinton administration's worldview. 
David Hendrickson says Clinton `signed on to the idea of a "new world order, "' and 
pursued `a considerably more ambitious agenda. "$ Likewise a congressional report 
16 Ibid. p. 135. 
17 Karen Mingst & Margaret Karns, The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era, Westview Press, 
Boulder, 1995, p. 23. 
18 David Hendrickson, `The Recovery of Internationalism, ' Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 4, 
September/October, 1994, pp. 26-43, p. 27. See also Burt Solomon, `Clinton: Three Crises and 
Counting, ' National Journal, October 23,1993, p. 2552. 
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said Clinton's peacekeeping policy was `initially consonant' with that of Bush. 
' 
However, even though Clinton's initial stance in this area emulated Bush's, the claim 
that the new administration continued Bush's NWO needs qualifying. 
Clinton was elected in 1992 on economic issues. As Gregg argues, the economic 
recession `effectively ended any pretence that the 1992 presidential election would be 
about creating a new world order. 20 Hames also questions whether Bush's NWO was 
a `worldview' shared by the Clinton team in 1992 21 Clinton nonetheless signalled 
support for US involvement in UN peace-enforcement operations. He criticised Bush 
during the campaign for not doing enough to prevent ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and 
was more favourable towards a UN standing army. President Clinton also told UN 
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali that he would `find the US a good troop contributing 
nation. '22 Clinton never made grand speeches promising a world policed by a US-UN 
partnership, but the commitment to the UN and human rights suggests that the NWO 
as an organising principle of foreign policy survived the 1992 election. 
The Clinton team looked to `assertive multilateralism' (AM) as its variation on 
Bush's NWO. Associated most closely with UN ambassador, Madeleine Albright, it 
describes a method of UNPE where the US would lead coalition forces. America 
would assert its authority to ensure that even though the onus was shared, operations 
never tailed off into areas beyond US interests. AM has been described as America: 
19 Mark Lowenthal, Peacekeeping in Future US Foreign Policy, Report for Congress, Congressional 
Research Services, Washington, March 21,1994, p. 1. 
20 Gregg, R, 1993, p. 136. 
21 Tim Hames, `Searching for the New World Order: The Clinton Administration and Foreign Policy in 
1993, ' International Relations vol. XII, no. 1, April 1994, pp. 109-127, p. 111. 
22 Boutros-Ghali, B, 1999, p. 71. See also Paul Lewis, 'UN is Developing Control Centre to Coordinate 
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`increasing its reliance on international institutions, rules and 
partnerships.. [to].. better manage transnational problems, spread the burdens of 
world leadership, win legitimacy for its goals and actions and consolidate the 
expanding community of free market democracies. ' 23 
Importantly, AM, like the NWO, was about strengthening UNPE capabilities by 
pledging the US to participate actively in UN peace operations. It was built upon a 
belief that cold war victory was proof that the world was now full of like-minded 
states, and therefore pragmatic problem-solving could occur. As Morton Halperin, 
nominated for the new post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and 
Peacekeeping, said, the US should act through international bodies to `guarantee' 
democracy and should `surrender the right to intervene unilaterally' abroad. 4 
To its critics, AM either implied a failure to use the UN for US purposes (instead 
making the US a UN tool), or it was based on the naive hope that other countries 
would wilfully serve as deputies to America's sheriff. 25 AM quickly disappeared from 
the administration's lexicon, but UNPE policy endured in Presidential Review 
Directive 13 (PRD 13). Originally approved by the NSC in July 1993- and revised in 
Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25)- PRD 13 is revealing in how 
unwavering the new administration was in reinforcing the UN's ability to conduct 
peace-enforcement operations. 6 Its most controversial proposal was the creation of a 
UN rapid reaction force. It met with harsh condemnation from the military, but it 
highlights the level of commitment to an empowered UN mooted at the time. 
Growing Peacekeeping Role, ' Newv York Times, March 28,1993, p. A10. 
23 Patrick, S, 2001, pp. 2-14, p. 2. 
24 John Correll, `Soft Power, ' Air Force Magazine, vol. 77, no. 5, May 1994, Editorial. 
25 Paul Findley, `Uncle Sam Can't Fill U. N. 's Shoes, ' March 1997, p. 20: 
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However, even though Clinton claimed he supported `a new voluntary U. N. rapid 
deployment force, ' it was never seriously contemplated by either administration. 7 As 
well as a rapid reaction force, PRD 13, included, among other aspects, the agreement 
that the US would accept greater UN authority over peacekeeping operations. 
PRD 13 was criticised in the press in June 1993, and discarded by September. 28 In 
late September, Elaine Sciolino reported on a White House meeting in which it was 
decided to redraft PRD 13 after consultation with Congress 29 Folker also notes that 
Congress was a key influence. 30 For example, in response to PRD 13, the House 
Appropriations Committee voted on September 26 to impose constraints on Clinton's 
ability to deploy troops abroad, such as providing notification of logistics and 
objectives. Consequently, as chapter four explains, a more restrained commitment to 
UN operations permeates PDD 25. Combining all these strands, these are the themes 
of early 1990s UNPE operations referred to in the thesis. 
1) UN partnership: Not an equal arrangement, but the UN is given a contributory 
role in peace operations. This could be a UNSC resolution legitimating 
deployments or a joint operation in which US forces establish order, and the UN 
takes responsibility for the long-term peace. This is less about sharing intelligence, 
http: //xvNv%v. Nvashington-report. orglbackissues/0397/9703020. htm. 
26 Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD25), May 1994. 
27 Ruth Marcus, `Bush Endorses Expansion of U. N. Peace-keeping Role, ' Washington Post, September 
21,1992, A15. 
28 R. Jeffrey Smith & Julia Preston, `U. S. Plans Wider Role in U. N. Peace Keeping, ' Washington Post, 
June 17,1993. 
29 Elaine Sciolino, 'US Narrows Terms for Its Peacekeepers, ' New York Times, September 23,1993, 
p. A8. 
30 Jennifer S. Folker, `Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Assertive Multilateralism and Post-Cold War 
Foreign Policy Making, ' in James M. Scott ed. After the End: Making US Foreign policy in the Post- 
Cold War World, Duke University Press, London, 1998, pp. 277-304, p. 284. 
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logistics and command of troops and more about linking UN and US objectives. 
2) Humanitarianism and the pursuit of aggressors: Undertaking military operations 
to check either dictators who abuse their own or foreign citizens, or conflicts 
involving a humanitarian crisis. 
3) US-led UNPE coalitions: Working under Chapter VII rules, the US would respond 
to conflicts peripheral to US strategic interests with a multilateral force. Forces 
would be put in place during conflicts to enforce a peace, rather than after. 
4) Defence of the rule of law and democracy: Promoting international norms of 
behaviour that reflect US values. UNPE policy represents a partial shift in 
sovereignty from the state to the international level through the increased UN 
authority, security, and judicial powers. This did not necessarily mean the US 
would subject itself to UN authority, but it would use violations of supranational 
law as a justification for punitive action. 
5) Swift, resolute action: As only America can put forces on the ground anywhere in 
the world, it would act to prevent humanitarian crises escalating. 
Central to these themes was the importance of human rights, the promotion of 
democracy, and a greater role for the UN in US policy. Legitimating interventions 
through UNSC mandates and using the organisation as a forum to lobby support for 
aggressive action was popular with both presidents. As this combination distinguishes 
UNPE from other eras, the cases are measured by the extent that these factors were 
observed. 
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Section Two: UNPE Policy: Real or Imagined? 
At first glance, UNPE was a radical shift in thinking on the use of force abroad, but, 
as is evident in section one, its existence is largely based on speeches and unpublished 
directives. Neither the NWO nor AM seem to have been taken seriously in the media 
or academia. In the former, prior to the 1992 presidential election the NWO had been 
dismissed as evoking `only cynicism. 31 Similarly, there was the occasional 
disparaging newspaper article about Clinton's approach, but AM was hardly 
mentioned in the media. 32 Bush's NWO and Clinton's AM have hardly been 
mentioned in either the post-cold war US foreign policy or the US-UN literatures, and 
in recent years have been ostensibly discarded as scholarly topics. As a policy, AM 
was incomplete and barely publicised, which explains its fleeting consideration in the 
literature. Jennifer Folker discusses AM's objectives and its eventual demise with 
Somalia and the NATO mission to Bosnia, but her article is more of a discourse on 
Clinton's foreign policy than a systematic analysis of AM. 33 The comparatively better 
known NWO is also hardly touched on. Robert Gregg's About Face, for example, is a 
rigorous investigation of US-UN relations, but the NWO is written-off before the 
1992 presidential election. 4 The UN's post-cold war role has been much discussed, 
but little has been said about the NWO/AM aspects of the US relationship. For 
example, Michael Barnett's excellent review article on the UN and its post-cold war 
31 Anthony Lewis, `Triumph and Tragedy, ' New York Times, September 28,1992, p. A15. For a 
positive view, see Stephen Rosenfeld, `By American Design? ' Washington Post, March 15,1991, 
p. A23: 1. 
32 Evan Thomas, `Playing Globocop, ' Netivsweek, June 28,1993, p. 21. Samuel Francis, `National 
Interests? How Quaint, ' Washington Times, October 1,1993. 
33 Folker, J, S, 1998, pp. 277-304. 
34 Gregg, R, 1993, p. 136. 
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conflict resolution role barely mentions the US. 35 Joseph Nye declares that Bush's 
NWO fits both world order in a realist balance of power sense, and in the idealist 
sense of international law and humanitarian values, but his article says nothing about 
the US role in UN peace operations. 36 Of course, this may be because America 
employing its military power in pursuit of humanitarian goals seemed so unlikely. 
The paucity of research perhaps reflects UNPE's footnote status in US foreign 
policy history, but the issues it raises about congressional and presidential attitudes 
towards international order and humanitarianism make it worth probing. A key 
problem in analysing UNPE is that it is unclear whether it represented a genuine 
rethink of specific aspects of US foreign policy or was simply rhetoric tailored to the 
mood of the time. It is also uncertain what AM meant, what distinguished it from the 
NWO, and how it furthered US interests. AM was talked about as a vague collective 
security model, rather than as a specific plan. 
That there was no comprehensive plan documenting its objectives, nor interagency 
studies conducted raises ontological questions about whether the greater commitment 
to UNPE operations existed beyond a few presidential statements. The lack of a 
blueprint need not have wholly undermined UNPE. Foreign policy making is both 
reactive and unpredictable, and it is tempting for presidents to wax lyrical about their 
global ambitions. However, both Bush and Clinton were prepared to invest political 
capital in an idea that was as much in tune with the `wind of change' spirit as it was at 
odds with the `America first' brand of isolationism that were both popular at the 
35 Michael Barnett, `Bringing in the New World Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United 
Nations, ' World Politics, 49, July 1997, pp. 526-51. 
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time. 37 Also, one should allow for the practice of presidential foreign policy making, 
where formal policy announcements are rare. Neither Bush's nor Clinton's versions 
were intended as detailed, formulaic models for post-cold war intervention. Instead, 
they were ad hoc reactions to crises: what Deibel describes as a `competent drift. 738 
Senior Clinton officials like Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, Anthony Lake and 
Al Gore were advocates of a muscular peacekeeping policy, but even the State 
Department, although much more favourable than the Pentagon, was never firmly 
committed to UNPE 39 Statements within the early Clinton administration were 
equivocal. In a 1991 speech, Clinton called for a UN Rapid Deployment Force to be 
used for `purposes beyond traditional peacekeeping, such as standing guard at the 
borders of countries threatened by aggression; preventing attacks on civilians. '40 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher was more cautious. In his address to the World 
Conference on Human Rights he was noncommittal on the US's function in the UN 
and to what extent the US would work to prevent aggression, and was unambiguous 
on human rights. 1 However, other officials were more sympathetic. Although the UN 
is remarked on only once in a 1993 speech, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake 
stated that the US `should not oppose using our military forces for humanitarian 
36 Joseph Nye, `What New World Order? ' Foreign Affairs, vol. 7 1, no. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 83-96. 
37 For example in a preface entitled `A New World Order' in the National Security Strategy of the 
United States (Washington D. C. 1991), Bush talks about the dangers in the developing world and 
stresses that `for America, there can be no retreat from the world's problems. ' 
38 Terry Deibel, `Bush's Foreign Policy: Mastery and Inaction, ' Foreign Policy, vol. 84, Fall 1991, 
pp. 3-23, p. 22. 
39 For a discussion of the State Department's position on peacekeeping at this time, see Michael 
MacKinnon, The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton: A Fairweather Friend, Frank 
Cass, London, 2000, Chapter 3, especially, pp. 39-45. 
40 Gov. Bill Clinton, `A New Covenant for American Security, ' Address at Georgetown University, 
December 11,1991. 
41 Vienna, June 14,1993. 
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purposes. ' 42 
Another reason it was not mere rhetoric is that involvement in UNPE deployments 
was not about a Pax Americana, with the US playing the world's policeman. UNPE 
conceptualised action beyond mere talk about the changing world, and extended a 
vision of how US power could be engaged in regions of peripheral security interests. 
Central to this vision was the belief that the US should assume a global leadership 
role. However, neither Bush nor Clinton had any intention of solving the entire 
world's conflicts. Nor would it become a hired hand, as in the Gulf War, providing 
military force, paid for by other rich nations. In other words, UNPE thinking was not 
based on unobtainable goals, but was instead grounded in a realistic view of 
America's global abilities. 
The selective nature of America's commitment to UNPE operations may raise 
questions about its legitimacy. However, all collective action is conducted `with due 
consideration to the exigencies of the specific situation, ' and because this new 
thinking was not universally applied does not prove it was `irrelevant as an 
underpinning element of policy. '43 Furthermore, as Boot notes, `there is nothing 
wrong with saving a few people in one place even if you cannot save everybody 
everywhere. A4 
42 Anthony Lake, `From Containment to Enlargement, ' Johns Hopkins University, Washington D. C. 
September 21,1993. See also Frank Wisner, `International Peacekeeping and Peace-Enforcement, ' 
House Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces, July 14,1993, p. 12. 
43 Steven Hurst, `The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration: In Search of a New World Order, ' 
Cassell, London, 1999, p. 132. 
44 Boot, M, 2002, p. 352. 
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That cutting back on military spending was popular in the post-cold war era may 
also undermine claims of a shift towards an expanded conflict resolution role. But, 
as any new foreign policy role for the US remained conditional on other countries 
taking some of the responsibility, a planned reduction in the military is not 
inconsistent with UNPE thinking. 45 Burden sharing in limited conflicts reconciled 
Republican preferences for a large, sparingly used military and Democratic fondness 
for deploying troops but maintaining a small military. This preference for coalitions 
was not intended as chances to get other nations to do America's bidding: it was to 
convince other states that they also had an interest in checking aggression in 
peripheral conflicts. UNPE, like the League of Nations, embodied the idea that 
aggression is a crime against humanity in which every state has an `interest, right 
and duty' to prevent 46 Thus, UNPE was never about surrendering sovereignty to the 
UN or giving other states control of US troops, it was about employing US leverage 
to encourage others to help resolve conflicts. 7 And, as the cases will show, 
domestic support for UNPE deployments was dependent on the perception that the 
UN was not encroaching on US sovereignty or that other nations were not 
contributing. 
Discussing whether UNPE policy was meaningless rhetoric or a coherent strategy is 
helpful, but whether lawmakers took it seriously is of particular importance. Some of 
Bush's NWO speeches were made to Congress, and an extensive report on UNPE was 
presented to lawmakers in March 1991. It describes Congress as an `interested 
45 See Hurst, S, 1999, p. 133. 
46 Ramesh Thakur, `From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: the UN Operation in Somalia, ' The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 32, no. 3,1994, pp. 387-410. p. 389. 
47 Bush said, `The [N\VO] does not mean surrendering our national sovereignty or forfeiting our 
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onlooker, ' but proposed it will become `critically... involved in [the NWO's] 
evolution. A8 Despite the dearth of major documentation, most lawmakers were 
cognisant of it. One Republican who was in the House at the time recalled the NWO: 
`... that was more than just presidential rhetoric. It was about a suggestion of here's 
what we need to be thinking about in the post-cold war era, and in that sense I 
thought that it was good thinking. It represented a reasonable, responsible iteration 
of showing flexibility in our foreign policy. '49 
While not so much with AM, the NWO was mentioned often in Congress during the 
early 1990s. Criticising the NWO, one representative said: 
`To me this is no new world order. This is the same old world ripoff... The United 
Nations, they authorize war. The American people, they pay for it, and then the 
American sons and daughters die. 'so 
In the Senate, Minority Leader, Bob Dole, said, 
`[T]he President has put real meaning- not empty political gestures- into the phrase 
"new world order" I commend the President for his leadership. He is launching a 
new course... that will move us beyond the cold war. 'S1 
These statements indicate that lawmakers were aware of the new world order that 
President Bush was talking about. Although this focuses on one aspect of post-cold 
war foreign policy, it is indicative of the fact that the shift towards greater US 
involvement in UN peace-enforcement operations was often discussed in Congress. 
interests. ' Maxwell (13/5/91). 
48 Stanley Sloane, The US Role in a New World Order: Prospects for George Bush's Global Vision, 
Report for Congress, Congressional Research Services, Washington, 1991, p. 35. 
49 Rep. Jim Kolbe (R- AZ), interview with author January 30,2001. 
50 Rep. James Traficant (D-OH), `Where is the Rest of the World? ' CR, January 10,1991, p. H114. 
51 Sen. Bob Dole (R-KS), Minority Leader, `The President's Proposal, ' CR, September 30,1991, 
p. S 12972. 
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UNPE and `Traditional' American Wars 
UNPE amounted to a serious attempt to rethink foreign policy and was intended as a 
practical approach to America's global commitments. As a strategy it was partly an 
acknowledgement of the US's humanitarian responsibilities and partly immersed in 
traditional notions of power capabilities. Although the thesis perceives UNPE as 
distinct within foreign policy history, evidence rooting it within more traditional 
models further cements its credibility. UNPE was in some ways a new version of cold 
war containment. Both the Truman Doctrine and UNPE envisage an active role in 
checking global instability and promoting free market democracy. At its most 
altruistic, UNPE was a variation on the Truman Doctrine that substitutes preventing 
human rights abuses for communist containment. It assumed that the interests of both 
America and the world were best ensured by the promotion of US values. 52 It was also 
a continuation of the early cold war belief that America should control the behaviour 
of other states. Bush did discourage comparisons with cold war containment, stating, 
`we and our European allies have moved beyond containment to a policy of active 
engagement in a world no longer driven by cold war tensions and animosities. ' 53 That 
said, there is evidence that President Bush was thinking in traditional cold war, rather 
than Kantian, terms in his vision of post-cold war strategy: 
`the cold war's end didn't deliver us into an era of perpetual peace. As old threats 
recede, new threats emerge. The quest for the [NWO] is, in part, a challenge to 
52 See Maxwell, (13/4/91). 
53 Texas A&M University, May 12,1989. Maxwell (13/4/9 1). See Gearoid O'Tuathail, `The Bush 
Administration and the "End" of the Cold War: a Critical Geopolitics of U. S. Foreign Policy in 1989, ' 
Geoforum, vol. 23, no. 4,1992, pp. 437-452, p. 449. 
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keep the dangers of disorder at bay. '54 
Like cold war containment, UNPE philosophy was based on `an unquestioned sense 
of Western superiority, ' in which cold war structures and ideals shifted to other areas 
to `continue the long-standing war against non-compliant regimes in the Third 
World. '55 Indeed, a criticism of UNPE was that it relied too much on old-style 
military methods. 56 
UNPE may seem distinct from cold war strategy, but it was a way of dealing with a 
more dangerous world in which enemies are no longer as divided along politico- 
economic lines and that human rights abuses can now be seen as a threat to 
international security. But, one should not infer that UNPE is a doctrine as significant 
as Truman's, which led to two major wars. A way to view UNPE is as Bush's NWO 
was described: `something less than an official doctrine, ' but more than `irrelevant 
rhetoric. ' 57 
The Small Wars Tradition 
UNPE as a post-cold war containment policy may be plausible, but its humanitarian 
and tactical aspects are problematic, as, arguably, the Powell Doctrine's three 
stipulations were more influential guiding principles in the post-cold war era: 
54 Maxwell (13/4/91). 
55 0 Tuathail, G, 1992, p. 446 and p. 449. See also Jeffrey Lefebvre, `The U. S. Military Intervention in 
Somalia: A Hidden Agenda? ' Middle East Policy, vol. 2, no. 1,1993, pp. 44-62. 
56 Mary McGrory, `Martial Arts, ' Washington Post, January 31,1993, p. 2. 
57 Brinkoetter, S, 1992, p. 69. John Dumbrell, Was There a Clinton Doctrine? President Clinton's 
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The military should only be used when vital interests are threatened. 
Any operation must have the backing of Congress and the public. 
US military force should be overwhelming. 
The type of UNPE operations discussed by Bush and Clinton were not in America's 
vital interests, and thus would be thought unlikely to win popular support. Also, 
UNPE operations were not designed to vanquish adversaries. UNPE seemingly goes 
against the then prevailing view within the foreign policy and military elite. However, 
inserting troops into strategically minor conflicts is common in American history. 
Boot's book disputes the view that small, limited wars (those with objectives over 
than the total annihilation of the enemy) are `non-traditional. ' 58 Full-scale wars- e. g. 
the second world war and the Gulf War- are the exceptions, and that short-term 
policing deployments are more typical in US history. Referring to tactics used and not 
size, such operations, described as `small wars, ' are intended to suppress guerrilla 
forces who refuse to meet armies in the open field. In the 1930s, the Marines 
published the Small Mars Manual, which says, 
`small wars are operations... wherein military force is combined with diplomatic 
pressures in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is 
unstable, inadequate or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life. '59 
Boot argues that the US has never shied away from an activist foreign policy. Citing 
numerous conflicts dating back to the Barbary Wars (1801-05), he shows that most 
military expeditions were executive-led, extremely successful and aimed at punishing, 
Foreign Policy Reconsidered, paper delivered to American Politics Group Annual Conference, 
Lancaster University, January 3-5 2001. 
58 Boot, M, 2002. 
59 Ibid., p. 284. 
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not vanquishing, aggressors. In countless actions over two centuries, US forces have 
become exceedingly proficient in restoring order in minor conflicts. Most historians 
may be preoccupied with big-unit wars, but Boot claims this overlooks the US's vast 
experience employing small-unit, counter-insurgency tactics against guerrilla forces in 
places like Samoa (1899); Haiti (1915-33); and Mexico (1916-17). Put simply, 
imperialist-style policing, which has obvious parallels with UN peace operations, is 
closer to an American way of war than the Powell Doctrine. 
The Powell Doctrine links the use of US troops and interests, but protecting vital 
interests was not always the overriding motive. Even before 1941, US forces were 
used for a variety of humanitarian reasons and not simply when US security interests 
were threatened. Military intervention for the mutual interest of both the US and the 
target country has a long tradition. Fostering greater trade and investment, and not 
exploitation of less-developed countries has often been the intention of policy 
makers. 0 In fact, where the US instigated protracted military interventions- Nicaragua 
(1909-25), Dominican Republic (1916-24), and Haiti- America had relatively few 
economic interests. Furthermore, China received only 1.4 percent of US foreign 
investment, but America still put significant military resources there from 1890-1920. 
Boot claims that business interests were the reasons Great Britain remained active in 
China, but for the US, the missionaries were more important. 61 For humanitarianism, 
Boot lists a number of instances where altruism was the main determinant. For 
example, action in Haiti in 1915 had two goals; keeping Europeans out and alleviating 
the appalling conditions of Haitians. It was not about protecting US business interests, 
60 Ibid., pp. 139-140. 
61 Ibid., p. 278. 
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which were unaffected by the revolution. 62 
Boot further argues that the use of US forces as nation-builders and soldiers as 
social workers- a ubiquitous criticism of UN peacekeeping- is nothing new. America's 
participation in small wars has commonly included an occupying force undertaking 
administrative work. Boot contends that the US has been interfering in the internal 
affairs of other countries since William Eaton, American envoy to Tunis, attempted to 
replace the pasha of Tunisia with his pro-American brother during the 1805 Tripolitan 
War. 63 Admittedly, most 19th Century uses of the military could be described as 
`butcher and bolt' operations. This refers to punitive expeditions in which a few 
troublesome natives are killed to quell unrest, prior to US forces swiftly escaping 
immersion into local politics. As the cases will show, this has obvious parallels with 
UNPE thinking; the US military would undertake the butcher and bolt role and the 
UN would carry out the long-term administrative role. 
As well as national interest and nation-building issues, the other tenets of the Powell 
Doctrine are removed from the realities of what Americans have long been prepared 
to endure. Rather than carefully dodging conflicts, America has always had an 
`idealistic impulse... for going to war. 64 Small wars had been fought with minimal 
public support prior to Vietnam: mass public support is normally needed only for 
major wars. 65 That Vietnam represents America's first experience of the dangers of 
entering wars without an exit strategy is debunked: troops were posted to Haiti for 
62 Ibid., p. 160. 
63 Ibid., p. 339. 
64 Ibid., p. 340. 
65 For example, the 1915 Haitian deployment passed by with few Americans noticing. 
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nineteen years, Nicaragua for sixteen years and for over a century in China. 66 Lastly, 
Boot mentions that small wars have involved foreign command of US troops (e. g. 
Samoa (1899) and Russia (1918-19)). 67 
The Powell Doctrine is typical of a belief within the modem armed forces that small 
policing wars waste resources. After 1945, the US Army preferred to avoid both the 
small wars constraints in means and ends and the fighting of non-professional 
combatants. As Boot says, `most military services conceive their role in big 
terms... annihilating the armed forces of the enemy. '68 But, it is a misconception that 
the American way of war is the overwhelming use of troops defending America's vital 
interests. Boot does not fully explain how politicians and the military can employ the 
Small Mars Manual techniques in the future, but he implies throughout that the types 
of conflicts the US participated in during the post-Gulf War era were far from 
unprecedented. Indeed, short-term constabulary deployments are arguably America's 
approach to warfare. Since Vietnam, the US has used deadly force in over twenty 
countries that were broadly endorsed by the public. Therefore, regardless of the 
Powell Doctrine, the resemblance between conflicts discussed in Boot's book and 
UNPE suggests that the small wars model is an habitual practice. As such it is no 
surprise that Bush and Clinton verged towards this model when the US was rethinking 
its role in the post-1989 world. The Powell Doctrine is central to comprehending post- 
Vietnam foreign policy, but the objective and method of UNPE are more embedded 
than previously thought. 
66 Ibid., p. 337. 
67 Ibid., p. 341. 
68 Ibid., p. 283. 
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Statements from both administrations imply that a humanitarian commitment to 
regions of peripheral security was not entirely disingenuous, and that it was noted in 
Congress enhances its credibility. Even if evidence of the sincerity of UNPE is 
disputed, its principles are not disconnected from traditional approaches to warfare, as 
fighting the spread of instability had cold war echoes and the method of punitive 
policing actions is hardly new. 
Conclusion 
This chapter explains how US foreign policy was reconsidered after the cold war. It 
has discussed the moment in the early 1990s when it seemed a humanitarian global 
order was attainable. Buoyed by the end of the cold war and the Gulf War victory, 
Bush (and later Clinton) alluded to a wider role in UNPE operations in which the US 
would protect human rights and the international rule of law. Mandated by UNSC 
resolutions, the US military would be deployed to check violence and establish norms 
of international behaviour in the post-cold war world. 
In the second section, UNPE policy is defended as an organising principle of foreign 
policy and its place within US history is explored. It is argued that the nature of 
foreign policy generally precludes detailed forward planning and that UNPE's 
vagueness is partly due to that. The chapter also explains that UNPE's equating of 
mass human rights abuses with threats to global peace is a variation on cold war 
strategy as controlling stability replaced communist containment. Citing Boot, it is 
also argued that UNPE operations were planned as small policing actions, which have 
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been features of US warfare for many decades. Contrary to the Powell Doctrine, the 
US has long been mixed up in small-scale deployments for reasons other than the 
US's strategic and economic interests. 
Placing UNPE within the institutional context, chapter two will introduce reasons 
why Congress was both inclined towards and effective in opposing this new thinking 
on foreign policy. Chapter three will begin the process of assessing UNPE in relation 
to the other theme of the research: what motivated individual lawmakers a foreign 
policy issues and how much effort they were prepared to make. Finally, focusing on 
Congress, the case chapters will detail and evaluate how the principles of UNPE were 
dismantled. 
Chapter One: Post-Cold War UN Peace-Enforcement 41 
Chapter Two: Congress and the Presidency 
Introduction 
This chapter concentrates on the institutional dimension of the thesis's examination 
of the failure of UNPE. As Congress and the presidency are the main foreign policy 
making branches, this chapter analyses their relationship, and advances reasons why 
efforts to widen US involvement in UN peace-enforcement operations inevitably 
struggled in the post-cold war Congress. The chapter firstly reviews the interbranch 
foreign policy making literature, and argues that the two presidencies theory wrongly 
assumes that lawmakers merely acquiesce in presidential directives. Aligning with the 
view that Congress is assertive in foreign policy, the chapter claims that lawmakers 
have more powers than budgetary and statutory constraints on the executive. The 
chapter discusses the importance of non-legislative tools, and argues that lawmakers 
employ a number of informal powers, such as speeches, letters, hearings, and 
gathering information, to signal support for or disapproval of executive policy. 
The chapter then illustrates reasons why broadening participation in UNPE 
operations would inevitably lead to struggle by showing how partisan, ideological and 
assertive the House and Senate were in foreign policy and use of force floor votes 
between 1987-2000. Three specific points are made. Firstly, that congressional voting 
on foreign policy issues between 1992 and 1995 can be partisan and ideological. 
Secondly, that intraparty and ideological cohesion is strong for both Republicans and 
Democrats, but slightly, more so for the former. Thirdly, the voting statistics underpin 
claims of Republicans actively objecting to humanitarian actions. Overall, this chapter 
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is used to introduce the main debates in the extant Congress-presidency literature and 
advance the argument that Congress, while not the dominant foreign policy partner, 
does not simply rubber stamp executive branch decisions. It uses the statistical tests 
on general foreign and use of force policy to present an image of Congress as a 
partisan, ideological and assertive institution that can then be explored and tested 
further in the cases. 
Congress and the Presidency 
The interbranch foreign policy making literature is concerned mostly with 
competition for control, with historical eras defined in relation to Congress's relative 
influence. ' There is, however, broad agreement that the president is the predominant 
power, and certainly during the cold war it was widely accepted that foreign policy 
was a presidential domain. Strong leadership was thought an effective response to 
threats, and so Congress was largely reverential. 
The president as the national leader and commander-in-chief is simply better 
positioned to lead, with the parochial Congress more suited to social and economic 
matters. Supreme Court rulings (e. g. Curtiss Wright 1936 and Chadha 1983) 
reinforced such thinking, but the Vietnam debacle discredited president-centred 
foreign policy, prompted reforms and encouraged greater partisanship and interbranch 
1 Thomas E. Mann, A Question of Balance: The President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy, 
Brookings Institute, Washington, 1990. For an overview of the congressional-presidential relations 
literature, see James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics`of U. S. Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1994a, ch. 1. 
2 Edward Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, New York University Press, 1957. Paul Light, 
The President's Agenda, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1982. For an opposing view, see 
Thomas Frank & Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress, Oxford University Press, 1979. 
Chapter Two: Congress and the Presidency 43 
rivalry. 3 The reforms in the 1970s created a more egalitarian institution; taking control 
away from the leadership and committee chairs. The new Congress has been criticised 
for its emphasis on `particularistic interests, ' but it did usher in a new era. With 
increased staff and improved access to information, the legislature became better 
equipped at challenging the president. This and the subsequent cold war victory 
reinvigorated consideration of Congress's role in foreign policy making. 4 Research 
commonly found that Congress was now more partisan and less deferential. 5 There 
was also a sense that lawmakers should have more input. As Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA) 
said: 
`Today, the time element is not the same as it was during the cold war. There is a 
perception that there's more time for decision-making... and that inevitably means 
that Congress is going to be much more involved than in the past. '6 
As mentioned, the collapse of communism encouraged consideration of a resurgent 
Congress. Congress had certainly had its battles with the executive; most notably 
during the Vietnam War and the Iran-Contra Scandal. The cold war meant many 
foreign endeavours were presumed justified, but, after 1989, such sacrifices were 
viewed as an `intolerable burden. '7 Also, the prominence of such issues as 
immigration and drug smuggling that straddle both the domestic and international 
3 Hrach Gregorian, `Assessing Congressional Involvement in Foreign Policy: Lessons of the Post 
Vietnam Era, ' Review of Politics, vol. 46, no. 1, January 1984, pp. 91-112. 
4 For a detailed review of the Congress literature during the early 1990s, see James Lindsay & Randall 
Ripley, `Foreign and Defense Policy In Congress: A Research Agenda for the 1990s, ' Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 3, August 1992, pp. 417-447. 
5 Gordon Jones & John Marini, The Imperial Congress: Crisis in Separation of Powers, Heritage 
Foundation, Washington, 1988. Michael E. Smith, `Congress, the President, and the Use of Military 
Force: Cooperation or Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era, ' Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 1, 
Winter 1998, pp. 36-58. 
6 Quoted in Melvin Small, Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U. S. 
Foreign Policy, 1789-1994, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996, p. 168-9. 
7 Ronald Steel, `The Domestic Core of Foreign Policy, ' Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: 
Insights and Evidence, Eugene Wittkopf & James M. McCormick eds. Rowman & Littlefield, Oxford, 
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sphere, the disparity between foreign commitments and resources, and that the victory 
was not followed by a peace dividend meant the public would be more tolerant of 
confrontational lawmakers. 8 The resurgent Congress is discussed later, but the 
following looks at the two presidencies theory. 
Two Presidencies Theory 
`In the nineties we were doing little more than minor harassment of a president 
mostly for political purposes to cover our rear ends to show that we had some 
problems with what the president was doing. '9 
This staffer's quote is a reminder that Congress is widely perceived to have 
remained passive and reactive since 1989. Indeed, the idea that presidents enjoy 
greater foreign policy success has been popular since Wildavsky's Two Presidencies 
article. 10 This view has two key tenets: that the president has more effective foreign 
policy powers than Congress, and that while Congress has not inconsiderable powers, 
it rarely, if ever, employs them productively. 
American history is littered with instances of presidents circumventing Congress. 
Small, for example, argues that ethnic, economic and political groups can contribute 
to foreign policy, but history is full of executive-led endeavours. 11 From the earliest 
days of the Republic, presidents sent troops abroad without consulting Congress. In 
1999, pp. 22-32, p. 23. 
8 Lindsay, J, 1992-93, pp. 626-629. 
9 Interview with Winslow T. Wheeler: Senior Analyst for National Defense: United States Senate 
Committee on the Budget, Washington D. C., January 25,2001. 
10 Wildavsky, A, 1966. See also Lee Sigelman, `A Reassessment of the `Two Presidencies' Thesis, ' 
Journal of Politics, vol. 41, no. 4,1979, pp. 1 195-206. 
11 Small, M, 1996. On the president's role in 19th Century use of force; see David Gray Adler, The 
Constitution and Presidential Warmaking: The Enduring Debate, ' Political Science Quarterly, vol. 103, 
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1801, while Congress was out of session, Jefferson ordered a blockade of the Barbary 
States, and in 1804 approved a mission to depose the Pasha of Tripoli. This was the 
first time US forces deposed a foreign power, yet Congress was not informed. In 
1900, McKinley approved the use of 5,000 troops as part of the multinational force 
suppressing the Boxer Rebellion without consulting Congress, and, more recently, 
Nixon secretly ordered planes to bomb Cambodia. 
Consistent with these examples, there are those who contend that the executive's 
post-cold war control has `remained largely intact. ' 12 Louis Fisher argues that Haiti 
and Bosnia were president-led, and that `Congress... not only fails to fight back but 
even volunteers in surrendering fundamental legislative powers, including the war 
powers, and the power of the purse. ' 13 Hinckley has produced one of the most 
thorough recent works in this area. Hinckley argues that Congress expanded its 
foreign policy activity in the 1970s, but soon fell back to its pre-War Powers level. 14 
She shows that Congress's influence in trade, intelligence, arms sales, foreign aid, and 
use of force declined between 1961 and 1991. Substantive legislation remains at about 
eight bills per year in the House and three in the Senate, with similar figures for 
funding legislation. 15 Even hearings are written off as nothing more than `cueing 
no. 1, Spring, 1988, p. 1-36. 
12 Paul E. Peterson, `The President's Dominance in Foreign Policy Making, ' Political Science 
Quarterly vol. 109, no. 2,1994, pp. 215-234, p. 225. 
13 Louis Fisher, `Without Restraint: Presidential Military Initiatives form Korea to Bosnia, ' Domestic 
Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence. Eugene Wittkopf & James M. McCormick 
eds. Rowman & Littlefield, Oxford, 1999, pp. 141-155, p. 153. William Banks & Jeffrey Straussman, `A 
New Imperial Presidency? Insights from U. S. Involvement in Bosnia, ' Political Science Quarterly, vol. 
114, no. 2,1999, pp. 195-217. 
14 Hinckley, B, 1994. 
15 `Substantive legislation' includes relations with other countries, intelligence activities and 
commitments abroad, but not, for example, defence procurements, immigration or appropriations bills 
that make no substantive changes. 
Chapter Two: Congress and the Presidency 46 
executive branch officials as to what matters the members are concerned with. ' 16 
Indeed, all oversight activities are merely a substitute for legislation that lawmakers 
know cannot win. Hinckley insists that there is an `illusion of activity' in which, far 
from struggling for control of foreign policy, the two branches pick `issues carefully 
and sparely with a large remainder left untended. ' 17 Arguing that lawmakers avoid 
blame and are inclined to defer to the president, she claims debates are symbolic, that 
most statements are under one minute, supportive of the president and rarely about 
troop deployments. 18 
War Powers, Hinckley contends, is a rare exception to an otherwise passive 
Congress, which only succeeded because of the freak combination of Vietnam, 
Watergate and a divided government. 19 It has rarely been the case that the executive 
branch produces a report on the use of force, and the implementation of the sixty-day 
rule even rarer still. Most post-War Powers uses of force have involved scant 
consultation, and, as with Carter's 1980 botched Iran hostages rescue mission, 
undertaken after the order has been given. As such, Hinckley's two presidencies 
interpretations of interbranch relations is correct in placing the executive branch at the 
apex of foreign policy making, but she underestimates Congress's legislative and non- 
legislative functions. Relative to the domestic realm, the president has supplementary 
foreign policy powers, but, as is discussed next, Congress has powers beyond those 
bestowed on it by the framers. 
16 Ibid., p. 97. 
17 Ibid., p. 19. 
18 Ibid., p. 95. 
19 Ibid., p. 87. For more criticism of War Powers, see Robert Zutz, `The Recapture of the S. S. 
Mayaguez: Failure of the Consultation Clause of the War Powers Resolution, ' International Law and 
Politics, vol. 8, no. 3,1976, pp. 457-78. 
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Resurgent Congress 
Hinckley's two presidencies theory claims that while lawmakers may have extensive 
constitutional, budgetary and political powers, they are reluctant to employ them in 
foreign policy. The need to attain winning coalitions and avoid presidential vetoes 
encourages weak legislation. Hinckley dismisses all non-binding resolutions, 
substantive legislation with escape clauses, and grandstanding in the media and op-ed 
articles. 0 Such thinking presumes two points: 
1) Congress is only assertive when it opposes the president. 
2) Congress's only meaningful role is binding legislation. 
Critics think that to be authoritative a lawmaker should disagree with the executive. 
This equates assertiveness solely with confrontation (as if there is perpetually a 
congressional viewpoint diametrically opposed to all executive policy), which 
fundamentally misunderstands congressional policy making. Assertiveness can be one 
group successfully lobbying the president to do something neither he nor another 
group of lawmakers want to do. Influence can also be in the shape of a group in 
agreement with the president that persuades him to resist an entrenched congressional 
opposition. In fact, with any foreign policy issue there will be groups in Congress 
concurring with the president's position, and some opposing it who form alliances 
20 Non-binding legislation includes simple and concurrent resolutions that do not require presidential 
action. Binding legislation are bills, joint resolutions and amendments that require the executive to act. 
Chapter Two: Congress and the Presidency 48 
with dissenters within the executive branch . 
21 Especially when the executive is 
uncommitted, the notion of a proactive institution becomes irrelevant, and is instead 
about assertive groups within Congress. Critics also believe that all legislation should 
be mandatory. Assertiveness can entail budgetary and statutory constraints to compel 
the executive to take action it would not otherwise have done, but it can, more 
benignly, mean evidence of congressional leverage. Assertiveness is variously 
manifested: codetermining legislation, policy advising, scrutinising executive branch 
actions, setting parameters (i. e. creating procedures with which future executive 
actions must comply), or simply putting congressional opposition on record. 
Congress does sporadically challenge the president. Lindsay, for example, explains 
how Congress blocked a series of Reagan's defence programmes, such as the 
development of MX missiles and applied extensive restrictions on policy towards El 
Salvador and Nicaragua. 2 These examples expand the notion of an assertive Congress 
beyond the confines of substantive legislation, and accept that lawmakers initially try 
non-legislative, indirect routes, but, if necessary, will pursue the legislative option. It 
is not about control, it is about monitoring actions and punishing non-compliance with 
delegated procedures. 
New Institutionalism and Anticipated Reactions 
As only using substantive legislation to assess congressional ability to restrict 
21 Lindsay, J, 1994a, p. 7. On issue networks, Jeremy Rosner, The New Tug-of-War: Congress, the 
Executive Branch and National Security, Carnegie Endowment, Washington, 1995, p. 16. See also Hugh 
Heclo, `Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment, ' Anthony King ed. The New American 
Political System, AEI Press, Washington, 1978, pp. 87-124. 
22 Lindsay, J, 1992-93, p. 609. 
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presidential adventurism tells a partial story, the thesis looks to a model that 
acknowledges the importance of policy procedures and potential hostility. Emerging 
in the mid-1980s, new institutionalism argues that Congress exercises authority more 
through process than policy. 23 This can entail creating posts within executive 
agencies, enfranchising new groups into the decision-making process, or creating rules 
and procedures. These are designed to deter non-compliance rather than directly 
determine or challenge policy. Thus, focusing on process and not policy is not an 
abdication, but instead affords `opportunities to influence the development or 
implementation of policy. '24 
It is tempting to apply the new institutionalist approach to the case chapters 
investigated. As neither chamber passed much substantive legislation challenging 
executive decisions in the area of UNPE, it can be argued that those decisions were 
influenced earlier in the procedural process bolsters a Congress-focused study. 
However, even though the cases were littered with demands for reports on mission 
plans and exit strategies, Congress created an Inspector General at the UN, and PDD 
25 was written after consultation with Congress, the executive's approach to UNPE 
was relatively new, and so procedural elements were not in place. In fact, the new 
institutionalist approach presents problems for the analysis of foreign policy. Higher 
monitoring and punishing costs, its secretive nature, and the courts' deference to the 
executive make it more difficult to affect policy. 25 
23 Matthew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, `Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrol 
versus Fire Alarms, ' American Journal of Political Science, vol. 28,1984, pp. 165-179. See also, Morris 
P. Fiorina, `Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power, ' 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 2,1986, pp. 33-51. 
24 Lindsay, J, 1992-93, p. 617. 
25 Lindsay, J, 1994, p. 282. 
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More appropriate to the UNPE issue, within the new institutionalist tradition, 
articles appeared from the mid-1990s that further broadened congressional policy 
making analysis. Lindsay, for example, argues that lawmakers are adept at `framing' 
issues (such as demanding reports and making speeches) to attract public and 
administration attention. 6 Even failed legislation can send a message, as it can 
`highlight the perceived ill of the administration. '27 Scott offers a typology showing 
more avenues to congressional leverage than direct, enforceable legislation. 28 
Lawmakers can guide foreign policy through two types of legislation: directly (issue 
specific legislation, appropriations and War Powers), or indirectly (non-binding 
resolutions, appointments and procedural legislation). Non-legislative methods of 
lobbying the executive can also be employed: directly (advice, letters and hearings), 
and indirectly (petitioning the public and contacting foreign governments). 29 Eileen 
Burgin also dismisses allegations of an impotent, inconsistent, myopic and election- 
obsessed Congress. 0 She argues that Congress is not dictatorial, but is able to 
influence policy through informal advice and consultation with the executive branch, 
dealings with foreign governments, public appeals through the press, hearings, floor 
statements, letters and lawsuits. 
Anticipated reaction is another overlooked congressional power. 31 To avoid losing 
26 Lindsay, J, 1994a, pp. 132-138. 
27 Ibid., p. 133. 
28 Scott, J, 1997. 
29 Ibid., p. 49. 
30 Eileen Burgin, `Assessing Congress's Role in the Making of Foreign Policy, '- Congress 
Reconsidered, Lawrence Dodd & Bruce Oppenheimer eds. Congressional Quarterly, Washington, 
1997, pp. 293-323, pp. 300-301. 
31 Lindsay, J, 1992-93, pp. 613-616. Burgin, E, 1997, p. 298. Scott, J, 1997, pp. 63-65. 
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credibility, presidents will foresee disapproval, and modify proposals accordingly. It is 
not necessarily congressional legislation but the threat of it that forces the executive to 
reconsider policy. Scott divides this into two groups. Signalling, which involves 
grandstanding methods to ensure change without directly challenging policy, such as 
speeches, media appearances, letters, hearings and non-binding resolutions warning 
the executive of potential dissension. Conditioning, which supposes that, based on 
previous congressional action, the executive pre-empts opposition by formulating 
suitable policy. For example, expecting Senate hostility to funding the Sentinel 
missile, Nixon adopted the Safeguard system instead. 32 Evidence of anticipated 
reactions is anecdotal, and its success can depend on the resources a lawmaker has, 
the intensity of support in the executive, and whether it entails a reversal or 
refinement of policy. However, it acknowledges that lawmakers will avoid imposing 
legislation, preferring to use informal pressures. 
New institutionalism and the informal tools emphasise the point that binding, 
substantive legislation is not the only measure of congressional influence. Reminding 
the executive that it is being monitored and insisting on reports and rules brings the 
executive more closely into line with congressional preferences. As a concession to 
Hinckley's two presidencies theory, it is fair to say that simply because Congress has 
powers it does not mean it will utilise them, but when presidents want to use troops 
abroad, they must expect some opposition. 33 
32 Lindsay, J, 1994a, p. 94. 
33 Hinckley, B, 1994. 
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Congressional Partisanship and Assertiveness 
It has been suggested that party has had little meaning in Congress since the 
Progressive era. 34 Parties have purportedly failed for more than a century to mobilise 
opinion in a manner comparable to the 19th Century. Even the New Deal coalition 
was allegedly nothing more than a `brief wrench' in the long-term decay. 35 This, 
however, underestimates the extent of partisanship in foreign policy. For example, 
Prins and Marshall use House roll call votes to examine bipartisan support for 
presidential foreign policy between 1953 and 1998. Consistent with the view that 
congressional influence on foreign policy has increased in recent years, they find that 
presidents have enjoyed less bipartisan foreign policy support since the 1970s. 36 
There have recently been challenges, employing various methodologies, to the 
notion of a deferential Congress. George Edwards (unlike Wildavsky, who uses only 
key votes) included all foreign policy votes between 1953 and 1986 in which the 
president's position was known and found no evidence of deference. 7 Empirical 
research also shows that while political foreign policy was low during the first two 
decades of the cold war, it intensified after the Vietnam war. For example, James 
Meernick measures all relevant foreign and defence policy voting between 1947 and 
34 Joel, H Silbey, `Foundation Stones of Present Discontents: The American Political Tradition, ' 
Present Discontents: American Politics in the Very Late Twentieth Century ed. Byron Shafer, Chatham 
House, Chatham, 1997, pp. 1-30. 
35 Ibid., p. 22 
36 From 1953 to 1973 mean House support for the president on foreign policy was 49 percent, between 
1973 and 1998, support fell to 22 percent. Brandon C. Prins & Bryan W. Marshall, `Congressional 
Support of the President: A Comparison of Foreign, Defense, and Domestic Policy Decision Making 
during and after the Cold War, ' Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 3 1, no. 4, December 2001, pp. 660- 
678, p. 668. Smith, M, E, 1998. 
37 George Edwards, At the Margin: Presidential Leadership in Congress, Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1989. 
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1988 and concludes that presidential support dramatically declined. 38 Representatives 
supported Eisenhower on 68.3 percent of foreign policy bills, but this shrank to 24.7 
percent with Reagan (72.2 to 42.1 percent in the Senate). 39 
The disappearance of a unifying threat and the growing prevalence of economic 
issues has meant political foreign policy was more commonplace during the first few 
years after the end of the cold war. 40 For example, Hastedt and Eksterowicz claim that 
1994-95 foreign policy voting was the worst showing for a president for fifty years 4' 
Schraufnagel and Shellman find mixed evidence of additional presidential deference 
in foreign policy relative to domestic policy. 42 Based on analysis of key votes between 
1984 and 1998, presidents can expect more support on domestic policy, but do better 
with foreign policy on non-unanimous and non-intermestic votes 43 Opposition party 
support for the president is one measure of presidential dominance, which they claim 
is inconsistent 44 
Empirical research shows examples of increased partisanship and less deference 
since 1989, but, although the congressional-executive relationship was more 
38 James Meernick, `Presidential Support in Congress: Conflict and Consensus on Foreign and Defense 
Policy, ' Journal of Politics, vol. 55, no. 3, August 1993, pp. 568-587, p. 572. 
39 Ibid. 
40 James McCormick & Eugene Wittkopf, `Bipartisanship, Partisanship and Ideology in 
Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947-1988, ' Journal of Politics. vol. 52,1990, 
pp. 1077-1100. James McCormick, Eugene Wittkopf & David M. Danna, `Politics and Bipartisanship at 
the Water's Edge: A Note on Bush and Clinton, ' Polity, vol. 30, no. 1, Fall 1997, pp. 133-149. 
41 Glenn Hastedt & Anthony Eksterowicz, `Presidential Leadership and American Foreign Policy: 
Implications for a New Era, ' in Wittkopf E& McCormick, J eds. 1999, pp. 123-139, pp. 135-136. 
42 Scot Schraufnagel & Stephen Shellman, The Two Presidencies, 1984-98: A Replication and 
Extension, ' Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 3 1, no. 4, December 2001, pp. 699-707. 
43 Ibid., p. 703. Key votes are those cited in Congressional Quarterly Almanac as major votes. Non- 
unanimous is the same as conflictual votes. Non-intermestic votes are either clearly domestic or foreign 
policy, rather than those, such as trade, which straddle both realms. 
44 Ibid., p. 704. 
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aggressive after 1989, it was not a radical shift. Wittkopf and McCormick use cross- 
sectional, time series measures of House foreign policy roll call votes to show that the 
cold war victory did not prompt new ideological preferences or role responsibilities. 
They argue that the 1990s `witnessed greater discord between Congress and the 
presidency than previously, but it has not dramatically altered the framework within 
which the government decides. AS Nevertheless, as the next part shows, whether more 
so than before 1989, UNPE was developing in an antagonistic political climate 
between the two branches. 
UNPE Related Voting: Partisanship, Ideology and Assertiveness 
Lindsay and Ripley complain that there is no general theory of congressional foreign 
policy activity, but assembling one is problematic as there are different types. 6 As 
roles and risks vary, measures of congressional assertiveness can only be informative 
on certain issues. Consequently, rather than build a wholesale congressional foreign 
policy model, this section explores voting behaviour more appropriate to the case 
chapters. Four specific hypotheses about congressional voting during the UNPE era 
(1992-1995) are tested. The hypotheses argue that comparative to the years between 
1987/8 to 1991 and 1996 to 2000, during the UNPE era: 
-Congress was more conservative. 
-Congress was more partisan. 
-Republicans and Democrats were less supportive of Clinton than Reagan or Bush. 
45 Eugene Wittkopf & James McCormick, `Congress, the President, and the End of the Cold War: Has 
Anything Changed? ' Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 42, no. 4, August 1998, pp. 440-466, p. 457. 
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-Republican opposition to use of force abroad was more unified than Democratic 
support. 
The analysis is derived from over 500 foreign policy roll calls in which the 
president's support or opposition was recorded by Congressional Quarterly between 
1987 and 2000.47 The large amount of votes means that regression measures of a 
range of variables on individual votes (as used in the case chapters) are impractical in 
this chapter. Instead, the statistical tests below are only basic percentage calculations 
of all relevant votes that are then grouped together into individual years. This 
admittedly represents a limited investigation of voting behaviour. However, the 
statistical measures are merely used to illustrate partisan and ideological trends over 
thirteen years. The relative strength of partisanship and ideology in relation to other 
variables will be examined in more detail on relevant roll calls in the case chapters, 
but the simplified models serve the purpose here. 
Liberal-Conservative Voting 
As post-cold war thinking on UNPE embodied a humanitarian-led foreign policy in 
which US military resources are allocated to UN peace operations, it is in principle 
more likely to find ready support among liberals than among conservatives. During 
the 1990s, opposition to working with the UN and the use of US military force in 
regions of relatively little strategic importance was generally found among lawmakers 
with conservative voting records. Therefore, one way of gauging congressional 
46 Lindsay, J& Ripley, R, 1992. 
47 CQ did not publish detailed records of presidential support votes prior to 1987. 
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support for UNPE would be to measure how liberal or conservative lawmakers were 
on foreign policy issue. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 trace the mean liberal-conservative 
percentages on all representatives' and senators' foreign policy votes between 1987 
and 2000 (which covers the UNPE era and provides before and after comparisons). 
The percentages are taken from the National Journal annual calculation of each 
lawmaker's conservative and liberal foreign policy voting. For example, Rep. Ben 
Gilman (R-NY), International Relations Committee Chairman, voted the liberal 
position on 21 percent and conservative on 72 percent of 1996 foreign policy votes. 
All the liberal percentages for every lawmaker are added together to find an average 
score for each year. For comparison, the exercise is repeated for conservative voting. 
Fig 2.1 Representatives' Aggregate Mean Liberal-Conservative Scores on Presidential 
Foreign Policy Roll Call Votes, 1987-2000 
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Fig. 2.2 Senators' Aggregate Mean Liberal-Conservative Scores on Presidential Foreign 
Policy Roll Call Votes, 1987-2000 
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Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the annual mean liberal and conservative voting scores for 
all representatives and senators between 1987-2000. For example, figure 2.1 reveals 
that in 1993 representatives on average chose the conservative position on 52 percent 
of foreign policy votes in which the president's position is known and liberal on 44 
percent. The figures show that conservative foreign policy voting increases in both 
chambers during the UNPE era (1992-95). The gap between conservative and liberal 
voting in the House is more noticeable, but in each chamber the 1992-1995 era 
includes the highest level of conservative voting. Furthermore, while not noted in 
figure 2.1. and 2.2, Republicans in both chambers are on average more conservative 
than Democrats are liberal, and less liberal than Democrats are conservative. Between 
1987 and 2000, House Republicans voted conservative on average on 71 percent of 
foreign policy votes, and liberal on 22 percent. Democratic results are 70 percent 
liberal and 27 percent conservative. Republican senators record 71 percent 
conservative and 22 percent liberal scores, with Democrats reaching only 67 percent 
Chapter Two: Congress and the Presidency 58 
liberal and 24 percent conservative. The distance overall between liberal and 
conservative voting is admittedly not huge: even at its peak in the House (1993) 
aggregate mean conservative voting is only eight percentage points higher than the 
mean liberal score. Nevertheless, figures 2.1 and 2.2 suggest that attempts to expand 
US involvement in UN peace-enforcement operations occurred at a time when 
Congress was comparatively more conservative. 
Higher levels of conservative voting on foreign policy issues in the House and 
Senate are detectable during the UNPE era, but one reason House conservative voting 
is not much higher is because the figures are made up of 390 Democrats and 341 
Republicans. This gives an advantage to the liberal scores. These results are 
nevertheless more telling when considering the context of the time. After 1989 there 
appeared to be greater global cooperation and more altruism within the US foreign 
policy community towards the UN and the resolution of secondary conflicts. It is 
worth considering, then, that in an era when liberal goals such as a standing UN army 
were believed achievable by senior executive branch officials, aggregate foreign 
policy voting in the House and Senate was, albeit slightly, more conservative. 
Partisanship 
One would assume that increased conservative voting would make it difficult for 
UNPE to develop as a foreign policy doctrine, but for UNPE to succeed it also 
required lawmakers to stand by the president regardless of their party as well as their 
ideological leanings. Figures 2.4 to 2.10 test for this, with 2.3 to 2.6 measuring 
partisanship. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 calculate partisan differentiation (PD) on foreign 
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policy issues between 1988-2000. Party differentiation is measured firstly by 
calculating the sum of the percentage of one party voting for a bill and the percentage 
of the other party voting against the bill. Then the sum of the percentage of the first 
party voting against the bill plus the percentage of the second party voting for the bill 
is subtracted from the figure reached in the first calculation. For example, assuming 
all members voted, if 95 percent of Republicans voted against 95 percent of 
Democrats that would produce the calculation: 95 + 95- (5+5)=180. A figure of 100 is 
considered a moderate level of party differentiation, with 200 representing 100 percent 
of Republicans voting against 100 percent of Democrats. 48 
The PD method is a simple percentage calculation, and no indication is given of any 
other influences on voting behavour. As noted, the tests in this chapter are merely 
used to track partisan voting trends, with analysis of other variables reported in the 
case chapters. PD is chosen because it improves on more commonly used party voting 
measures. Rather than just revealing the percentage of Republicans voting against 
Democrats, PD produces a score that also accounts for lawmakers who either voted 
against the majority of their party or did not vote at all. All this produces one number 
that gives an convenient guide to the intensity of party voting. 
The PD scores are used to compare the percentage of Republicans voting against 
Democrats for the House and Senate on two groups: 
1) All 1988-2000 foreign policy votes in which the president's position is known. 
48 Thanks to Dr. Douglas Jaenicke for explaining this. 
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2) All 1988-2000 votes from group one that specifically relate to the use of force. 
Group one includes all the foreign and defence policy votes listed in the annual 
Congressional Quarterly presidential support scores. Adapting the method of, among 
others, Wildavsky, the second category uses only use of force votes. 9 Not all years 
have use of force votes, but where they do, they involve funding, approving, reporting 
on, commanding and deploying US troops in combat or potential combat situations, 
but do not include issues about missile defence or small forces sent to train foreign 
troops. 50 These votes (where present) are selected because decisions about using 
combat forces are arguably the most controversial issues related to UNPE. And, as 
none of the use of force votes refer to conflicts involving major US interests, it is 
assumed that a lawmaker who consistently opposes force abroad is someone who 
disapproves of UNPE. 
49 Wildavsky, A, 1966. Edwards, G, 1989. Meernick, J, 1993. 
50 For the full list of use of force votes, see appendix table 1.2. For a similar classification of use of 
force issues, see Smith, M. E, 1998, p. 39. 
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Fig 2.3 House Partisan Differentiation Scores on Presidential Foreign Policy and Use of 
Force Votes, 1988-2000 
Year: 1988-2000 
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The X-axis lists all the years between 1998-2000. The Y-axis gives the partisan differentiation scores. 
The lines within the figures represent all foreign policy votes (black) and only use of force votes (grey). 
Source: CQ 
Fig 2.4 Senate Partisan Differentiation Scores on Presidential Foreign Policy and Use of 
Force Votes, 1988-2000 
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Figures 2.3 and 2.4 measure party voting on House and Senate foreign policy and 
use of force votes in which the president's position is known. For example, figure 2.3 
shows that the mean PD scores on all 1995 use of force votes is 155. Extracting use of 
force votes from general foreign policy uncovers higher levels of partisanship on an 
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issue commonly presumed to be bipartisan. 51 On all House foreign policy votes 
(figure 2.3), apart from 1998 (37), PD is moderate. In the Senate (figure 2.4), foreign 
policy votes are moderately partisan, but there is an increase between 1992-95.52 PD is 
pointedly higher for use of force votes between 1992-2000 in the House and, during 
1993-94 in the Senate, and, importantly, peaks between 1992-95. Both figures show 
that, contrary to the rally around the flag effect, voting on troop use in combat 
situations abroad during the UNPE era was significantly partisan and certainly more 
so than for foreign policy making in general. 
PD scores can be less significant solely due to one party. Even high PD scores can 
conceal fragmentation in one party. A comparative examination of voting unity will 
thus uncover which of the two parties was the most unified on foreign policy voting. 
To compare party cohesion, figures 2.5 and 2.6 calculate the mean majority voting 
scores for all annual use of force votes for all Republicans and Democrats who served 
in Congress between 1988 and 2000. By taking the highest percentage result of 
members voting together for each party on every vote, an annual mean measure of 
what extent lawmakers are voting with their party is given. For example, figure 2.5 
shows that on average 91 percent of House Republicans in 1995 voted the same way 
on every use of force vote in which the president's position is known. 
51 Congressional bipartisanship is defined here as a majority of both Republicans and Democrats voting 
either in favour of or in opposition to a foreign policy floor vote. Partisanship, conversely, refers to 
foreign policy floor votes in which a majority of Democrats vote against a majority of Republicans.. 
52 For the results, see appendix tables 1.1 and 1.2. 
Chapter Two: Congress and the Presidency 63 
Fig 2.5 House Republican and Democratic Majority Voting on all Presidential Use of 
Force Votes, 1988-2000 
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The X-axis lists all the years between 1988 and 2000. The Y-axis gives the highest percentage of 
Republicans and Democrats voting with their party. The black line represents Republican unity and the 
grey line signifies Democratic unity. Source: CQ 
Fig 2.6 Senate Republican and Democratic Majority Voting on all Presidential Use of 
Force Votes, 1988-2000 
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With use of force, House Republican cohesion (figure 2.5) is higher than for 
Democrats for every year except in 1998 and 1999. What is also noteworthy is that 
Republican unity peaks between 1992-1995. Figure 2.9 shows that Senate 
Republicans' cohesion on presidential use of force votes was higher than for 
Democrats between 1988 and 1990. The six subsequent years- including the years 
Chapter Two: Congress and the Presidency 64 
1993 to 1995- reveal that Democratic senators were more unified than Republicans. 
The Senate (figure 2.6) is different, with Democratic cohesion seeing higher levels 
during both the UNPE era and after. 
Compared to general foreign and defence policy, use of force is highly partisan, and, 
in the House, Republican cohesion is higher than for Democrats in both categories. In 
the Senate, Republican foreign policy unity grew during the UNPE era, and, although 
lower than for Democrats, was reasonably high on use of force votes. As figure 2.4 
shows that party differentiation was high for both foreign and use of force votes 
during the UNPE era, meaning that intraparty cohesion is strong for Republicans as 
well as Democrats. 
Cohesion among Republicans, particularly in the House, is more substantial than for 
Democrats. Figures 2.1 to 2.6 point to a partisan and ideologically conservative 
climate in which Republicans were more unified in the House than Democrats. 53 
Partisan differentiation is steep in both chambers on use of force votes, but figures 2.1 
to 2.6 are not overwhelming proof of Republican predominance. However, there is 
some evidence of it. 
Presidential Opposition and Party Support 
The chances of UNPE succeeding as a policy doctrine would have been greatly 
increased if Clinton received bipartisan support from Congress. However, attempts to 
53 Many Republicans may not be conservatives and vice versa, but for shorthand purposes, they are 
loosely grouped as one. Democrats and liberals also broadly fit together. 
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expand America's involvement in UNPE operations happened at a time when 
Congress, with the exception of Senate use of force votes, was more partisan and 
ideologically conservative. Republicans either were more unified, or were becoming 
so, with Democrats increasingly less cohesive. A further measure of foreign policy 
partisanship and deference towards the president is to measure party support for 
Clinton. As a president can win a vote through majority support from his own party, 
this is not necessarily bipartisanship. Figures 2.3 to 2.6 relate to voting behaviour in 
which the president's position is known, but, so far, none of the figures give an 
indication of presidential support. As noted, pursuing an altruistic policy like UNPE, 
which involves sending US troops as part of a UN force to regions of peripheral 
strategic importance, would arguably need to happen when presidents have robust 
congressional support in foreign policy. Applying Schraufnagel and Shellman's et al. 
method, figures 2.7 and 2.8 measure voting support for the president. 54 Ranging from 
Presidents Reagan to Clinton, both figures illustrate the percentage of votes in which 
the president's position is known where either the majority of the opposition party 
(2.7) or his own party (2.8) voted against him. 55 Figure 2.8 differs in that it only 
counts majorities of the president's party that voted against him. For example, in 2000 
of the ten House foreign policy votes in which President Clinton expressed a position, 
a majority of Republicans voted against him on nine and Democrats voted against him 
on six. 
54 Schraufnagel, S and Shellman, S, 2001. Meemick, J, 1993. Prins, B& Marshall, B, 2001. 
55 For annual 1987-2000 House and Senate foreign policy votes measuring presidential support, see 
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Fig 2.7 Percentage of House and Senate foreign policy votes in which a majority of 
the president's opposition party voted against him, 1988-2000 
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The X-axis lists the years between 1988 and 2000. The Y-axis gives the percentage of relevant votes. 
The percentages of votes in which a majority of the president's opposition party in the House (black) 
and Senate (grey) voted against the president. Source: CQ 
Fig 2.8 Percentage of House and Senate foreign policy votes in which a majority of 
the president's party voted against him, 1988-2000 
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Figure 2.7 shows the percentage of presidential foreign policy support votes where 
the majority of the House and Senate opposition party disagrees with him. In the 
House, Clinton's first two years show moderately low levels of opposition from 
appendix table 1.3. 
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Republicans relative to the Reagan and Bush years, but with congressional victory in 
1995, the percentage swells to 76 percent. It peaks towards the end of his presidency, 
but it shows the trouble Clinton was having in winning backing early on. A similar 
pattern is seen in the Senate. Opposition does not peak during the UNPE era, but there 
is an increase during Clinton's early years, and in 1994 and 1995 most Republicans 
voted against him on 66 and 62 percent of votes respectively. Figure 2.8 shows the 
percentage of House and Senate presidential support votes where the president's party 
votes against him. In the House, the two highest years where the majority of the 
president's party opposed him are 1998 and 2000, but Clinton's first two years saw 
much opposition from Democrats. Apart from 1992, the House results show that Bush 
had more endorsement from Republicans than Clinton had from Democrats. The 
extent of Republican opposition to Reagan and Bush (1990 aside) remains around the 
10 percent mark, but Senate Democratic opposition to Clinton sharply increased (1996 
and 2000 aside) from 1994-95. 
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 are for general foreign policy votes, but, in calculating the mean 
level of opposition on all 1987 to 2000 use of force votes where the majority blocked 
the president, an average of 69 percent of representatives from both parties opposed 
Reagan and Bush and 60 percent in the Senate. Clinton, however, faced an average of 
84 percent resistance in the House and 65 percent in the Senate. 56 Thus, consistent 
with Prins and Marshall's findings, bipartisan endorsement in both foreign policy and 
use of force was less prominent for Clinton. 57 Contradicting Silbey, Clinton actually 
faced more legislative obstruction from the opposition and less loyalty from his own 
56 For annual 1987-2000 House and Senate use of force votes measuring presidential support, see 
appendix table 1.4. 
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party than Presidents Reagan or Bush. 58 Again, this evidence is not incontrovertible, 
but added to the other measures, a voting pattern emerges of an era in which Congress 
was more conservative, partisan and willing to vote against the president. This was a 
time in which Republicans were more cohesive than Democrats in foreign policy. 
Added to the earlier sections, where it is argued that Congress has many non- 
legislative tools with which to sway foreign policy, the voting data shows Congress to 
be an institution at odds with the one described by two presidencies theorists. 
Republican Opposition and Democratic Support for Use of Force 
While the figures have so far uncovered evidence of greater Republican cohesion 
and a tendency to oppose Clinton, they disclose nothing about the extent of 
Republican resistance to UNPE issues. Consequently, the purpose of this section is to 
show that Republicans were more opposed to UNPE issues than Democrats. Figures 
2.9 and 2.10 compare Republican opposition and Democratic approval on use of force 
presidential support votes. Each chart calculates both the percentage of votes in which 
a majority of Republicans oppose and a majority of Democrats support the use of 
force. For example, in 1993 Republicans opposed and Democrats supported all six 
House use of force votes. Importantly, this does not include exactly the same votes as 
figures 2.4 to 2.6, as it is unclear on some votes whether they are for or against the use 
of force. 59 
57 Prins, B& Marshall, B, 2001. Rosner, J, 1995, p. 71. Smith, M. E, 1998, pp. 41-42. 
58 Sibley, J, 1997. 
59 For example, House vote 171 (1992). For the list of votes chosen, see appendix table 1.4. 
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Fig. 2.9 House Republican Opposition to and Democratic Support for Presidential Use of 
Force Votes, 1988-2000 
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The X-axis lists the years between 1988 and 2000. The Y-axis is the percentage of votes in which either 
Republicans opposed or Democrats supported the use of force abroad. The black blocks signify the 
Republican opposition and the grey blocks present Democratic support for the use of_force abroad. 
Source: CQ 
Fig. 2.10 Senate Republican Opposition to and Democratic Support for Presidential Use of 
Force Votes, 1988-2000 
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Republicans opposed or Democrats supported the use of force abroad. The black blocks signify the 
Republican opposition and the grey blocks present Democratic support for the use of force abroad. 
Source: CQ 
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With the exception of 1999,1993-2000 House voting (figure 2.9) shows a 
maximum of Republican (Rep) hostility and Democratic (Dem) support for the use of 
force. 60 Results in 1992 reveal the exact opposite, but this is only measured by two 
votes (155 and 156) about troop numbers in Europe and Korea, which is more of a 
potential use of force issue. In the Senate (figure 2.10), excepting 1998, all Republican 
opposition to the use of force was at least above 50 percent, with four years (including 
1994 and 1995) at 100 percent. 61 These demonstrate that both generally and during the 
UNPE era congressional voting was party political and that Republicans were more 
likely to obstruct anything risking US lives. None of the charts show massive 
Republican opposition relative to Democratic support, but they at least indicate that 
most Republicans consistently disapproved of the use of force. 
Foreign policy as a product of domestic politics is further examined in chapter 
three's discussion of decision making within Congress, but the evidence above goes 
far in reinforcing claims that opposition in Congress was a contributory factor in 
UNPE's failure. The argument that Congress can be partisan, ideological and prepared 
to challenge the presidency in this aspect of foreign policy is then tested in the cases. 
60 There were no relevant votes between 1989 to 1991. None of the votes in 1988 (83/84) and 1992 
(155/156) recorded majorities of either Republicans opposing or Democrats supporting use of force. 
61 No relevant votes were recorded for 1991 to 1992 or 1996 to 1997. None of the votes in 1988 
(131/134) and 1990 (213/271) recorded majorities of either Republicans opposing or Democrats 
supporting use of force. 
Chapter Two: Congress and the Presidency 71 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined claims of bipartisanship, non-ideology and deference in 
congressional foreign policy making, and describes the decision making climate 
during the UNPE era. The chapter argues that despite claims by two presidencies 
theorists, Congress was resurgent in foreign policy after the cold war. Congress is 
neither imperious nor reverential towards the executive branch, but does, when 
necessary, act to keep foreign policy within the bounds of the perceived national 
interest. The chapter also stresses that there is more to congressional influence than 
mandatory legislation. Expanding analysis beyond substantive bills offers a more 
accurate picture of congressional influence. Non-legislative powers such as 
grandstanding and signalling potential opposition to the executive branch are 
examples of effective informal powers available to lawmakers. 
A series of statistical measures of floor voting behaviour reveal that Congress was 
comparatively more conservative, partisan, and proactive in foreign policy during the 
early Clinton presidency than the 1980s and late 1990s. The evidence considered here 
also shows that partisanship in the House and Senate was strong on use of force 
voting. The figures further reveal that Clinton endured more hostility from the 
opposition party and less support from his party than Reagan or Bush. Finally, the 
statistics show that Republican majorities persistently opposed the use of force 
abroad. The general trend in the figures indicates that attempts during the first Clinton 
administration to direct American foreign policy towards more altruistic goals took 
place when Congress was conservative, partisan and persistently opposed to the use of 
force. Early 1990s congressional foreign policy did not induce major change, but, 
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consistent with the view that Congress was resurgent, the figures broadly show that 
while many in the executive branch may have wished to expand global engagement, 
Congress opposed presidential flexibility and instead party politicised foreign policy. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce the key arguments in the 
interbranch foreign policy making literature and put forward the case that Congress is 
an effective partner in this area. The statistical tests are simply used to illustrate the 
point that Congress was partisan, ideological and assertive in both general foreign and 
use of force policy between 1987 and 2000, and this is explored and tested in the 
cases. The relative influence of party and ideology (as well as other cues) on floor 
voting is further discussed in chapter three and is also tested in the cases. Rather than 
just looking at voting trends at the aggregate level, the next chapter will consider how 
decisions are reached in Congress. 
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Chapter Three: Congressional Decision-Making 
Introduction 
While partisan and ideological issues are introduced, the discussion in chapter two 
focuses primarily on the institutional impact of Congress on foreign policy making. 
As it is equally necessary to shed light on how legislators make choices about voting 
and how much time they allocate to issues, chapter three considers the other theme of 
the research: how collective outcomes are reached. It develops a perspective on 
congressional behaviour that accepts that lawmakers choose what issues to take role 
in, and that most are not actively interested in foreign policy. The chapter briefly 
illustrates how foreign policy is led by a handful of policy specialists and then 
discusses the methodology of how congressional participation is more fully examined 
in the case chapters. The focus then shifts to what Shepsle and Weingast refer to as 
the third generation of congressional analysis that deals with how individual 
lawmakers reach collective decisions., In particular, the chapter considers the 
influence of such factors as party, committee and ideology on congressional 
behaviour. It describes the methodological approach used in the cases to identify the 
significant influences on voting decisions. As well as considering controversies 
regarding the variables, it details the main statistical test used in the cases. It argues 
that binary logistic regression, which predicts category membership from a subject's 
placing within a series of independent variables, is the most appropriate model for 
testing roll call voting decisions. 
*ýýý 
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Chapter two portrays the UNPE era (1992-95) as one in which the House and Senate 
were more conservative, partisan and assertive in foreign policy than during the 1980s 
and late 1990s. While at the institutional level this is revealing about the atmosphere 
in which Clinton was struggling to formulate a peacekeeping policy, it says nothing 
about individual decision making within Congress. Chapter two's party voting 
measures do not indicate to what extent constituent demands, for instance, influenced 
behaviour. 
A discussion about what influences foreign policy decisions cannot assume that 
rational, goal-oriented lawmakers are even interested in the subject. That most 
lawmakers take part in floor votes gives an exaggerated impression of activity. In fact, 
choosing how active to be on an issue is feasibly a more important decision for 
legislators to make than what position to take. Whether lawmakers participate in 
building coalitions for legislative packages, drafting amendments or bargaining with 
colleagues in anything more than a handful of issues is a major, but curiously under- 
researched, question. Yet how much lawmakers get involved with an issue can affect 
the course of legislation and influence executive actions. One exception to this neglect 
is Richard Hall's Participation in Congress. Hall claims that very few lawmakers are 
meaningfully engaged in any given subject. Dealing with the inexhaustible array of 
complex issues within a limited timeframe renders lawmakers simply unable to 
concentrate on more than a few issues at a time, and so a comparatively tiny 
proportion of issue specialists are responsible for decision making. Members' interests 
and resources are uneven, so most, thinking of the opportunity cost of engaging with 
I Shepsle, K& Weingast, B, 1994. 
2 Hall, R, 1996. 
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one item of legislation as opposed to another of more personal interest and electoral 
importance, will look to colleagues with expertise on the issue with whom they share 
similar political objectives. In Hall's version of the gains from exchange model, rather 
than merely vote trading, lawmakers trade how active they are prepared to be on 
issues. This division of labour is not so much imposed by institutional or party 
authority, but is instead the result of individual members' choices about what matters 
to them. 3 
As specialisation helps Congress function efficiently, it is not vital that every 
member be equally involved in every decision. This, however, still causes problems 
for Congress's representative role as a small number of legislators controlling a 
particular issue may be preference outliers and members who may be more 
representative of the chamber have no incentive to monitor what the former do. Hall 
thus challenges the view that a simple majority vote produces a result that reflects the 
position of the median legislator. As with Dahl's claim that intense minorities rule, a 
largely indifferent chamber forgoes its constitutional control of legislation by allowing 
a subset of specialist members to take the lead. 5 As such, representation becomes 
twice removed: constituents elect someone to make decisions for them who in turn 
look to specialists in the chamber to make voting choices for them. There is a danger 
that specialists whose views do not reflect the wider chamber can overwhelm the 
inactive. Moreover, as constituents want their representatives to engage in greater 
numbers of issues, this creates a paradox of legislative action: 
3 Ibid., p. 10. 
4 Ibid., p. 5. 
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`the more responsive members are to intense constituency interests when making 
decisions about participation, the less representative the deliberations of the 
chamber are likely to be. '6 
To show that lawmakers are flexible about which issues to engage with, Hall 
modifies certain postwar behavioural norms. He dispels assumptions about 
specialisation norms on committees. Popularised by scholars such as Fenno, there is a 
belief that lawmakers concentrate their workload on a small number of issues that they 
think will help them achieve their goals. 7 Here, members do dull work because it is 
expected. 8 Fear of criticism of inaction is thought sufficient to solve the free-rider 
problem. Hall moves away from this rational choice view of actors doing what they 
perceive is in their self-interest and argues that legislators are purposive actors who 
simply choose to work on what interests them. 9 Related to this, Hall adjusts the 
apprenticeship norm that was popular among scholars prior to the 1970s reforms. 1° 
This norm envisages a legislature dominated by committee chairs and party leaders 
who would not allow freshmen an opportunity to influence legislation. Since the 
1970s reforms, such as increasing the staff and budget resources available to junior 
members, there has been a reconsideration of this norm's empirical value. " Hall 
acknowledges that formal power imposed on freshmen is no longer the case, but 
freshmen- due to informational disadvantages and lack of access to committee 
5 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956. 
6 Hall, R, 1996, p. 5. 
7 Richard Fenno, `The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of 
Integrations, ' American Political Science Quarterly, vol. 56,1962, pp. 310-324. 
8 See Donald R. Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina 
Press, 1960. 
9 Hall, R, 1996, p. 56. 
10 Ibid., p. 101. 
11 Christopher Deering & Steven Smith, Committees in Congress, Congressional Quarterly Press, 
Washington D. C., 1997, p. 203. 
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contacts- will inevitably tend to follow others. 12 Put differently, freshmen do not have 
duties forced upon them by senior members, but when the former choose what issues 
to participate in, they are likely to look to the latter for guidance. 
Finally, Hall considers the reciprocity norm. 13 This refers to implicit arrangements 
that members of one panel will not intrude on the business of other committees and to 
agreements to support one another's positions. Rather than this form of group 
socialisation, Hall argues that subcommittee members decide themselves how much 
attention to give to an issue, even if this means foregoing some activity with greater 
electoral benefit. 14 
Hall's modification of the three norms is an attempt to dispel the myth that voting 
and other participation is centrally controlled. He portrays legislators as individual 
optimisers who make decisions regarding how much effort to invest with little regard 
for collective goals or the expectation of colleagues. He defends his claim by showing 
that markups on the Agriculture, Education and Labour, and Energy and Commerce 
committees are continually under-attended. 15 To measure how often and to what 
extent lawmakers participated in committee activity (such as attending hearings), Hall 
conducts a difference in means test to show that average absenteeism on the Energy 
and Commerce subcommittee, for instance, ran at thirty-three percent. He also 
measures lawmakers' interest in legislative work. Combining interview data and 
hearing transcripts, he finds that a typical committee member has no particular interest 
12 Ibid., p. 102 and p. 125. 
13 Ibid., p. 106. 
14 Ibid., p. 105. 
15 Ibid., p. 35. 
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in forty-five percent of bills that go through a markup. 16 
Hall's claim that lawmakers' participation in any given issue is low is persuasive. 
Also, that lawmakers abdicate decision making to policy specialists raises important 
questions about Congress's representative role. A particular question is how do 
lawmakers choose which policy specialists to support when making voting decisions? 
The case chapters address this by measuring the extent of lawmakers' participation. 
Each counts involvement in a range of floor, legislative, committee and media 
activities, but a brief, selective look now at participation in foreign policy floor 
debates in the 104th Congress backs up Hall's claim that most lawmakers are not 
interested enough in any given issue to do more than merely vote. 
Floor activity can provide an informative measure of participation as it has become 
increasingly important as a policy making forum. Floor statements have a better 
chance of reaching constituents than behind-the-scenes committee work, and 
attendance at a committee hearing, as opposed to speaking on the floor, is arguably 
less evident of a keen interest in an issue. A member may attend a hearing due to an 
expectation that they have to be there. For example, chairs and ranking members need 
to regularly attend, and promotion-seeking members will presumably want to avoid a 
reputation for absenteeism. Once dismissed in positive congressional analysis as 
`mood music', scholars such as Krehbiel have emphasised the importance of floor 
debates in disseminating knowledge in an environment of imperfect information. '? 
16 Ibid., pp. 83-84. 
17 See Shepsle, K& Weingast, B, 1994, p. 152. Krehbiel, K, 1991. 
Chapter Three: Congressional Decision-Making 79 
There is, admittedly, also an element of merely showing one's face at floor debates, 
but counting speakers on the chamber floor- where there are no barriers to entry 
indicates whether members are prepared to make a speech on a subject that is outside 
the jurisdiction of their own committee assignments. The following therefore 
considers how much lawmakers participate in foreign policy floor debates. 
Table 3.1: Average Number of Contributions by Members, House and Senate Floor 
Debates, First Session, 104th Congress 
All Subjects 
Foreign Policy 
House 
58 
5 
Senate 
138 
9 
Row one lists the average number of floor statements made by representatives and senators on all 
subjects. Row two lists the average number of floor statements made by representatives and senators 
on foreign policy issues. Source: Compiled from Congressional Record (http: //thomas. loc. goi/). 
Table 3.1 lists mean participation in floor debates on all subjects and just foreign 
policy in the first session of the 104th Congress (1995). To identify the relevant 
debates, table 3.1 only counts speeches listed as `foreign policy' in the internet version 
of the Congressional Record (CR) index. Admittedly, the CR index counts a broad 
range of substantive, procedural and symbolic issues as `foreign policy, ' but it is at 
least an authoritative source. The table shows that representatives contributed to an 
average of fifty-eight floor debates on any subject in 1995 of which only five were 
listed as `foreign policy' in the index. The disparity is even higher in the Senate. 
Senators are on record as speaking at an average of nine foreign policy debates out of 
138 general ones. 
The contribution to foreign policy floor debates by leaders was especially miniscule 
in the first session of the 104th Congress. House Republican leaders, Armey and 
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Delay, made four and five foreign policy floor statements respectively. The 
Democratic leadership was comparatively more verbose on foreign policy issues. Of 
the eighty-seven speeches given by Rep. Richard Gephardt (D-MO), Minority Leader, 
only twelve were on the subject of foreign policy. In the Senate, Bob Dole (R-KS), 
Majority Leader, made sixty-eight statements on foreign policy, but only eight of Sen. 
Trent Lott's (R-MS), Majority Whip, 146 floor remarks were on foreign policy issues. 
For Democrats, Sen. Tom Daschle (D-SD), Minority Leader, contributed to fifteen 
foreign policy debates (out of 245), and Sen. Ford (D-KY), Minority Whip, spoke at 
two. 
Even with the CR's broad definition of `foreign policy', table 3.1 shows that 
lawmakers make comparatively few foreign policy floor speeches over the course of a 
single year. This brief examination supports Hall's premise that most lawmakers are 
not interested in a given issue, but the activities used in table 3.1 do not reveal all 
those who worked on an issue. Consequently, each of the case chapters will expand 
analysis of active involvement to include legislative, committee, floor, and media 
activities. Divided into seven categories, they will measure participation to see how 
many lawmakers did nothing other than vote during each crisis. Using CR as the 
source (where a comprehensive list of all valid statements is available), relevant 
speeches made in either chamber will be looked at first. The speeches are divided into 
two levels of participation. Firstly, the number of lawmakers who made at least one 
relevant floor statement will be counted. Unlike Hall's differentiation between major 
and minor insertions into the CR, the length of comments is not taken into account in 
the case chapters. This is because how much a lawmaker says in a particular debate 
may be due to the available floor time rather than any indication of how intensely 
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interested they are in the issue. The analysis will secondly show how many lawmakers 
inserted a comment into the Extension of Remarks. Staffers possibly write these 
comments, but lawmakers putting forwarding their views in this way is an indication 
of some interest. Often used to expand on points already made on the floor, the 
Extension of Remarks is also employed by lawmakers absent during a floor debate 
who want to put their view on record. Either way, including this facility in the analysis 
gives a more accurate indication of participation than can be captured by floor 
statements alone. 
By using the Bills section of the internet version of CR, the participatory measures 
will include the average number of lawmakers who introduced or cosponsored at least 
one relevant bill. Introducing legislation indicates an above average level of 
involvement, but how much cosponsoring bills signifies participation depends on the 
lawmaker. Cosponsoring may only amount to members putting their names forward, 
but it could involve extensive co-authorship and coalition-building efforts. '8 Either 
way, although it is difficult to calculate how much they worked on legislation, 
cosponsors are more than simply voting. At the least, they are publicly linked to a bill 
even if it fails to reach the floor. Those who merely intend to vote on the floor version 
are able to avoid any constituency backlash from endorsing a bill that never reaches 
the floor. Therefore, all the case chapters will count both lawmakers who either 
introduced or cosponsored a bill (whether or not it reached the floor). 
The analysis will then list how many lawmakers are named in at least one 
18 On the relative value of cosponsoring, see Rick K. Wilson & Cheryl D. Young, `Cosponsorship in 
the U. S. Congress, ' Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. XXII, February 1997, pp. 25-43. 
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contemporaneous Congressional Quarterly (CQ) report as being involved with the 
particular issue. To count, lawmakers must either be quoted on the subject or 
mentioned as undertaking an activity relating to the issue, such as offering an 
amendment. This is done to measure participation generally, but, since senior 
lawmakers are more likely to be cited, it also serves to assess how much, if any, 
involvement was undertaken by party leaders. Using a method used by Sinclair, all 
relevant articles listed in the CQ index will be read for examples of activity from party 
whips and leaders. 19 
The case chapters will then consider committee attendance. Using the annual 
Congressional Information Service index, all committee hearings, markups and 
roundtables held on the crises will be read. Any lawmaker who spoke at the relevant 
panel meetings will be listed as participating. As with the measures of floor activity, a 
lawmaker need only speak once at a committee meeting to count. 
The cases do not weight the activities. Although distinctions between all the 
categories are problematic, introducing a bill is certainly indicative of greater 
involvement than merely voting on it. As it is difficult, for example, to measure 
whether submitting a statement in CR is a greater contribution than cosponsoring an 
amendment, the case chapters will initially weight the activities equally. Finally, after 
all those who participated in the activities are counted, the number of lawmakers who 
engaged in none of them will be listed. This will give a percentage of non- 
participation (other than floor voting) that can be compared across parties and 
19 Barbara Sinclair, Legislators, Leaders and Lawmaking, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 
1995, p. 31. 
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chambers. 
After counting participation among all lawmakers, the case chapters will also 
measure participation specifically among all party leaders and a sample of committees 
with foreign policy jurisdiction. All those listed in CQ from the senior leadership to 
regional whips for each relevant year are counted as party leaders. The analysis will 
simply count how many of them undertook at least one activity during each crisis and 
report an overall percentage of those who did nothing. To avoid straining the point, 
the cases will not count participation among members of the four policy committees. 
These were active in advising and coordinating party members on policy in the 1990s 
(notably the Senate Democrat Policy Committee under Daschle's chairmanship), but 
the overlap between policy committee members and party leaders renders specific 
analysis unnecessary. 
As dozens of committees and subcommittees encroach on foreign policy, analysing 
all committees with a foreign policy jurisdiction would potentially encompass every 
lawmaker. In restricting the number to the most relevant, the chapters include only the 
committees that Lindsay cites having as wide jurisdiction over foreign policy: 
International Relations, Foreign Relations and the House and Senate Appropriations, 
Intelligence and Armed Services Committees. 20 This does not include every panel that 
dealt with issues related to the cases. Nor should it be assumed that all those on the 
eight committees were any more interested in foreign policy than non-members, but 
utilising Lindsay's categorisation provides an idea of how interested committee 
members with a jurisdiction in foreign policy were in the policy-making crises under 
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consideration. 
The analysis of participation admittedly does not provide a comprehensive overview 
of congressional activity. Media appearances, letters to the president, public speeches 
and private meetings are difficult to count in a systematic and exhaustive manner, and 
so are not included. Counting the efforts of party leaders and committee members is 
also not exhaustive as it does not take account of activities behind-the-scenes. As 
noted, Hall dug deeper in his analysis of committee activity, and others have explored 
in more detail how much party leaders restrain committee bills, but it is not possible 
to do the same in the cases studied here. 21 There is no record, for example, of the 
extent of leadership pressure applied to members at caucus conferences and very little 
leadership and committee activity on the cases was reported in the specialist media 
such as CQ or the National Journal. 
Reiterating chapter two's point that binding, substantive legislation is not the only 
unit of congressional influence, what the cases offer is an overview of a series of 
public-level activities. The measures cover a sample of legislative, floor and 
committee activity and so will give a fair indication of overall participation. The 
method used also has the benefit of consistency. The same publications and indexes 
are used to quantify involvement in each of the activities for all three cases. 
Furthermore, although many lawmakers engaged in more activities than will be 
covered in the cases, what is of especial interest is how many did nothing other than 
20 Lindsay, J, 1994a, pp. 53-67. 9I 
" John Owens, `The Return of Party Government in the US House of Representatives: Central 
Leadership-Committee Relations in the 104th Congress, ' British Journal of Political Science, vol. 27, 
no. 2,1997, pp. 247-272. 
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vote. As such, anyone who, for example, was concerned enough about Somalia to 
write a letter to the president is likely to have contributed to at least one of the 
activities counted in the analysis. The number of those who did nothing other than 
vote is thus unlikely to change by further expanding the range of activities. At the 
least, if the pattern in table 3.1 of widespread non-participation is repeated in the 
cases, this has implications for the study of UNPE and Congress's complicity in its 
failure. Rather than an institution of passionately anti-UN ideologues, the evidence 
that would suggest that congressional policy was being led by a handful of people. If it 
is accepted that legislators look to others to create effective legislation, this leaves 
unanswered the question of what factors influence lawmakers in deciding which 
specialists to follow. The rest of this chapter will thus consider possible cue-taking 
variables that could provide explanations of congressional voting decisions. 
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Congressional Cue-Taking 
A key purpose of the research is to explain how lawmakers made their voting 
decisions on the three crises. What is required is an approach that explains how 
individual, mostly non-participatory, legislators resolve collective dilemmas on a 
particular issue. According to Shepsle and Weingast serious attempts to explain 
behaviour at the individual level have only really developed since a generation of 
scholars in the 1970s combined the abstract rational choice theory of individuals 
trying to get what they want with substantive congressional scholarship. 22 One of the 
most famous is Fenno, who, in his 1973 work on House committees, claims that 
lawmakers are chiefly motivated by desires to gain influence within the chamber, 
create good public policy and win reelection. 23 This generation of scholars developed 
a gains from exchange model in which members sought to make themselves better off 
through the distribution of power (logrolling, alliances and vote trading). This 
generation, however, focused too much on majority cycles, while party and legislative 
structures were largely ignored. Shepsle and Weingast identify a second generation of 
scholars in the late 1970s who conceptualised an analytical approach arguably closer 
to legislative behaviour by introducing analysis of spatial representation to the earlier 
distributive model. 24 Rather than concentrating on single peak majority voting, 
congressional decision making was conceptualised as a game played within structural 
arrangements (committees) and procedural routines (agenda setting and restrictive 
rules). Shepsle is one notable example who analysed divisions of labour (committees), 
22 Shepsle, K& Weingast, B, 1994, p. 150. 
23 Richard Fenno, Congressmen in Committees, Little, Brown, Boston, 1973. See also, David Mayhew, 
Congress: The Electoral Connection, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1974. 
24 Shepsle, K& Weingast, B, 1994, p. 152. 
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specialisation (issue jurisdiction), and monitoring mechanisms (rules). 5 This 
approach has, however, been criticised for supposing that structures and procedures 
are fixed ahead of time. 26 There was an assumption of perfect information, no 
consideration of the impact of debate and deliberation, and the implications of 
committee composition and the influence of party leadership were insufficiently 
considered by this successor generation of congressional scholars. 
While previous scholarship tended to view factors such as party influence as 
exogenous, Shepsle and Weingast identify a third generation of substantive 
congressional analysis that emerged in the late 1980s that incorporates numerous 
partisan and informational perspectives. 7 One perspective among third generation 
scholars emphasises the importance of parties in resolving collective dilemmas for 
rational actors. For Cox and McCubbins, parties are legislative cartels that exploit 
chamber rules to benefit their members by, for example, increasing the power of 
committee chairs and controlling the legislative agenda. 28 In solving problems of 
public goods, externalities and coordination, parties serve as vehicles for collective 
action. They play a role in elections, create a collective reputation that candidates can 
capitalise on, set procedures and agendas, and provide incentives for legislators to 
work together. Factors such as the president and macroeconomic conditions are 
arguably more important in affecting electoral fortunes than the relative popularity of 
congressional parties, but the `element of communality in the electoral chances of 
25 Kenneth Shepsle, `Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting 
Methods, ' American Journal of Political Science, vol. 23, no. 1,1979, pp. 27-59.. 
26 See Shepsle, K& Weingast, B, 1994, p. 163. 
27 Ibid., p. 153. 
28 Cox, G& McCubbins, M, 1993, p. 278. 
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incumbents of the same party is strong enough to merit attention. '29 As such, Cox and 
McCubbins investigate electoral tides to show that what the public thinks of a party 
affects its members in the same way. 30 They insist that because electoral swings are 
relatively consistent across districts, same party candidates tend to be pushed in the 
same direction. 31 They also demonstrate that lawmakers are aware of the national 
popularity of their party because retirement rates tend to align with electoral trends 32 
Cox and McCubbins dispute rational choice theories that dismiss parties as units of 
analysis because they are too internally divided to be of any theoretical use. 33 
However, weakening party identification among voters and members' greater access 
to institutional resources since the 1970s reforms have encouraged the belief that 
lawmakers are freelance entrepreneurs. Furthermore, some issues are simply too 
complex to be dealt with in a partisan manner. Whereas gun control is something on 
which lawmakers understand there is room for partisanship, in contrast scientific 
issues may require the use of experts of either party to guide lawmakers on the best 
option. Finally, it is possible that legislators will vote with the party against their 
consciences or their constituents' wishes because they know the bill will lose. 
Nevertheless, the promotional opportunities that parties offer makes partisanship 
arguably better than the electoral connection at explaining why lawmakers vote with 
their party and especially why they undertake work behind-the-scenes that is not seen 
by constituents. 
29 Ibid., p. 122. 
30 Ibid., p. 112. 
31 Ibid., p. 113. 
32 Ibid., p. 122. 
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Cox and McCubbins offer one explanation of why and how individual legislators 
would create and maintain a strong party structure. They argue that in order to solve 
prisoner's dilemma scenarios, `central authorities' are created to reassure individual 
legislators that others are pulling their weight. 34 Similar to Hobbes' theory of the state 
in which individuals forgo some of their power to a sovereign who maintains order, 
taxes subjects and punishes wrongdoers, the central authority consists of `policy 
entrepreneurs' who bear the costs of monitoring the community, are paid for the 
service they provide, and who possess selective incentives that can be used to punish 
or reward. 
The party leadership can be viewed as a central authority as it has the means and 
incentive to set agendas and hammer out policy. Party leaders serve as `political 
entrepreneurs' offering benefits to rival intraparty blocks in order to get them to back 
legislation. 35 Also, shifting majority coalitions are less able to cause policy changes as 
legislators are constrained by party membership where the cost of defecting may 
exceed benefits. 36 Fear of losing committee seats may encourage lawmakers to back 
party choices on key votes. As legislating provides a major opportunity to achieve 
such goals as good public policy and reelection, members create a leadership that can 
achieve these goals without excessively constraining individual strategies. 37 
There are potential problems with a central authority. Firstly, there is a danger that 
33 Ibid., p. 7. 
34 Ibid., p. 83. 
35 Ibid., p. 91. 
36 See Gary Cox & Matthew McCubbins, `Bonding, Structure and the Stability of Political Parties, ' 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 2, May 1994, pp. 215-231. 
37 Sinclair, B, 1995. 
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the party leadership will either have insufficient authority to deter non-cooperative 
behaviour or will abuse its powers by imposing rules that outweigh the benefit of 
cooperating. Secondly, even with a central authority, there is still a potential free-rider 
problem because individual lawmakers may choose not to work on legislation that has 
collective, but little personal, gain. The first problem can be disregarded as the central 
authority can be removed. 38 As for the second, lawmakers' pursuit of their many goals 
is dependent on reelection, which requires a combination of individual characteristics 
and party affiliation. 
Cox and McCubbins note that both high levels of party cohesion and an activist 
leadership have motivated scholars to consider the notion of `party government. '39 
Rhode, for example, describes a model of `conditional party government' in which 
party leaders will take action when there is widespread agreement on important 
issues. 0 Sinclair has written extensively on how party leaders influence the entire 
legislative process in the House. 41 At the pre-floor stage, the speaker will talk 
informally to committee chairs about getting a bill on the agenda, meeting with all 
party members on a committee, or getting outside lobbyists to influence a 
committee. 42 On the floor, leaders can get whips to lobby support, schedule legislation 
at the most advantageous time, impose rules restricting the number of amendments, 
introduce an amendment with a clause nullifying another amendment 43 
38 Ibid., p. 103. 
39 Ibid., p. 3. 
40 David Rhode, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1991. 
41 Barbara Sinclair, Majority Leadership in the House, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 
1983. Sinclair, B, 1995. 
42 Sinclair, B, 1983, pp. 102-4. 
43 For example, an amendment to a foreign aid bill blocking funding to a particular country can be 
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Cox and McCubbins also put substantial emphasis on indirect methods of party 
control by distinguishing between `active' and `latent' ways of transferring procedural 
power into substantive gains. 4 In the former, the speaker may block floor time for a 
bill he opposes. With the latent version, which Cox and McCubbins see as the most 
important, parties manipulate congressional structures to achieve gains. For example, 
a majority party could alter a committee's membership and jurisdiction to produce a 
steady flow of legislation beneficial to its members. 
Particularly since the 1980s, party government theory has become prominent in 
explanations of congressional behaviour. 45 Greater power for the speaker and new 
roles for rules committees have ensured that partisanship has become increasingly 
important over the last two decades. While the 1970s reforms decentralised power 
away from party and committee leaders and increased the number and independence 
of subcommittees, the Reagan domestic agenda polarised Congress along ideological 
lines and intensified hostility between the postreform party leaderships 46 
Furthermore, due to greater homogeneity among party members and the increase of 
omnibus bills, leaders have become more prominent in shaping legislation, vote 
mobilisation and structuring procedures. 7 This trend deepened in the 1990s when 
Republicans, fed up with being the minority House party, demanded the reforms 
(mentioned below) that increased party control. 
neutralised by another measure stating that all amendments are subject to the president stating whether 
they are in the national interest. Ibid., p. 147. 
44 Cox, G& McCubbins, M, 1993, p. 8. 
45 Ibid. Owens, J, 1997. For an overview of the recent party leadership literature, see Steve Smith, 
`Positive Theories of Congressional Parties, ' Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2, May 2000, 
pp. 193-215. 
46 See Roger Davidson, The Postreform Congress, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1992. 
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The influence of party leaders on rank and file lawmakers (that is, those not holding 
a leadership or whip role) has been questioned. Cooper and Brady's 1981 article has 
been particularly influential. 48 They argue that House party unity was more a result of 
electoral outcomes than the impact of party leaders. By contrasting the aggressive 
style of Speaker Joseph Cannon with the more informal approach of Sam Rayburn, 
they argue that leadership styles do not have a direct relationship on party voting. Part 
of their analysis shows that how polarised the parties are in agricultural and industrial 
districts had a stronger effect on party voting between 1890-1920. In other words, 
party voting increased the more, for example, Democrats represented agricultural 
districts and Republicans were from industrial constituencies. Regardless of who was 
the Speaker, wider polarisation between these districts ensures greater interparty 
conflict and intraparty cohesion and centralised leadership. Krehbiel offers a similar 
model to Cooper and Brady in that policy decision are the consequence of the 
dispersal of policy preferences on the floor. 49 Put differently, the median chamber 
member is more important in determining voting decisions on a given issue than party 
leaders. Krehbiel concedes that party leaders may influence individual members, but 
posits the not unreasonable demand that such evidence be found before claiming it. 50 
While all these studies raise important points about how majorities are formed, their 
conceptions of leadership are incomplete due to problems of measuring the impact of 
47 Sinclair, B, 1995, p. 47. 
48 See Joseph Cooper & David Brady, `Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House From 
Cannon to Rayburn, ' American Political Science Review, vol. 75,1981, pp. 411-425. 
49 Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics, University of Chicago Press (Manuscript). Cited in Smith, S, 2000, 
pp. 196-7. 
50 Ibid., p. 205. 
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backroom negotiation on party unity. For example, Cooper and Brady's research is 
based on anecdotal evidence about the Speakers Reed, Cannon and Rayburn and 
measures of the formal power they had. How is it possible to measure systematically 
leaders' informal influence on members when a few phone calls to a handful of 
lawmakers may have a big impact on roll calls? It is also difficult to ascertain how 
much whips work to round up support. Just because party members vote together does 
not mean there was any lobbying by leaders. Party colleagues may be voting the same 
way due to shared ideological preferences or because they represent similar districts, 
and not due to a threat of punishment or hope of reward from the leadership. 
It could be the case that the increased partisan floor voting of recent years has 
exaggerated the importance of parties in organising collective action. Put another way, 
the results in chapter two are party votes in that significant majorities in each party 
share the same preference, but they may not be party votes in the sense that leaders 
lobbied members to vote a particular way. Rather than a centrally-structured hierarchy 
of the type imagined by party government theorists, lawmakers may spontaneously 
vote with party colleagues. By systematically measuring observed participation of 
party leaders in both chambers, a distinction will thus be made in the case chapters 
between party voting that is actively encouraged by leaders and whips and party 
voting in which a majority of members vote together without any effective prompting 
from leaders. Admittedly, counting the involvement of leaders in such activities as 
floor speeches gives no indication of any latent powers that they might have 
employed. However, as is argued throughout the thesis, public-level activities are a 
reasonable guide to party leaders' interest in an issue. 
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Rather than deciding how to vote based on direct prompting from party leaders, it is 
likely that lawmakers followed the lead from foreign policy committee members. 
Committees arguably have effective control over issues and, within their jurisdiction, 
dominate public policy. In what is referred to as the `distributive committees' 
perspective, committees are perceived as autonomous. 51 They have both a negative 
monopoly over agenda setting in terms of preventing legislation reaching the floor and 
a positive alternative through preparing legislation. They have fixed jurisdiction over 
particular issues, are unrepresentative ideologically and regionally, and are in essence 
fiefdoms in which members pursue their own policy and reelection strategies immune 
from party hiring and firing controls. This view sees parties as nothing more than 
procedural and roll call coalitions that lack member loyalty on anything more than a 
case by case basis. 
Majority leaders may refuse to let legislation onto the floor, and bills must fend off 
hostile amendments and win majority support, but committees have access to 
information and staff to monitor possible difficulties on the floor. The costs of 
participation are not trivial, and so being on a committee staffed by experts and 
targeted by information-rich interest groups arguably gives members an advantage 
over non-members. 52 Assuming that information is imperfect, access to better 
information improves knowledge of the likely outcome of decisions. As they are in a 
position to monopolise information and expertise, there developed a trusted 
relationship between committee members and non-members. 
51 See, for example, Barry Weingast & William Marshall, `The Industrial Organization of Congress, ' 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 96,1988, pp. 132-163. 
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As noted, one indication of government by committee is the unrepresentativeness of 
committee members in relation to the whole chamber. The autonomous committee 
approach claims that members do not reflect the ideology and objectives of non- 
members in the parent chamber, and are instead peopled by those who represent their 
constituency's interests. There have been attempts to prove that committees are made 
up of preference outliers. Hinckley found a bias towards conservatives on the 
Agriculture and Armed Services Committees and liberals on Education and Labour 
and Foreign Affairs Committees. 53 Other studies have found that committees are 
ideologically reflective of the parent chamber. Cox and McCubbins ran a difference in 
means test based on ADA ideological annual ratings and found that only two 
committees, Education and Labour and Government Operations, are consistently out 
of step ideologically with the whole chamber. 54 
Cox and McCubbins's findings support an alternative view: that committee 
members simply do the bidding of outside agencies. Here there is so little room for 
independent decision making that committees only produce legislation sought by the 
majority party. Due to chair assignments, greater numbers of seats, setting the 
legislative agenda, and favourable staff and party ratios, majority parties do have an 
advantage with committees. As the majority party establishes jurisdiction, distributes 
resources and assigns the most seats to its members, rather than undermine its 
objectives, committees are in fact designed as a tool to further its control of the 
legislative process. 55 Consequently, a homogenous majority party can seize legislative 
52 Hall, R, 1996, p. 87. 
53 Barbara Hinckley, Stability and Change in Congress, 3rd ed. Harper & Row, New York, 1983. 
54 Cox, G& McCubbins, M, 1993, pp. 60-79. 
55 Ibid., p. 8. 
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authority in order to prosecute a political agenda on which its members agree. 
It has been argued that parties leave committees to pursue their own objectives. As 
members whose constituencies care about issues within a committee's jurisdiction 
tend to be successful when applying for seats, this is an indication that parties have 
limited control over committees. Hall argues that subcommittee assignments are 
ostensibly self-selected: assignments are informally arranged and lawmakers 
invariably get their first choice of seats. 56 Cox and McCubbins contest the view that 
steering committees merely rubberstamp assignment requests. They find that while 
between fifty and sixty percent of first choice requests between the 86th and the 97th 
Congresses were accommodated, upwards of thirty-five percent of lawmakers were 
unsuccessful in all their assignment requests. 57 They further argue that the proportion 
of successful requests does not allow for informal enquiries made prior to 
applications, lawmakers' calculations of which committees they stand the best chance 
of being accepted on, and the fact that steering committees will occasionally refuse 
assignment requests even though vacancies are still outstanding. 58 In short, gauging 
party influence from committee assignments may be of limited utility because 
observed success may not match actual success. 
If parties had no control over assignments, making committees open to any 
lawmaker, then prestige committees would be overwhelmed with requests for seats. 
There is also an overlap between the partisan and the self-selection explanation. For 
56 Hall, R, 1996, pp. 118-120. Irwin Gertzog, `Routinization of Committee Assignments in the U. S. 
House of Representatives, ' American Journal of Political Science, vol. 20,1976, pp. 693-712. 
57 Cox, G& McCubbins, M, 1993, pp. 31-34. 
58 Ibid., p. 33. 
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the former to be relevant, committee assignments would be allocated in a manner that 
furthers a collective goal; most likely reelection chances for the party to maintain its 
majority status. As a party that wants to win elections will see the benefit in letting its 
members participate in the committees of their choice and that individual lawmakers 
will seek out assignments that maximise their reelection chances, it is not clear that 
the self- or partisan-selection models are different. 
Another element of committee autonomy that Cox and McCubbins investigate is the 
automatic appointment of lawmakers to committee chairs or ranking minority seats 
due to the length of service to the committee. 59 When seniority is inviolate, power in 
the chamber is decentralised away from party control and given to individuals. Nelson 
Polsby et al. measured postwar accession to committee chairs and found that either 
apportionment was automatically awarded or a senior position on another committee 
was offered. 60 Cox and McCubbins contest this by arguing that seniority may not be 
the only reason that certain lawmakers get access to key positions. 61 They cite cases in 
which members of the party caucus and steering committees have supported 
committee requests from lawmakers from their region. Also, statistics showing 
seniority as inviolate disguise cases where rule changes have been imposed to prevent 
lower ranking committee members from gaining from the seniority system. For 
example, there have been occasions when a former majority party will remove people 
who have served for longer than others when cutting the number of committee seats. 
59 Ibid., pp. 43-59. 
60 Nelson Polsby, Miriam Gallaher & Barry Rundquist, `The Growth of the Seniority System in the 
House of Representatives, ' American Political Science Review, vol. 62, no. 1,1969, pp. 148-168. 
61 Cox, G& McCubbins, M, 1993, p. 48. 
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Claims of committee autonomy remain debatable, but what is certain is that a 
succession of reforms have weakened committees since their heyday in the 1940s and 
1950s. Individual committees' ability to block legislation from reaching the floor was 
restricted with the 1974 rule that legislation is referred to several committees, but at 
the same time the reform arguably decentralised power so much that it made it much 
more difficult for individual committees to introduce initiatives. Overlapping 
committee jurisdictions impede formulation of coherent policy, encourage obstruction 
and reduce the ability to hold individuals accountable. These problems were addressed 
by the House Republicans' 1995 changes that limited chairs to six year terms, 
dissolved three standing committees, prohibited proxy voting, limited committees to 
five subcommittees, restricted members' assignments to two committees and four 
subcommittees, and cut staff by one third. The 1995 reforms so centralised the 
fragmented system that there was even a shift of power back to committees from 
subcommittees. Committee chairs were given rights such as naming members 
(including leaders) of subcommittees and hiring staff. The reforms nonetheless 
prompted a wholesale reduction in committee autonomy in favour of the Republican 
leadership. The leaders took additional control away from committees by giving the 
speaker the power to select which aspects of legislation committees were given 
jurisdiction over and to create nearly twenty ad hoc task forces covering such subjects 
as crime and term limits. 62 
The 1990s' reforms suggest that committees are under the sway of majority party 
62 There were no dramatic rule changes or the elimination of committees, but in the spirit of the mid- 
1990s reform some Senate committees cut back on their subcommittees, slashed their operating budgets 
by fifteen percent, and reduced staff by twenty percent. As with the House, these reforms were designed 
to take power away from committees, but did not fully take effect until 1997. 
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leaders, but a variant on the subservient committee view insists that committees are 
subordinate to their parent chamber and so produce legislation they know will pass on 
the floor. 63 One of the most notable third generation expositions on this is Krehbiel's 
Information and Legislative Organisation. 64 Krehbiel offers an informational 
rationale that he argues is better at explaining congressional behaviour than 
distributive/gains from exchange models, which do not allow for specialisation or 
policy expertise. 65 Similar to Hall's notion of lawmakers trading how active they are 
prepared to be on an issue, Krehbiel's supply-side model is less concerned with the 
pork-barrelling and log-rolling associated with distributive models than with how 
lawmakers acquire and circulate expert information. 
The two main themes of Krehbiel's book are his Majoritarian and Uncertainty 
postulates. 66 With the former, Krehbiel talks of `remote majoritarian choices' as the 
basis of individual decision making. This is more than merely voting majorities as 
depicted by the 1970s generation of congressional scholars: policy is in fact a 
consequence of institutional features that are chosen by majorities to act in their 
interests. Institutions are endogenous to policy decision making which ensures an 
equalibrium where policy outcomes result from both individual preferences and 
institutional practices. In short, institutions that frustrate the will of the majorities do 
not last. The majoritarian postulate states that everything is done to satisfy the 
majority. The uncertainty postulate, however, questions whether the majority even 
knows what it wants. In order to address this shortfall, chambers create specialists: 
63 Joseph Cooper, `The House and Its Committees: Some Organizational Perspectives, ' Committee 
Organization in the House, House Select Committee on Committees, Washington, 1973, pp. 541-551. 
64 Krehbiel, K, 1991. 
65 Ibid., pp. 3-6. 
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`Informational theories embrace the notion of policy expertise as a potential 
collective good. If obtained and shared, individuals' policy expertise redounds to 
the whole, that is, to all legislators. As in the distributive perspective, informational 
theories view legislatures as arenas of individual distributive conflict. But, unlike 
the distributive perspective, informational theories also view legislatures as 
organisations that may reap collective benefits from specialisation. A7 
In order to reap collective benefits, chambers provide committees with resources 
and agenda controls to help them become policy experts. Due to difficulties predicting 
how policy will evolve, committees, with their expertise and access to information, 
work to reduce non-members' uncertainties about outcomes by sharing policy 
information. The institution thus creates a committee system to ensure an efficient 
division of labour in which the acquisition of information and the framing of policy is 
apportioned to account for the massive and varied workload with which each chamber 
is burdened. Krehbiel thus conceives of committees not only as having agenda setting 
and distributive powers, but also as organisations of specialists created by the chamber 
to collect and disseminate information of use to all non-members. 68 This stresses how 
central committees are to Krehbiel's informational rationale. Committees may not be 
autonomous, but, because they have access to information that may affect voting, they 
have a major influence on policy. In short, when committees distribute new 
information, the legislature will make decisions that are different had such 
information not been available. 
As noted, committees in distributive models are composed of members whose 
66 Ibid., pp. 16-19. 
67 Ibid., p. 5. 
68 Ibid. 
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preferences diverge significantly from those of the larger legislature. 69 For Krehbiel's 
chamber-centred informational rationale to be of theoretical value, the preferences of 
committee members should be similar to the wider chamber. If committees reflect the 
chamber, assignments should not be self-selected by high-demanders with a specific 
interest in getting a seat. Committees should also not be peopled by preference 
outliers: the ideological ratings of committee members should be heterogeneous in 
that they are similar to both Republican and Democratic sides of the policy spectrum. 
In other words, committees are not so ideologically homogenous that they do not 
reflect the chamber. Although he finds some evidence of preference outlying 
committees, the overall composition of the committees studied by Krehbiel seem 
rarely to be significantly biased relative to the parent chamber. 70 
As neither thinks that mean ideologies among committee members are significantly 
different to chamber majorities, Krehbiel's findings reach a similar conclusion to Cox 
and McCubbins's analysis that is mentioned above. This thesis, however, will not run 
tests of preference outliers on foreign policy committees. It is difficult to conclude 
whether foreign policy committees are made up of high-demanders in the same way, 
for example, that it is possible to count how many members of agriculture committees 
are from farming districts. This thesis thus does not run a test of assignment selection 
or a study of policy outliers, but the regression analysis in each case chapter 
(described below) indicates that House and Senate foreign policy committees are not 
homogenous and reflect voting behaviour in the wider chambers. 
69 Ibid., p. 127. Deering, C& Smith, S, 1997. 
70 Krehbiel, K, 1991, p. 249. Cox, G& McCubbins, M, 1993, pp. 60-79. 
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It is plausible that committees are effectively agents of majorities in Congress. Both 
the House and Senate set committee rules, and, as a majority on the floor must 
approve bills, the threat of rejection forces committees to consider the chances of roll 
call success when framing legislation. Especially when there is little party cohesion 
and when issues are salient, committees are likely to become agents of the chamber. 
Consequently, committee dominance is generally not as noticeable in the 
comparatively less partisan Senate. Relatively more independently-minded senators 
have greater powers than their colleagues in the lower chamber because the size of the 
House requires more restrictive rules and party dominance to control legislators. The 
filibuster allows senators more opportunities to prevent legislation succeeding on the 
floor, and, whereas House amendments must be germane to the bill, senators can 
attach any amendment to a committee bill. This reduces the control that committees 
have over their bills once they reach the floor. Senators have even seen their power 
increase in recent years. They used to be required to sit on numerous committees, but 
since the 1977 reforms increased staff and cut the number of committees senators 
have had more time to concentrate on non-committee matters. 
The idea that senators create a system in which they are free to decide on issues 
suggests that ideological views are an important voting cue. Rather than relying on 
prompting by policy specialists, lawmakers have sufficient knowledge and experience 
to make their own voting decisions on a new issue. That lawmakers use ideas on other 
issues as a way to reduce informational costs when faced with a new issue is a 
potentially persuasive way of explaining collective action. It does seem intuitive that 
ideology should impact on congressional decision making. Lawmakers' greater 
interest and involvement in politics means they are likely to employ a `single, abstract 
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ideological dimension to evaluate most issues. '71 This implies that lawmakers decide 
how to vote based on their personal views, unconstrained by party, institutional or 
electoral considerations. As lawmakers do not have time to study in depth every issue 
that they are expected to vote on, relying on previously-held views helps reduce the 
costs of participation. Particularly non-committee members who do not have access to 
the same extent of information as members are likely to rely on ideological 
preferences. Put simply, ideology serves as a cognitive shortcut when making voting 
decisions. 
The notion of cognitive shortcuts has been applied to the study of foreign policy 
decision making. The causal weight of ideas, and not just traditional conceptions of 
the national interest, has been investigated by Goldstein et al. They dispute realist or 
rationalist claims that decisions are calculations of short-term national or personal 
interests, and are instead made by competing elites with beliefs held prior to the 
emergence of specific issues. 72 They argue that ideas are analogous to `roadmaps' in 
which decision makers follow specific paths to choices, largely discarding alternative 
routes. 73 In the absence of innovation, ideas become embedded in institutions, 
individuals and groups. 74 An ideational approach does not dismiss interests as a major 
influence, but draws on the Weberian notion of ideas shaping how people perceive 
security interests. Put differently, decision makers' preconceived ideas about problems 
impact on the response they think is in the national interest. 
71 Valerie Sulfaro, `Sources of Structure in Congressional Behavior: The Influence of Ideology on 
Foreign and Domestic Policy Votes, ' Southeastern Political Review, vol. 28, no. 1, March 2000, pp. 77- 
110, p. 80. 
72 Judith Goldstein & Robert Keohane (eds. ), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and 
Political, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993. 
73 Ibid., p. 12. 
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The ideational approach does have its critics. Clausen dismisses the liberal- 
conservative variable as a predictor of roll calls, claiming, `Few politicians... possess 
either the talent to develop, or the desire to abide to by, a clearly formed ideology. '75 
Another criticism is that unidimensional ratings that include multi-issue voting are 
potentially misleading because if lawmakers vote differently across issues a single 
score will disguise important distinctions. 76 Any voting predictions are based on the 
assumption that lawmakers maintain consistent ideological opinions over a period of 
time and range of issues. What is especially problematic about foreign policy is its 
relative complexity and `psychological distance from traditional constituent concerns' 
that renders it tangential to other issue areas. 77 
Goldstein et al. focus on foreign policy, but if ideology is structured as part of 
congressional behaviour there should be an identifiable pattern of voting behaviour 
across issue areas. 78 Without a multi-issue rating then all that can be said is that those 
who persistently vote the conservative position in foreign policy are likely to do so in 
future. However, a multi-issue liberal-conservative continuum as a predictor of 
political preferences has been used since the 1960s. 79 Research has consistently been 
produced that supports the notion of congressional voting being explained by 
74 Ibid., p. 13. 
75 Aage Clausen, How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1973, 
p. 101. Quoted in Sulfaro, V, 2000, p. 79. 
76 Clyde Wilcox & Aage Clausen, `The Dimensionality of Roll-Call Voting Reconsidered, ' Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 16,1991, pp. 393-406. 
77 Sulfaro, V, 2000, p. 79. 
78 Ibid., p. 80. 
79 See in particular, Philip Converse, `The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Politics, ' Ideology and 
Discontent, ed. Apter, D, Free Press, New York, 1964, pp. 206-261. 
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ideological inclinations. 80 More recently, Sulfaro found that ideology was the most 
important dimension in both domestic and foreign policy in the early 1990s. 81 
Most work in this area uses ideological ratings taken by interest groups, but track 
only one aspect of observable behaviour. They do not, as examples, monitor behind- 
the-scenes actions or incorporate any content analysis of speeches. However, 
empirical evidence seems to bolster the value of ratings. A raft of research has 
appeared that confirms the reliability of the unidimensional model. Shaffer, for 
example, analysed the key votes used for Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) 
ratings over eighteen years and found the single score instructs much congressional 
behaviour. 82 
Whether ideology can serve as an `independent' cue is also questionable. Interest 
group ratings do not control for how much voting decisions are influenced by such 
other factors as party pressure and constituency demands. It has been argued that 
ideological preference is indistinguishable from electoral self-interest to the degree 
that even when politicians occasionally vote contrary to constituent demands this 
could be done to boost their reputation in order to attract more election funding. 83 
Research showing that senators are able to shirk the demands of their constituents and 
allow their personal views to dictate their voting decisions has challenged such a 
80 Jerrold Scheider, Ideological Coalitions in Congress, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1979. Keith 
Poole, `Dimensions of Interest Group Evaluation of the U. S. Senate, 1969-1978, ' American Journal of 
Political Science, vol. 25,1981, pp. 49-67. 
81 Sulfaro, V, 2000. 
82 William Shaffer, `Rating the Performance of ADA in the U. S. Congress, ' Western Political 
uarterl , vol. 
42, no. 1,1989, pp. 33-51. 
83 Sam Peltzman, `Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting, ' Journal of Law and Economics, 
vol. 27,1984, pp. 211-240. 
Chapter Three: Congressional Decision-Making 106 
view. 84 Due to reduced concerns about expending political capital indulging 
electorally unpopular viewpoints, older senators (and therefore nearer to retirement 
than younger senators) are much more likely to vote according to their own views. 
This implies that in the Senate, where average ages are higher than in the House, 
ideology is a more prevalent cue. This comparative disregard for constituency 
demands may also reflect the fact that senators stand for election every six, rather than 
two, years. 
That reelection considerations should supersede ideological preferences is perhaps 
inevitable in the US political system. Especially in two party systems, it has been 
argued that parties converge on policy preferences because maximising votes requires 
moving towards the ideological mainstream. The corollary is that voter approval 
outweighs ideologies, which, according to Anthony Downs in his seminal work on 
public opinion and government behaviour, are merely `weapons in the struggle for 
office. '85 A connection between voting behaviour and constituency opinion is 
explored in many other studies. A classic work is Fenno's Home Styles, which 
explores the constraint that constituents place on their representatives. 86 Fenno quotes 
one representative as saying, `I'm not here to vote my own convictions. I'm here to 
represent my people. '87 
84 Michael Davis & Philip Porter, `A Test for Pure or Apparent Ideology in Congressional Voting, ' 
Public Choice, vol. 60,1989, pp101-111. 
85 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper and Row, New York, 1957, p. 96. See 
also Gerald Pomper, & Susan Lederman, Elections in America: Control and Influence in Domestic 
Politics. Longman, New York, 1980, especially chapter seven (pp. 128-155). 
86 Fenno, R, 1978. 
87 Ibid., p. 146. See also John Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions, University of Michigan 
Press, Ann Arbor, 1989, p. 48. Eileen Burgin, `Representatives' Decisions on Participation in Foreign 
Policy Issues, ' Legislative Studies Quarterly, XVI, 4, Nov 1991, pp. 521-546. 
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The electoral connection assumes that lawmakers, wishing to avoid accusations of 
being unpatriotic, will rarely challenge the administration in foreign policy, and will 
only grandstand on issues that align with constituency preferences. This portrays 
lawmakers as irresponsible vote-seekers on foreign policy, but the constituency link 
does not account exclusively for all aspects of lawmakers' behaviour. Firstly, the 
electoral connection is unable to explain why congressional involvement continued to 
increase and expand into foreign policy areas in the post-Vietnam 1980s and 1990s 
long after public interest waned. Secondly, it is not guaranteed after the election that 
campaign promises will be adhered to, with politicians, according to Wood and 
Andersson, shifting the equilibrium to include personal, constituent and global 
concerns. 88 Thirdly, the electoral connection ignores legislators' tactical ploys. For 
example, a lawmaker may vote for a bill that he or she does not support but their 
constituents do because it is certain to fail. Additionally, if lawmakers do not want an 
amendment that is popular with constituents, they could vote for a rule blocking the 
amendment without voters finding out. 
Cue-taking from the public has been dismissed as voters are not particularly 
interested in foreign affairs. 89 The public's inability to form structured, coherent 
opinions poses such a potentially fatal threat to effective government that foreign 
policy should be left to elites. Indeed, the notion of a fickle public encroaching on the 
perennial rules of foreign policy encounters the realist view of government as the 
88 B. Dan Wood & Angela Hinton Andersson, The Dynamics of Senatorial Representation, 1952- 
1991, ' The Journal of Politics, vol. 60, no. 3,1998, pp. 705-736. 
89 Philip Powlick, The Attitudinal Bases for Responsiveness to Public Opinion among American 
Foreign Policy Officials, ' Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 35, no. 4, December 1991, pp. 611-641. 
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leader and not the follower of public opinion. 90 That said, due in part to elevated 
education levels and wider media coverage, the belief that the public is capable of 
making rational, meaningful and consistent decisions in the area of foreign policy has 
gained ground. 91 Moreover, lacking an intricate political knowledge does not diminish 
the ability to form coherent opinions. Even without a detailed knowledge, the public 
remains capable of forming rational foreign policy opinions. As Page et al. asked: 
`[h]ow important was it to be able to identify SALT or NATO or other acronyms, 
so long as people knew the United States belonged to an anti-Soviet military 
alliance and had talks about arms control with the USSR? '92 
Also, certain foreign policy matters, such as committing US forces into combat, are 
followed with considerable public interest. 93 Even while new issues such as 
immigration, drugs, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation became prominent in the mid- 
1990s, lawmakers are still aware that the relatively low levels of interest in foreign 
policy can change once military casualties are sustained 94 Lastly, describing the 
public as a single entity is problematic. Those of lower socio-economic status are less 
favourable towards escalation in war than middle class Americans, and citizens who 
attain higher levels of education are more likely to be informed about foreign affairs 
and to express their views. 95 
90 For a review of the realism-public opinion literature of the cold war-era, see Ole Holsti, `Public 
Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus, ' International Studies 
uarterl vol. 36,1992, pp. 439-466, especially pp. 442-445. 
91 Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 87-118. 
92 Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy 
Preferences, University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 13. 
93 Mueller's well-known study identifies a link between public support and US casualties in the Korean 
and Vietnam wars. John Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, John Wiley, New York, 1973. 
94 John Rielly, `The Public Mood at Mid-Decade, ' Foreign Policy, no. 98, Spring 1995, pp. 76-94. 
95 Andre Modigliani, `Hawks and Doves, Isolationism and Political Distrust: An Analysis of Public 
Opinion on Military Policy, ' American Political Science Review, vol. 66,1972, pp. 960-978, p. 964. 
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It is fair to say that lawmakers have an instinct about what the public will tolerate. 
Cohen, for example, found that while foreign policy makers do not attach great 
importance to polls, they do tend to rely on a sense of the public mood. 96 Lawmakers 
will let their districts know that they are working hard in Washington, but the electoral 
connection is ultimately unable to explain why lawmakers engage in issues that are 
unpopular with voters and undertake legislative work that is unseen by constituents. 97 
The electoral connection is better at explaining the relationship between elected 
leaders and constituency subsets. Hall argues that while undifferentiated masses of 
voters have little impact on a lawmaker's position, this is not the case with 
subconstituencies. For example, on a milk bill, dairy farmers will pay close attention 
to how much effort their representative makes on their behalf. 98 This encourages 
lawmakers to `showhorse' by concentrating on formal roles (voting) at the cost of 
informal (backroorn negotiations) to show interested sub constituencies that they are 
working for them. 99 
Such activity implies that the existence of a subconstituency powerful enough to 
swing an election depends on the issue. Not only is this issue-specific reasoning 
entirely plausible it can also be applied more generally to cue-taking analysis. 
Whether partisanship or another cue is the most significant dimension depends largely 
on the issue. Particularly in an institution of multiple political issues, it is also 
plausible that a combination of factors, rather than one overarching principle, explains 
96 Bernard Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy, Little Brown, Boston, 1973, pp. 64-70. 
97 Lindsay, J, 1994ä, p. 33. Hall, R, 1996, p. 4. 
98 Hall, R, 1996, p. 59. 
99 Ibid., p. 62. 
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behaviour. Indeed, Shepsle and Weingast argue that third generation models that deal 
with the role of parties, information and committees are not as incompatible as they 
may appear, and so encourage research that merges all of them. 100 All third generation 
models are concerned with the creation of an institution that can solve collective 
dilemmas through cooperation, they accept that knowledge of outcomes is 
asymmetrical and imperfect, with committees serving as the main source of 
information. Consequently, blending elements of each approach widens understanding 
beyond the previous generations' overemphasis on gains from exchange explanations, 
and describes a process closer to Congress's complex and varied policy making 
process. As such, any exploration of foreign policy voting behaviour needs to consider 
an array of possible explanatory factors. 
Binary Logistic Regression and the Cue-Taking Variables 
One purpose of the cases considered in this thesis is to examine the strength of the 
potential cues discussed above on congressional floor votes. As roll calls are 
dichotomous, categorical dependent variables, analysis of congressional voting on the 
cases uses a binary logistic regression (BLR) model run on SPPS (version 12). BLR 
predicts which category in the dependent variable a subject will likely be in, based on 
a series of predictive (independent) variables. On the basis of such factors as party and 
committee membership, each legislator is given a probability by the logistic regression 
function that is used to allocate them to one of the two categories of the dependent 
variable. This is similar to discriminant analysis, the more commonly used method of 
100 Shepsle, K, & Weingast, B, 1994, pp. 166-167. 
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category prediction, but this is not suited to the datasets as a reliable discriminant 
analysis requires restrictive conditions such as a normal distribution. As well as being 
more appropriate than linear and multiple regression (which can only work on 
measurable, quantitative scores), the qualitative nature of the datasets mean that BLR 
is more apposite than widely used models such as ANOVA. Analysis of variance 
would be useful in showing which independent variables have the strongest influence 
on voting behaviour, but ANOVA is essentially unable to handle tests with the 
amount of categorical variables used in the cases. It is also for this reason that chi 
square crosstabulation, which can run comparisons between singular independent and 
dependent variables, is rejected. The MANOVA model is also eliminated due to its 
difficulty with multiple categorical variables. MANOVA has an advantage over 
ANOVA as it can run tests with more than one dependent variable, but even if it could 
manage numerous predictor variables, including all votes in the case chapters is not 
necessary as the analysis selects one key vote as the primary dependent variable. In 
summary, as it can handle dichotomous dummy criterion and multiple independent 
qualitative variables that are not normally distributed, BLR is the most reliable test of 
category prediction for this purpose. 
As an equation, the logistic regression function, though nonlinear, is similar to a 
linear regression equation involving a linear function Z of the independent variables: 
Z=BO+BIXI+B2X2 
.... 
Bo is the constant, Bi+B2 are the regression coefficients and Xi+X2 are the 
independent variables. The purpose is to calculate the probability of an event based on 
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the odds in favour of the event happening. At a simplistic level the logistic regression 
is based on the odds of an event happening (that is, an independent variable having a 
significant impact on a dependent variable) divided by the odds of the event not 
happening. 101 
A dummy dichotomous score of 'I' will be given for those who voted `yes' and `2' 
for those who voted `no' on key roll calls for each member of the House and Senate. 
Roll calls are a useful tool for exploring cues used by lawmakers to frame opinion, but 
they are not perfect. As well as Hall's complaint that deciding which way to vote is 
one of the least onerous tasks facing a legislator, the use of roll call votes for analysis 
has been criticised because they are only a partial representation of legislative 
behaviour. 102 The function of committees as gatekeepers means they can stop bills 
reaching the floor. If committees are preference outliers, then it could suppress a true 
picture of lawmakers' attitudes by preventing certain issues from reaching the floor. 
As noted earlier, however, the evidence suggests that committees do not greatly differ 
ideologically or party politically from non-members. Consequently, committees' 
gatekeeper role should not be regarded as a drawback to using floor activity as a 
measure of all lawmakers' views. 103 
The cases include five predictor variables in their models. To test whether party 
membership has a significant effect on voting behaviour, `Party' is a dichotomy 
101 The description of the equation is simplified for the purposes required here. For an explanation of 
the binary logistic regression equation and output tables, see Paul Kinnear & Colin Gray, SPSS 12 
Made Simple, Psychology Press, Hove, 2004, pp. 387-396. 
102 James Snyder, `Artificial Extremism in Interest Group Ratings, ' Legislative Studies Quarterly, 
vol. 17,1992, pp. 319-46. 
103 Sulfaro, V, 2000, p. 82. 
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scored 1 if the lawmaker is Republican and 2 if Democrat. The BLR model will test 
whether being a Republican or Democrat is enough to predict category membership. 
As with the other variables, if partisanship is a significant factor then it is assumed 
that a change in the party assigned to each legislator would lead to a change in voting 
behaviour. 
In testing for a link between membership of the foreign policy committees and 
voting in the case chapters, the number 1 is entered into the SPSS value box for all 
members of the eight foreign policy committees listed above (no distinction is made 
for chairs or ranking members). The analysis allocates the value label 2 for all non- 
members. This tests whether being a member of one of the foreign policy committees 
allows for predictions of voting activity. In other words, are the voting decisions of 
committee members impervious to other factors, such as partisanship, or are they a 
response to these outside agencies? 
The Election variable explores whether the security of lawmakers' seats impinges 
on voting decisions. It measures whether a member's electoral support is enough to 
shape their voting decisions. Influence could manifest itself in anticipated rewards or 
punishment at the next election, or simply that members expect to have to explain 
their decision to constituents. If the issue were sufficiently vulnerable to such 
constraints, a result would be produced that shows that those who represent unsafe 
seats make identical voting choices. To assess this possibility, each lawmaker's 
margin of victory at the previous general election result is calculated. To account for 
elections in which several candidates won a share of the vote, calculations only 
include votes for Republican and Democratic candidates. For Democrats, this is done 
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by subtracting the losing Republican candidate's percentage share of the sum of the 
Republican and Democratic votes from the winning Democrat's percentage share of 
the same number of votes. For example, Rep. Robert Borski (D-PA) won sixty percent 
of the total number of Democratic and Republican votes in 1992, giving him a twenty 
percent margin of victory. This process is reversed to calculate Republican margins of 
victory. As the 535 margins of victory vary from less than one to ninety-eight percent, 
legislators are allotted into groups of ten percentage points: those with margins 
between 0 and 9.99 percent are coded `1', those between 10 and 19.999 are coded `2' 
and so on. For example, Rep. Butler Derrick (D-SC) beat his Republican rival by a 
margin of 22.31 in the 1992 election and so is allocated the number W. 
Those who ran unopposed in the general election or retired by the next election are 
coded `11'. This is because the election variable would presumably have a relatively 
weaker impact on voting decisions for unopposed or lame duck members. Unopposed 
lawmakers may face party challenges at primary elections, but by holding seats that 
the opposition party has no realistic chance of taking at the next election, they are less 
vulnerable to constituency disapproval than members with unsafe seats. The yearly 
edition of CQ publishes the list of retiring members. Anyone who stood down at the 
end of his or her term is counted as retiring. Due to the length of time involved in 
organising election campaigns, it is assumed that retirees knew they would not be 
seeking reelection by the time they voted in the cases and so their concern about 
constituency approval cannot be put in the same category as the others. The variable 
makes no distinction for lawmakers who resigned in disgrace. As it is difficult to 
pinpoint when they realised that they would not be standing at the next election, it is 
assumed that they were still concerned about constituency opinion until announcing 
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their resignation. 
This measure of electoral margin takes no account of constituency preferences. 
Whether constituents are predominantly for or against UNPE interventions is not 
considered here. It is possible to study district and state level opinion polls to see if 
there is a causal effect, but this would only be worth doing if the election variable is 
significant, which is not expected to be the case. 
The influence of ideology on voting decisions is then considered. The ideology 
variable tests whether there is a significant link between a lawmaker's position on a 
liberal-conservative continuum and foreign policy voting choices in the cases. The 
annual ratings from the American Conservative Union (ACU) is taken as the 
measure. 104 The ACU rate how conservative every member of Congress is from 
voting choices on a range of issues. The higher the score, the more conservative 
legislators are presumed to be on a range of issues and therefore more likely to vote 
the conservative position on foreign policy. 
To reduce the possibility of drawing inferences that are affected by suppressed 
relationships, the cases will include a final independent variable- President. This 
variable assesses the impact of the chief executive's popularity on voting decisions. 
Clinton's percentage of the 1992 presidential vote for each lawmaker's district or state 
is listed. Ranging from twenty to eighty-five, the percentages are grouped into the 
same sets of ten percentage points as the election variable. The purpose of including 
104 All ACU ratings for representatives and senators since 1972 can be found at: 
www. conservative. org/ratingsarchive. asp 
Chapter Three: Congressional Decision-Making 116 
this variable is to test whether there is a significant difference between those who 
come from districts where Clinton received a high percentage of the vote and those 
from constituencies which gave Clinton minimal support. Although this is another 
electoral and partisan variable, it is an appropriate quantitative measure of presidential 
influence. It is true that one could create a variable based on the number of times each 
lawmaker voted for or against the president. However, there is a danger of a false 
positive or type I error as this would produce an unrealistically significant result as all 
it says is that those who regularly vote against the president are more likely to do so in 
the cases considered here. 
The variables chosen offer a fair spread of potential voting cues. Any one of the 
party, president, election, committee, ideology and regional variables could be cited as 
possible influences on voting behaviour. Admittedly, the range of variables is not 
exhaustive. For example, there is no measure of interest group or media influence. 
The lack of an interest group variable is due to problems finding a suitable measure 
with which to test lawmakers' susceptibility to interest group pressure. Foreigners are 
barred from making campaign donations and domestic organisations which might 
wish to influence congressional decision making on humanitarian interventions are 
unlikely to have money to fund enough lawmakers to the extent that they would 
change their vote. As it is also impossible to check how much time and effort 
lawmakers spent with these groups between 1992 and 1995, an interest group variable 
is avoided. 
It is reasonable to assume that in lawmakers' minds the mass media is an important 
foreign policy floor voting guide Intuitively one would suppose that politicians try to 
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appear responsive because of the media's leverage with voters, but the relationship is 
complex and subject to much disagreement. 105 One view is that television pictures of 
Third World famines have prompted governmental action; or at least `speeded up the 
decision-making process. ' 106 Others argue that the media merely reports issues with 
which the government is already dealing. For instance, television news companies 
only picked up the Somali crisis after it had been widely debated in Washington. 107 
One way of assessing the role of the media in the cases would be to conduct a content 
analysis of news reports to see if they have a corresponding effect on voting. 
However, alleging that media reports about UN involvement in UNPE operations 
influenced lawmakers is difficult to prove. Time series analyses search for changes in 
the media position and then find a corresponding shift in lawmakers' positions. 108 
While this can show that the media have no impact, it does not confirm a causal 
connection between congressional activity and media reporting. Such analysis 
presumes that lawmakers or their staffers have seen, understood and acted upon news 
reports. Studies have measured media influence by reading articles and categorising 
them as `for' or `against' an issue. Media reports are, in fact, often descriptive and 
difficult to determine whether they are for or against an issue. 109 By blending criticism 
with praise, most op-ed articles on interventions are ambiguous, conveying cautious 
approval of a limited US humanitarian role. Due to these problems of linking media 
reports with congressional voting decisions, a media variable is not tested. 
105 On media influence: Lance Bennett & David Paletz, `The News About Foreign Policy, ' Taken by 
Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U. S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf WVar, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1994, pp. 13-17. 
106 Michael Mandelbaum, `The Reluctance to Intervene, ' Foreign Policy, no. 95,1994, pp. 3-18, p. 16. _ 107 Jonathan Mermin, `Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media- 
Driven Foreign Policy, ' Political Science Quarterly, vol. 112, no. 3,1997, pp. 385-403. 
108 For a time series analysis opposing the view that the media influences policy, see Ibid. 
109 See Richard Brody, Crisis, War, and Public Opinion: The Media and Public Support for the 
President, Bennett, L& Paletz, D, 1994, pp. 210-227. 
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Despite incorporating only six variables, if the models are significant predictor of 
foreign policy voting behaviour then the null hypothesis (that there is no relationship 
between predictor and criterion variables) can be rejected. The tests will give a better 
idea of whether lawmakers were driven primarily by partisan concerns, were freelance 
entrepreneurs indulging their own ideological predilections or constituency delegates, 
and whether being a member of a foreign policy committee is enough to predict voting 
behaviour. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter broadens the thesis's research into congressional behaviour by 
considering how collective decision are reached. It considers a number of perspectives 
on congressional decision making that the case chapters will examine. Drawing firstly 
on Hall's argument that lawmakers are largely free to participate in the issues that 
interest them, the chapter contends that most lawmakers are only marginally involved 
in foreign policy. The opportunity costs of participating beyond floor voting are so 
high that, as with any given issue, a few specialists direct foreign policy decision 
making. The extent of participation among individual lawmakers, party leaders and 
foreign policy committee members will be explored in detail in the case chapters. In 
considering how lawmakers create collective outcomes when so few participate 
beyond the cursory, the chapter aligns with elements of what Shepsle and Weingast 
refer to as the third generation of congressional analysis. As well as looking at 
electoral and committee cues, the chapter further considers the importance of party 
and ideology on voting decisions introduced in chapter two. Themes related to these 
potential cues are explored and the methodology used in the case chapters to test their 
relative importance on voting is explained. It describes the statistical test used in the 
cases- binary logistic regression- which, based on factors such as committee 
membership, is used to predict roll call voting decisions. 
Chapter Three: Congressional Decision-Making 120 
Chapter Four: Somalia 
Introduction 
This chapter uses the American engagement in the UN operation in Somalia to 
explore the role of Congress in post-cold war foreign policy making. It discusses the 
origins of the crisis, the events leading to the US intervention in 1992, domestic 
support for the UNITAF operation, and the Clinton administration's handling of the 
crisis. It then investigates the impact of the Somali crisis on post-cold war foreign 
policy and what it reveals about congressional behaviour. 
A key aim is to show that Congress influenced US policy towards Somalia. It will 
argue that lawmakers used legislative and non-legislative measures to pressure Bush 
into ordering the mission in 1992, and then to compel Clinton to abandon it in 1993. 
The chapter further argues that while UNPE as a foreign policy approach did not end 
with the October 1993 debacle in Mogadishu, it was modified in part due to 
congressional demands. This interpretation of interbranch relations is used to 
challenge the two presidencies view that Congress is ineffectual and uninterested in 
foreign policy. 
The other purpose of the chapter is to examine the voting behaviour of individual 
lawmakers. The analysis explores cue-taking on key floor votes on the Somalia crisis. 
The binary logistic regression tests find that partisanship in the House is the most 
reliable indication of preferences, and while ideology is the most powerful cue in the 
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Senate. Partisan voting in the House, however, was seemingly not driven by party 
leaders and whips. The chapter thus considers why an institution of mostly non- 
participatory members and apparently indifferent leaders managed such a forceful 
reaction to the Clinton administration's Somalia policy. As members of foreign policy 
committees provided most of the legislation relating to the Somalia crisis, it is argued 
that both Hall's notion of policy specialists and Krehbiel's informational rationale 
offer convincing explanations of how collective decisions are reached. 
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Part One: The Crisis in Somalia 
Historical Background 
Somalia was ruled from 1969 by a president whose repressive regime imposed a 
uniform culture on rival clans with no historical loyalty to the state of Somalia. 
President Siad Barre's increasing alienation of the clans led to widespread violence 
throughout the 1980s. When Barre was overthrown by a guerrilla group called the 
United Somali Congress in January 1991, the numerous political organisations 
operation in Somalia were unable to share power. The ensuing civil war between 
militia forces linked to the various warlords and Barre's troops plunged the country 
into a state of anarchy, frustrating the delivery of food supplies intended to deal with 
the growing threat of famine. 
By 1992, the fighting had killed 15,000 people and hampered the delivery of food 
supplies. The UNSC responded by launching UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in 
Somalia), consisting of fifty monitors. ' Due to this ineffective response, Congress 
lobbied Bush into airlifting supplies. On August 3, the Senate passed by voice vote a 
resolution urging the president to install UN security guards. 2 A troop deployment had 
its critics within the administration. Colin Powell (JCS) and Brent Scowcroft (NSA) 
were cautious about placing US troops in a crisis where the enemy was not easily 
identifiable, but, by November the prevailing view was that a UNPE operation was 
feasible. On November 25, Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, offered UN 
1 Resolution 751, April 24,1992. 
2 S. Con. Res. 132. Passed by voice vote. 
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Secretary-General (UNSG) Boutros-Ghali 30,000 US troops with the condition that 
they serve under US commanders. On December 3, the UNSC passed Resolution 794, 
which authorised member states to establish `a secure environment for humanitarian 
relief operations. ' A day after the UNSC sanctioned Resolution 794 Bush announced 
the deployment of 30,000 US troops as part of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). 
Although the administration may have preferred a national government reinstated in 
Mogadishu, Bush's intention was not to nation-build, but to halt a humanitarian crisis. 
The Gulf War was the blueprint, but, arguably, the US-UN operation in Somalia was 
the test case for Bush's NWO. In a region of limited US economic and security 
interests, a short-term engagement guarding food supplies would be an apt swan song 
for Bush. UNITAF is an example of a Bootian small policing action that was intended 
as a `butcher and bolt' exercise. It was planned as an interim measure to restore 
enough order to deliver supplies to stem a famine. Once UNITAF had achieved this, 
control would be handed back to the UN, which would undertake the prolonged task 
of rebuilding Somalia. 
UNITAF was tenable, was something in which the US could make a difference and 
was the first time the US military had intervened predominantly to deal with a 
humanitarian crisis perceived as a threat to international peace and security. The 
prominence of the UN was a further characteristic of UNITAF. The US would run the 
mission on the ground, but UNSC Resolution 794 insisted that the UNSG advise on 
the force's command structure, and that the UNSC have a say in when the mission 
ended. The operation was a UN-mandated, US-led coalition force. UNITAF was 
designed to work closely with the UN, which is a step beyond the Gulf War model. 
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Thus, the scenario alluded to in Bush's speeches of forceful UNSC-sanctioned and 
US-led humanitarian exercises emerged in his decision to dispatch troops to Somalia. 
UNITAF and Congress 
The role of Congress is analysed in section two, but before addressing how UNITAF 
evolved in 1993, it would be worth considering why the stationing of 30,000 troops in 
the region gained bipartisan support. It can mainly be attributed to a combination of 
dismay at the situation and a willingness to allow the president to explore new forms 
of foreign policy. Even Rep. John Lewis (D-GA), with a history of opposing military 
use, said, `It would seem somewhat out of the ordinary for me to support a military 
effort, but... there are no other affirmative means to alleviate the situation. '3 
UNITAF's unprecedented level of UN complicity also aided congressional 
cooperation. For liberals, the UN `reinforced the morality' of UNITAF, and, other 
nations eventually taking over the operation under the UN's auspices helped win 
conservative backing. The UN hardly roused criticism, and undoubtedly helped add 
credence to Bush's claims that US troops would simply be a catalyst for a long-term 
international venture. This was especially helpful in gaining support among 
Republican conservatives. 
The mission's humanitarian objectives and its perceived simplicity counted for 
much, but its popularity outside Washington also assisted in securing cross-party 
3 CQ, December 5,1992, p. 3760. 
4 Patricia Deese, Congress, the President and the United Nations: UN Peacekeeping and the Politics of 
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endorsement. The intervention was certainly popular in the media. 5 Support was also 
evident among the public. For instance, an NBC poll found that 74 percent thought 
America should be involved in Operation Restore Hope. 6 A December poll found that 
70 percent believed UNITAF was worth the financial and human costs. 7 UNITAF's 
popularity, however, appeared based on its brevity. An ABC poll, for instance, found 
that 62 percent thought UNITAF `would end quickly, ' with only 30 percent believing 
America would become `bogged down. '8 
This cautious public approval was also evident in Congress where not everyone 
backed UNITAF unconditionally. Sen. Hank Brown (R-CO) in December 1992 
unsuccessfully demanded Senate hearings on the intervention. Rep. John Murtha (D- 
PA), and Sen. Larry Pressler (R-SD) voiced apprehension about the US shouldering 
too much of the burden. 9 
That no resolution sanctioning the mission was sought in the 102nd Congress 
indicates that detractors were in a minority. Congressional assertiveness, as chapter 
two notes, is not necessarily manifested in opposition to the president: most 
lawmakers wanted the US to respond to the crisis. Yet the endorsement did not mean 
Congress was wilfully deferring to the president. Questions were raised about funding 
and long-term objectives. At the December 17 House Foreign Affairs Committee 
Military Intervention, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Boston College, 1996, p. 365. 
5 See, for example, Robert Lewis, `The Key to Relief in Somalia: Women, ' Baltimore Sun, January 6, 
1993. Oberdorfer, D, December 6,1992. 
6 National Journal, January 16,1993, p. 157. Once the troops were deployed, an LA Times poll found 
that 84 percent approved of the mission. See Andrew Kohut & Robert Toth, `Arms and the People, ' 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 2, November/December 1994, pp. 47-61, p. 51. 
7 CBS News Poll, National Journal, January 2,1993, p. 45. 
8 Ibid., January 16,1993, p. 157. An LA Times poll found that only 18 percent thought the mission 
would last 7-12 months, and only 7 percent thought it would last more than a year. 
9 CO Almanac, 1992, p. 536. Sen. Larry Pressler (D-SD), `Cost of Feeding Somalia Should Be Shared, ' 
Chapter Four: Somalia 126 
hearing on the operation, representatives were supportive but anxious about these 
points. 10 The purpose of the hearing was to decipher the mission's goals, the role of 
the UN, and the exit strategy, but executive officials could only speculate on how the 
mission would turn out. 
Despite minor condemnation, congressional support for the mission remained steady 
throughout the final days of the Bush presidency. A full-scale famine had been 
averted, order was restored, and there were no US fatalities. These, however, were the 
halcyon days. The new administration's eventual inability to prevent the US from 
getting drawn into Somalia's civil war did much to unravel earlier successes and, 
ultimately, destroyed congressional support for the operation. 
Clinton and Somalia 
As president-elect, Clinton praised the deployment; referring to Resolution 794 as a 
`historic step" 11 Nevertheless, Clinton's continuation of his predecessor's policy did 
not ensure Republican support. Democratic opposition was tempered by loyalty to the 
new president, but bipartisan worries were mounting about how much longer the US- 
led force would stay. Due to unease with the probability of an open-ended obligation 
with ambiguous objectives, a perception was also growing that Clinton would allow 
the UN to make decisions rather than assume the lead himself. 
Despite burgeoning uncertainties, there was no concerted attempt from either 
Argus Leader, December 27,1992. 
10 "The Situation in Somalia, " House Committee on Foreign Affairs, December 17,1992. 
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chamber to stifle the mission. The main Somalia activity in early 1993 was SJ. Res. 45, 
which authorised the use of force, but was not a mandate for Resolution 814's broader 
objectives. SJ. Res. 45 passed by voice vote in the Senate on February 4, but its passage 
through the House was problematic. It was approved 23-18 in the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, but the hearing uncovered concerns about the protracted plan. 12 Also, an 
amendment by the chairman, Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN), set a twelve-month deadline 
on the use of US forces. The close defeat (15-18) of an amendment by Rep. Ben 
Gilman (R-NY), ranking Republican, to shrink authorisation to six months was 
indicative of the growing Republican resistance to the deployment and the perceived 
inability of the administration to manage the US-UN relationship. 
On May 25, the House voted (243-179) in support of SJ. Res. 45, which authorised 
the use of US troops for one year. 13 The vote highlighted division between the parties, 
but it gave the president considerable leeway and indicated that most representatives 
were still satisfied with the operation. 
US-led UNITAF transferred to UN-led UNOSOM II on May 4,1993. The US had 
hoped to leave Somalia after UNITAF, but, as fighting was still heavy in Mogadishu, 
the Pentagon accepted that UNOSOM II could not preserve order without a sizable 
US presence. Mandated by UNSC Resolution 814, UNOSOM II's goal was to rebuild 
Somali society and rehabilitate the political institutions. 14 By assigning US troops to 
UNOSOM II, Clinton had gone much further than Bush's plan to restore order and 
deliver food, and, importantly, there was no doubt that UNSC Resolution 814 was 
11 CO, December 5,1992, p. 3759. 
12 House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 5,1993. 
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about nation-building. 
A series of UN attacks involving US troops on the Somalia National Alliance 
(SNA), in retaliation for the killing of twenty-four Pakistani peacekeeping troops in 
June 1993, proved that the assumption of a low-risk operation had been over- 
optimistic. This provoked hostility in Congress. Although much criticism was targeted 
at the UN and the other contributing nations, lawmakers increasingly viewed the 
White House as their adversary, and so linked funding for the mission to stricter 
conditions. For example, Sen. Robert Byrd (D-WV), President Pro Tempore and 
Appropriations Committee Chairman, unsuccessfully tried to attach an amendment to 
the FY1994 defense authorisation bill giving the administration thirty days to gain 
approval or funding would be cut-off. '5 
However, while Congress's initial enthusiasm for the operation was rapidly 
dissipating, Capitol Hill remained quiet on Somalia during the summer. That 
SJ. Res. 45 was still waiting to be voted on in the Senate in its revised form suggests it 
was not a priority. In late July 1993, lawmakers scrutinised the administration about 
whether the mission's objective was humanitarian or about capturing the warlord 
Aidid, but this was muted. 16 Later in the summer, Senators George Mitchell (D-ME), 
Majority Leader, and Bob Dole (R-KS), Minority Leader, crafted a moderate 
amendment calling on Clinton to submit a report by October 15 and gain approval by 
November 15 for continued participation, which comfortably passed in the Senate 90- 
13 Republicans 3-170: Democrats 239-9. 
14 UNSC Resolution 814, March 26,1993. 
15 HR2401/1298. 
16 `Current Events in Somalia, ' House Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 29,1993. 
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7 (a similar measure passed in the House 406-26). 17 
Hostility was beginning to appear in the press. The Washington Post, for example, 
reported that the administration was anxious that the rising death toll would make it 
difficult to appropriate funding to continue the mission. 18 Despite this, the Clinton 
team pushed the UNSC to adopt Resolution 865, which sought to `advance the re- 
establishment of regional and national institutions and civil administration. "9 Yet 
with this expansion of the operation's nation-building objectives the administration 
put itself into a politically volatile position. Without Congress approving the wider 
mission, it had managed to embroil the US in a civil war. 
When eighteen US Rangers were killed while attempting to capture an SNA 
command post in Mogadishu on October 3, shifts towards abandoning the mission 
began immediately. Clinton pledged in a televised address on October 7 to recall the 
troops, and assured Americans that for the remainder of the mission there would be a 
retreat from nation-building, street patrols and efforts to arrest Aidid. 
The disaster in Mogadishu provoked intensive criticism of the administration that 
was not limited to Republicans. Even high profile internationalists like Sen. Bill 
Bradley (D-NJ) talked about forcing the president to withdraw the troops. 20 By 
November 9, any deference towards the chief executive, or any unease at voting to end 
an operation with troops on the ground had evaporated. But, after the decision was 
made to desert Somalia, the choice of when to leave remained. A March 31,1994 
17 S. Amdt 790, September 9,1993: HR 2401, September 28,1993. 
Chapter Four: Somalia 130 
deadline was preferred by the administration as it allowed time for the UN to replace 
the departing US forces, but many in Congress wanted out by January 31. As 
amendments to the Defense Appropriations bill (HR. 3116), senators voted 61-38 
(S. Amdt. 1041) on October 15 firstly for January and then 76-23 for the March 31 
deadline (S. Amdt. 1042). As part of H. Con. Res. 170, the House voted twice on 
November 9: 224-203 for January (H. Amdt 384), and for March (H. Amdt. 385), 226- 
201, with the latter taking precedence. 
Congress, within ten months, had gone from pushing the executive to allocate troops 
to a UN force into demanding that US troops withdraw from the region. The initial 
response to Somalia may have signified new foreign policy thinking, but S. Amdt. 1042 
and H. Amdt. 385 were the first time since the Vietnam war that Congress voted to 
withdraw funding for a foreign deployment. The rest of this chapter will relate the 
Somalia case to the main themes of the research: whether the experience irrevocably 
ruined the UNPE approach, whether this is evidence of an assertive, partisan 
Congress, how voting decisions were reached, and the extent of participation among 
individuals lawmakers. 
18 Rubin, T, August 20,1993. 
19 Passed in UNSC, September 22,1993. 
20 Richard Cohen, `Overseas Crises Take a Toll at Home, ' National Journal, October 9,1993, p. 2443. 
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Part Two: Somalia and UNPE Policy 
The expanded US-UN role in global humanitarian policy was in trouble in October 
1993. The UN's standing was damaged by the disaster in Mogadishu, and Clinton was 
left with a policy failure in an area in which he desperately needed to establish 
credibility. Many Republicans grabbed this opportunity to condemn the new 
administration, and, as criticism also emanated from Democrats it would be 
worthwhile assessing the impact of Congress on Somalia policy. The extant literature 
on Congress and Somalia offers few insights. Writings on America's role in the crisis 
generally concentrate on Clinton's allowing US forces to be drawn into the civil war 
in Somalia, and changing the mission from humanitarian relief to nation-building. 1 
Moreover, most are highly disparaging of the Clinton administration's handling of the 
crisis. Halberstam, for instance, has a detailed chapter on how senior officials were 
increasingly confused about which direction to take. 22 Western's 2002 article is an 
example of the US-Somalia literature from which Congress is absent. 23 He argues that 
Bush's decision to dispatch troops was a response to pressure from liberal 
humanitarians who sought to persuade the incoming president to send a force to either 
Somalia or Bosnia. As Somalia was thought the safer option, it was chosen, but 
Congress is barely mentioned. 
Even within the post-cold war interbranch literature, Congress's influence on 
21 For example, Mats Berdal, `Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping, ' Survival, 
vol. 36, no. 1, spring 1994, pp. 30-50. John Bolton, `Wrong Turn in Somalia, ' Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, 
no. 1, January/February, 1994, pp. 56-66. Jonathan Howe, `The United States and United Nations in 
Somalia: The Limits of Involvement, ' Washington Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 3, summer, 1995, pp. 49-62. 
22 David Halberstam, D, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals, Simon & Schuster, 
New York, 2001, pp. 248-266. 
23 Jon Western, `Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in U. S. 
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Somalia policy is given scant attention. Hendrickson and Forsythe's dismissal of 
Congress's involvement in a short paragraph is one example. 24 To be fair, the 
legislature has not been entirely ignored. Deese includes a section on Congress and 
Somalia in her thesis and MacKinnon has a short chapter on it, but these are 
exceptions. 25 
In examining Congress's role, Somalia, at first glance, would confirm Hinckley's 
argument that Congress is weak in foreign policy. 26 From the perspective of the 
presidential primacy interpretation, Somalia fits the pattern of congressional deference 
dressed up to look like genuine input. The decision to evacuate the region on March 
31, for instance, was supposedly agreed with the administration before the floor 
debates. 7 However, Congress arguably shaped Somalia policy. The Bush 
administration originally thought the region was too dangerous to send troops, but 
Senate hearings kept the pressure on from mid-1992. Once lawmakers were satisfied 
that the US was doing something, they debated the administration's policy throughout 
1993 and committees scrutinized officials. Hearings pressed the executive to define its 
objectives, explain its leadership role, and state when troops could leave. 
After the disaster on October 3, the administration was widely condemned. Defense 
Secretary Les Aspin was attacked for refusing requests for armoured reinforcements 
that could have rescued the soldiers. 28 Aspin and Christopher took further flak on 
Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia, ' International Security, vol. 26, no. 4, Spring 2002, pp. 112-142. 
24 Ryan C. Hendrickson & David Forsythe, D, `U. S. Use of Force Abroad: What Law for the 
President? ' Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 4, Fall 1996, pp. 950-961, p. 956. 
25 Deese, P, 2000, pp. 62-73. MacKinnon, M, 2000. 
26 Hinckley, B, 1994. 
27 Ibid., p. 195-196. 
28 See statements by Sens. Lugar and Feingold about the inadequate size of the force in relation to its 
Chapter Four: Somalia 133 
October 5 when they met 200 lawmakers in a congressional briefing room. They had 
hoped to assure members that the operation had not veered off-course, but they ended 
up having to solicit advice about what to do next. Such ill-defined planning unnerved 
lawmakers. Rep. Peter King (R-NY) said about the meeting: 
`... it just seemed pretty clear to us that the administration did not know what it was doing in 
Somalia... You assume that the first meeting you have that the cabinet officials and the 
military are going to overwhelm you with their knowledge, and a few days later you catch 
up to them. Instead, they were overwhelmed. So we felt if it was the first meeting where 
they're coming in to defend themselves and they cannot articulate what their policy 
was... they couldn't explain where we were going. So at that stage I did support the US 
extricating itself from Somalia... I was really struck by how unprepared they appeared. I 
figured if they were that unprepared for us and we didn't know ninety percent of what was 
going on and they couldn't bluff us then they must really be confused. i29 
Lawmakers felt a responsibility to step in as the administration was not controlling 
policy. Floor statements were used to pressure Clinton to ditch the mission, and even 
enforceable legislation to cut-off funding was deemed necessary. The administration 
encountered such opprobrium for two main reasons. Firstly, some lawmakers felt 
misled into approving something that was not about `feeding hungry people, ' but was 
instead 'nation-building. 00 Secondly, the UN was seen as the cause of the problem, 
and by extricating troops from Somalia, legislators argued that they would prevent 
policy being authorised by the UNSC, instead of through Congress. Rep. Donald 
Manzullo (R-IL) said, `It is turning over the decisions that we should have been 
making for ourselves in Somalia to the United Nations. '31 
Interbranch relations during the Somalia crisis points towards a resurgent Congress. 
tasks, `U. S. Participation in Somalia Peacekeeping, ' U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Washington D. C. October 19,1993. 
29 Interview with author, January 31,2001, Washington D. C. 
30 House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Ben Gilman (R-NY). Quoted in Cohen, R, 1993, p. 2443. 
Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC), Foreign Relations Committee ranking Republican, October 19,1993, pp. 2-3. 
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Lawmakers placed themselves in the overseer role and were forceful both at the 
beginning in pushing the administration to take action, and then later in demanding 
withdrawal. The administration may have sidelined the legislature on this issue during 
most of 1993, but after October 3, anticipation of vehement resistance meant Clinton 
had no choice but to stop the mission. While some within the Clinton inner circle 
considered remaining in the region, the overwhelming response was to get out of 
Somalia. 32 However, it is not so much about whether Congress forced a reluctant 
Clinton to end the mission, but about conditioning future deployment policy. 
Originally, the intention of UNITAF would confirm that the UNPE approach was part 
of conflict resolution thinking. In an endeavour similar to the model described by Boot 
as `butcher and bolt, ' US troops would be sent to Somalia in overwhelming force, 
establish peace, and then leave the region for the UN to police. 33 Although UNITAF 
was intended as a new era of humanitarian activity, in late 1993 the reaction to the 
Somali crisis showed that congressional support for prioritising human rights and 
pursuing aggressors was conditional on the US obligation being light. Such 
congressional hostility arguably damaged the administration's humanitarian policy to 
the degree that many commentators saw the debacle in Somalia as UNPE's epitaph. 34 
Conversely, a small group within the literature on the crisis argues that the policy 
impact of the Rangers' deaths has been exaggerated. Chester Crocker, for example, 
claims that Somalia represented strategic confusion and a lack of political will, but did 
31 Rep. Manzullo (R-IL), House Committee on Foreign Affairs, op. cit. November 3,1993, p. 16. 
32 George Stephanopoulos, All Too Human, Little Brown and Company, London, 1999, pp. 214-5. 
Anthony Lake, telephone Interview with author, September 16,2003. 
33 Boot, M, 2002. 
34 MacKinnon, M, 1999; 2000. Bennis, P, 1996. Halberstam, D, 2002, pp. 264-5. 
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not eradicate humanitarian intervention as a practice. 35 This view appears the more 
persuasive. Firstly, prior to the October 3 incident, the administration was already 
talking publicly about reining in America's commitment to UNPE. For example, 
Clinton's speech telling the UN to learn to say `no, ' was the week before. 36 Secondly, 
it was stressed by the administration that UN peace-enforcement would continue as an 
aspect of foreign policy. Lake's New York Times article acknowledged that the US 
would ask tougher questions in the UNSC about the objectives of future missions and 
seek to reduce the US's share of peacekeeping costs, but also indicated that 
peacekeeping strategy would remain a useful tool when considering military actions in 
peripheral areas. 37 
PDD 25, the most comprehensive statement on America's stance on UN peace- 
enforcement, was published in May 1994. It talks of being more selective about which 
operations the US will lead, and seeks to reduce the amount the US pays, but it also 
states that the `establishment of a capability to conduct multilateral peace operations is 
part of our National Security Strategy. ' It calls for more efficient peace operations, 
stresses the importance of ensuring that American interests are at stake before 
installing US forces abroad, and includes a section on greater congressional 
consultation. Yet it also shows that humanitarian interventions still fit the national 
interest where there had occurred `[i]nternational aggression... [a] humanitarian 
disaster coupled with violence [or an] interruption of established democracy or gross 
violation of human rights. ' 
35 Charles Crocker, `The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong, ' Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, 
no. 3, May/June, 1995. 
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The other issue was the future role of the UN in US foreign policy. Despite the 
administration making no secret of its policy to arrest Aidid, many believed the UN 
had drawn the coalition into the clan war. 38 The New York Times said `the heart of the 
problem' was a `highly personalized vendetta' between Boutros-Ghali and Aidid, and 
that the former `had resisted the pressure' from the US to adopt `less confrontational 
policies. '39 Many lawmakers also blamed the United Nations for operational 
failures. 0 House Republicans, concerned that UN resolutions were becoming an 
alternative to congressional approval, criticised Clinton's inattentiveness to the 
situation. Somalia did greatly undermine the UN's credibility in conflict resolution. 
Even accounting for its obvious military drawbacks, the UN's failings in diplomacy 
and mediation were exposed by its inability to bind the factions to various ceasefire 
and disarmament agreements. Another problem was that the failure of the 
technologically advanced nations to capture an allegedly `primitive' warlord exposed 
the UN's weak command structure. The coalition force in Somalia was nominally 
under the command of the UNSG's special representative, but the structure effectively 
allowed contingents to run their own missions. In fact, the October 3 mission was 
ordered by US command in Florida and was conducted without the knowledge of an 
increasingly marginalized UN. 
Republican opposition to UNOSOM did not irreparably damage America's 
relationship with the UN, but PDD 25 shows that while the administration remained 
36 UN General Assembly, New York, September 27,1993. 
37 Anthony Lake, `The Limits of Peacekeeping, ' New York Times, February 6,1994. 
38 Rubin, T, August 20,1993. John Lancaster, `Aspin Lists United States Goals in Somalia, ' 
ü'ashington Post, August 28,1993. 
39 New York Times, October 8,1993. 
40 See, for example, Rep. Ben Gilman (R-NY), House Foreign Affairs Committee, op. cit. November 3, 
1993, p. 28. 
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drawn to the potential of the UN system, more careful consideration would be made 
regarding the UN's role in US foreign policy. That the UN would not have so much 
control over multilateral missions in the future assuaged some members of Congress. 
As Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN) said, `There are a lot of markers thrown down before 
the UN qualifies for peacekeeping again. Al From February 1993, various 
congressional committees had failed to get the administration to accept that the 
mission warranted a War Powers agreement, but now there was a sense after October 
3 that it would be wary of future deployments. 2 
Hinckley's claims of an ineffectual post-cold war Congress seem hard to sustain 
when considering the response of the legislature to the Somalia crisis. 43 Instead, the 
Somalia case largely validates claims made soon after the cold war that Congress 
would protect its foreign policy role. 4 Voting to cease funding, for instance, can be 
seen as Congress signalling to the president that it expects to be consulted when 
troops are used abroad. The March 31 deadline for withdrawal succeeded, though, 
because there was a sense that America's security interests would be threatened if 
Congress went too far in restricting the president's ability to lead. Sen. Bob Dole (R- 
KS), Minority Leader, referring to this, said, `I don't believe we should tie the 
president's hands, but I don't think Congress should sit on its hands either. '45 The 
statement is a reminder that Somalia did not instigate a constitutional crisis: in 
comparison to Vietnam, one veteran staffer described the interbranch wrangling over 
41 Q, October 2,1993. 
42 See Madeleine Albright, `United Nations Peace Operations, ' Senate Committee on Armed Services, 
May 12,1994. For the media, Thomas Lippman, `Clinton Envoy Cites Lessons of Somalia, ' 
IVashington Post, December 18,1993, p. A8. 
43 Hinckley, B, 1994. 
44 Edwards, G, 1989. Olson, W, 1991. Smith, M. E, 1998, Fleisher, R et al. 2000. 
45 CO, November 23,1993, p. 2899. 
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the crisis as `small potatoes. '46 However, while it was not the case that legislators 
forced Clinton to abandon the troubled region, the administration knew that it would 
have to be more careful in future to avoid criticism on Capitol Hill. Assertiveness thus 
manifested itself by using Congress's funding power to send a message to the 
president that it expected to be included. As Burgin claims, Congress is not 
dictatorial. 47 It was not trying to challenge the president, but simply attempting to get 
his attention. 
Congressional Voting Cues 
The above discussion addresses one of the main themes of the research; the role of 
Congress in foreign policy decision making. Congress was arguably doing its job 
voting against continuing the mission, but it may not be the case that legislators were 
acting responsibly in diverting America from a costly war and criticising UN influence 
on US foreign policy. In other words, lawmakers may have been motivated by party 
political considerations. Therefore, the following considers decision making within 
the institution. One way of doing this is to test a range of cue-taking variables on key 
floor votes relating to the Somali crisis. An initial overview of partisanship over the 
course of the Somali crisis is observable from floor voting. Using the same method as 
in chapter two, figures 4.1 and 4.2 track party differentiation (PD) for all Somalia 
House and Senate floor votes. 8 
46 Interview with Winslow T. Wheeler: Senior Analyst for National Defense: Senate Committee on the 
Budget, January 25,2001, Washington D. C. 
47 Burgin, E, 1997, p. 300. 
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Figure 4.1 House Partisan Differentiation on all Somalia Floor Votes 1993 
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The X-axis gives the roll call number for each floor vote. The Y-axis represents the partisan 
differentiation (PD) score between 0 and 200. Compiled from Congressional Quarterly, 2003. 
Comparing the percentage of Republicans voting against Democrats, figure 4.1 
measures the Republican-Democratic differentiation on all House floor votes listed in 
the vote index of the 1993 edition of CQ as `Somalia'. Scores over 100 indicate that a 
significant number of Republicans voted against a significant number of Democrats. 
Partisan division in the House is identifiable in nearly all the Somalia House floor 
votes held between May and November 1993. Figure 4.1 shows a consistently high 
level of PD, with eight of the ten votes registering scores above 100 (the point at 
which partisanship can be considered a factor). The two votes (463/472) with low PDs 
were merely requests for reports, but all votes involving authorisation for continuing 
the mission were highly partisan. Thus, PD was strong on controversial legislation, 
but low on relatively benign votes. 
48 For the full list of votes and percentages, see appendix, tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
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measures the Republican-Democratic differentiation on all House floor votes listed in 
the vote index of the 1993 edition of CQ as `Somalia'. Scores over 100 indicate that a 
significant number of Republicans voted against a significant number of Democrats. 
Partisan division in the House is identifiable in nearly all the Somalia House floor 
votes held between May and November 1993. Figure 4.1 shows a consistently high 
level of PD, with eight of the ten votes registering scores above 100 (the point at 
which partisanship can be considered a factor). The two votes (463/472) with low PDs 
were merely requests for reports, but all votes involving authorisation for continuing 
the mission were highly partisan. Thus, PD was strong on controversial legislation, 
but low on relatively benign votes. 
48 For the full list of votes and percentages, see appendix, tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
Chapter Four: Somalia 140 
Figure 4.2 Senate Partisan Differentiation on all Somalia Floor Votes 1993 
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The X-axis gives the roll call number for each floor vote. The Y-axis represents the partisan 
differentiation (PD) score between 0 and 200. Compiled from Congressional Quarterly, 2003. 
Drawing conclusions is problematic as there are fewer votes, but, as is observable in 
figure 4.2, the Senate records much lower levels of PD. Votes 313 and 314 indicate 
some partisanship. These are the more controversial October 15 votes demanding the 
US leaves Somalia, but neither reaches the significance level of 100. The simple 
assumption made from figures 4.1. and 4.2 is that voting in the House reveals a 
general trend towards partisanship, which was not repeated in the Senate. 
The description of figures 4.1 and 4.2 is purposively brief; merely used to emphasise 
that most, but not all, Somalia votes resulted in a majority of Republicans opposing a 
majority of Democrats. Certain votes, albeit minor ones expressing the `sense of 
Congress, ' simply did not provoke a partisan reaction and so, particularly in the 
Senate, it would be misleading to suggest otherwise. It is even likely that cues other 
than partisanship had an influence on votes with high PD scores. To test this, the 
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following analysis uses binary logistic regression (BLR) to assess the impact of the 
cues discussed in chapter three on key roll call votes. Five independent variables are 
used: party membership, ideological ratings, foreign policy committee membership, 
Clinton's share of the vote, and winning election margins. For dependent variables, 
analysing every vote requires too much space, and so one vote from each chamber is 
chosen to illustrate the findings. 9 House vote 556 (H. Amdt. 385) and Senate vote 314 
(S. Amdt. 1042) are selected because they are arguably the most controversial votes on 
the Somalia deployment. As votes 556 and 314 approved the president's preference 
for extending funding until March 31,1994, they involve decisions about the 
president's right to use force abroad. Also, to avoid exaggerating the extent of 
partisanship in the following illustrations by selecting the votes with the highest PD, 
556 is the sixth and 314 is the third highest. 
House Vote 556 Regression Analysis 
After extracting non-voters and missing values in the independent variables, 423 
participants were entered into the regression for House vote 556. Without running a 
regression, the most reliable guess of a subject's category membership is the group 
with the highest frequency. As 226 voted `yes', guessing that all the participants are in 
this category would be correct in only fifty-three percent of cases. Running the BLR 
test will improve the odds of predicting category membership. 
49 Summaries of the regression on all the other Somalia votes are in appendix, table 4.3. 
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Table 4.1 Iteration History table showing that the Party (step 1) and Ideology (ACU93) 
(step 2) variables are inchrded in the model 
Iteration History(a, b, c, d) 
Iteration -2 Log Coefficients 
likelihood 
Constant Party ACU93 
Step 17 202.188 -8.534 6.486 
Step 27 195.691 -7.615 4.895 . 253 
a Method: Forward Stepwise (Likelihood Ratio)°" 
b Constant is included in the model. 51 
c Initial -2 Log Likelihood: 587.19552 
d Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because parameter estimates changed by less 
than . 001 
53 
Table 4.1 lists which variables were found to be significant predictors of voting 
behaviour. `Party' was the first variable selected at step one, followed by `ACU93'. 
The initial -2 log likelihood is 587.195, so the final figure in step two (195.691) is not 
particularly high, and so it can be assumed that the model has performed well. Table 
4.1 thus suggests that knowledge of a representatives' party membership and 
ideological voting record can be used to predict voting behaviour. 
50 This is the most commonly-used option because it states clearly and sequentially which variables are 
entered into the model. 
51 As the logistic regression, though non-linear, is similar to linear regression, the constant is the point at 
which the regression line crosses the Y-axis. 
52 The -2 log likelihood serves a comparable purpose to the error sum of squares in multiple regression. 
It is similar to chi-square in that it has a large value when the model fits poorly as there is too much 
unaccountable variance. To attain an estimate of the B-value, the calculation is repeated until the 
estimates converge on fixed values. 
53 The log likelihood decreases at each iteration because the goal is to reduce the amount of variance 
that could be due to error. To simplify and tidy table 4.1, only the final iteration of each step is 
included. Previous iteration estimates are only provisional values and therefore not important. 
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Table 4.2 Model Summary table showing two measures ofR square to compare how much 
of the variance can be explained by the model and how much is due to error 
Model Summa 
Step -2 Log Cox & Snell Nagelkerke R 
likelihood R Square Square 
I 202.188(a . 596 . 796 
2 195.691(a . 602 . 804 
a Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because parameter estimates changed by less than . 001. 
Table 4.2 is the model summary that incorporates two pseudo r-square tests. 54 Step 
two shows that the Nagelkerke value is 804. This means that the model can explain 80 
percent of the variance. This is perhaps optimistic, and some caution should be 
applied. The BLR equation is non-linear and its r-square variant on the OLSR version 
is controversial. That said, even allowing for an elevated value, 80 percent is high 
enough to be confident that a large amount of variance is genuinely not due to 
unaccounted error. 
Table 4.3 The Hosmer and Lemeshow test of the model's goodness-of-fit to examine 
whether the pattern of results matches a predicted pattern 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 
2 
. 000 
8.117 
0 
5 . 150 
Table 4.3 runs a Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit test. In order for the model 
to be a good fit, the chi-square should be low and the Sig. column needs to be 
insignificant at P=>0.05. Step two shows that expected frequencies do not differ 
significantly from the observed frequencies, showing that the data fits the model well. 
54 These are similar to ordinary least square regression (OLSR), where a line is computed so that the 
squared deviations of the points from the line are minimised. The Cox & Snell R square compares how 
much of the variance can be explained by the model and how much is due to error. The larger the 
pseudo r-square statistic the more of the variation is explained by the chosen variables and not by error. 
The Nagelkerke R-square is an adjusted version of Cox and Snell. The latter's highest value is less than 
1, and so Nagelkerke's, which has a maximum value of 1, is a better fit for a 0-1 model. 
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Table 4.4 The Classification Table calculating the likelihood of being able to correctly 
predict a representative's category membership based on that subject's score that is 
attained from the two predictor variables. 
Classification Table(a) 
Predicted 
Vote 556 Percentage 
Correct 
Observed yes no 
Step 1 Vote 556 yes 225 2 99.1 
no 29 169 85.4 
Overall 92.7 
Percentage 
Step 2 Vote 556 yes 225 2 99.1 
no 29 169 85.4 
Overall 92.7 
Percentage 
a The cut value is . 500°0 
The classification table (4.4) shows the practical results of using the logistic 
regression model. Step 2 reveals that the model correctly predicted that 225 
participants would be in the yes category, with only three wrongly put in that category. 
Of the 198 predicted no votes, 169 were correct. Both success rates are high, and so 
overall the three-step model was able to predict the voting behaviour of 93 percent of 
subjects. As with the Nagelkerke R-square, classification tables are prone to inflate 
the probability, but even accounting for its optimism, this is a considerable 
improvement on the 53 percent that would occur by simply putting all the subjects in 
the yes category. 
55 For each case, the predicted response is `yes' if that subject's model-predicted probability is greater 
than the cut off value of . 500. 
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Table 4.5 Testing the significance of the Party and Ideology (ACU93) variables by 
examining if the model would be significantly affected by the removal of the two variables 
Variable 
Model if Term Removed 
Model Log 
Likelihood 
Step 1 Party -293.597 
Step 2 ACU93 -101.094 
Party -122.047 
I 
Change in 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
385.007 
6.497 
48.402 
df 
1 
Sig. of the 
Change 
. 000 
. 011 
. 000 
Table 4.5 further tests the significance of the cues. The Sig. of the Change column 
shows no score is greater than 0.05, and so it can be concluded that the model would 
be significantly affected if the two variables were removed. 56 The table also shows 
that the Party variable is by far the most powerful predictor. 57 The Ideology variable, 
while significant, has a comparatively tiny impact on the model. The table clearly 
show that the Party variable has a figure (385.007) that is much higher than for the 
Ideology (6.497) variable. Therefore, though significant, the strength of the Ideology 
variable is so small that it can be ignored. Ideology had an influence on vote 555, but 
the significance in was also tiny. Party, on the other hand, was the most significant 
factor on eight of the ten House votes. As such, party and not ideology should be 
considered as the most consistent predictor of voting on the Somali crisis. In other 
words, knowing a representative's party membership and ideological voting record in 
1993 would ensure correct prediction of voting behaviour in 93 percent of cases. 
It can be noted that the Committee, Clinton and Election variables were not 
significant factors. This means that members of the foreign policy committees did not 
56 The change in the -2 log likelihood column gives a numerical measure of how much impact each of 
the two variables in step two had on the model. 
57 `df signifies the degrees of freedom which is set at 1 in all the regression tests in this thesis. The 
figure 1 is normal for tests with the number of subjects and variables used in the models. BLR output 
also produces a Wald statistic, but, as this is generally less reliable than the -2 log likelihood, it is not 
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vote in a way significantly different to non-committee members. Voting among 
foreign policy committee members was influenced by outside factors, most likely 
party membership. It can also be inferred that knowing how electorally popular 
Clinton was in 1992 in each district or a representatives' margin of victory in the 1992 
election does not improve the ability to predict voting choices. 
Senate Vote 314 Regression Analysis 
Seventy-three of the ninety-five senators entered into the model voted in support of 
Senate vote 314. Therefore assuming that all the participants are in the `yes' category 
would result in a success rate of 77 percent. This is high, but it would still be worth 
running a regression to improve the ability to predict category membership and to 
identify which variables are the most significant. 
Table 4.6 Iteration History table showing that the Ideology (ACU93) (step 1) and Election 
(step 2) variables are included in the model 
Iteration History(a, b, c, d 
Coefficients 
-2 Log Constant ACU93 Election 
Iteration likelihood 
Step 16 75.740 -4.018 . 4311 
7 
Step 26 69.723 -3.060 . 447 -. 406 
a Method: Forward Stepwise (Likelihood Ratio) 
b Constant is included in the model. 
c Initial -2 Log Likelihood: 102.824 
d Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than . 001. 
The Iteration History (table 4.6) shows that two variables have been entered into the 
model after only six iterations: Ideology (ACU93) and Election. ACU93 is the 1993 
American Conservative Union ratings that monitor conservative voting patterns and 
shown here. 
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election measures margins of victory at the last general election. Table 4.6 thus reveals 
that senators' ideological preferences and electoral popularity were found to be 
significant predictors of voting choices. 
Table 4.7Model Summary table showing two measures of R square to compare horn much 
of the variance can be explained by the model and how much is due to error 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log Cox & Nagelkerke 
likelihood Snell R R Square 
Square 
1 75.740(a) . 248 . 375 
2 69.723(a) . 294 . 445 
a Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than . 001. 
Table 4.8 The Hosmer and Leineshow test of the model's goodness-of-fit to examine 
whether the pattern of results matches a predicted pattern 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 
2 
10.662 
8.264 
5 
7 
. 059 
. 310 
The Model Summary of Senate vote 314 (table 4.7) has a Nagelkerke r-square step 2 
value of . 445, which 
is much weaker than for House vote 556. This means that the 
two-step model can explain 45 percent of the variance and that 55 percent is 
unaccountable. This is still moderately powerful, and so there is cause to be 
reasonably confident of the model's findings. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test (table 
4.8) shows that the model adequately fits the data. The chi-square scores are not high 
and neither of the Sig. results are significant at p=<0.05. 
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Table 4.9 The Classification Table calculating the likelihood of being able to correctly 
predict a senator's category membership based on that subject's score that is attained from 
the two predictor variables. 
Classification Table(a 
Predicted 
Vote 314 Percentage 
Correct 
Observed Yes No 
Step 1 Vote 314 Yes 69 4 94.5 
No 10 12 54.5 
Overall 85.3 
Percentage 
Step 2 Vote 314 Yes 67 6 91.8 
No 9 13 59.1 
Overall 84.2 
Percentage 
a The cut value is . 500 
Sixty-seven participants were rightly predicted as members of the yes category (with 
only six wrong) in step two of the classification table (4.9). Of the twenty-two subjects 
that the analysis predicted would vote `no', thirteen were correct. The latter was not 
particularly impressive, but, overall, the model correctly predicted the voting decisions 
of eighty participants. This is only a minor improvement on the 77 percent prediction 
of category membership if no regression was run. However, as the roll call result was 
76-23 there was only likely to be a small increase. The BLR test nonetheless shows 
that using the steps achieves a high level of accuracy (84 percent). 
Table 4.10 Testing the significance of the Ideology (ACU93) and Election variables by 
examining if the model would be significantly affected by the removal of the two variables 
Model if Term Removed 
Variable Model Log Change in df Sig. of the 
Likelihood -2 Log Change 
Likelihood 
Step 1 ACU93 -51.412 27.083 1 . 000 
Step 2 Election -37.870 6.018 1 . 014 
ACU93 -48.470 27.217 1 . 000 
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Table 4.10 examines whether the model would be significantly affected by the 
removal of the AUC93 and Election variables. The variables chosen both show 
significant changes in the -2 log likelihood, and so it can be assumed that the model 
would be significantly impaired if the two variables were removed. The changes in the 
-2 log likelihood scores also show that the Ideology variable (27.217) is a much more 
powerful predictor than the Election variable (6.018). In short, based on knowing 
mainly the ideological preferences and also the electoral margin of victory of a senator 
would allow for correct predictions of voting behaviour in 84 percent of cases. 
That the Party and Committee variables were discarded in the course of the analysis 
means that members of the same party or the foreign policy committees did not vote 
in a way significantly different to members of the other party or non-committee 
members. Decision making was not based on a single stance by committee members 
immune to other pressures, most notably ideology. The model also shows no 
relationship between state-level results of the 1992 presidential election and voting on 
this issue, implying that it was not important for senators to be seen supporting or 
opposing the president on this issue. 
There is less reason to be confident about the Senate findings of the BLR analysis 
than with the House: the ability to successfully predict category membership without a 
regression is high, and 55 percent of the two-step Nagelkerke r-square test reveals 
unexplained variance. Despite these reservations, the BLR model does reveal that 
Senate preferences are influenced primarily by ideological views. 
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The model finds Election a lesser, but significant, variable. The summary of the 
results of the regression on the other Somalia votes in the appendix (table 4.3) reveal 
that neither roll call 252 nor 318 ran successful tests, but the Election variable is also 
found to have a small impact on vote 313 (which also finds Ideology to be the main 
predictor). It seems unlikely, however, that electoral concerns would impact on voting 
decisions a full year before one-third of senators stood for reelection. Also, there is not 
a consistent pattern of electoral concern in Senate voting in the other cases. The 
Election variable does not appear to be significant in any floor votes in the other cases 
in this thesis. 58 
The regression analysis bolsters the importance of partisanship in figure 4.1, and 
helps explain why figure 4.2 did not report comparable levels of partisanship among 
senators. The weaker interparty conflict in the Senate could be attributed to senators 
viewing troop deployment as a matter above party politics. Instead, senators voted in 
line with their ideological beliefs. There may also have been a sense that the 
administration was consulting with the Senate, but ignoring the House, which may 
account for representatives' partisan stance. 59 
The evidence shown here suggests that foreign policy in Congress is driven by 
partisan and ideological concerns. The congressional response to Somalia does not 
suggest that post-1989 executive branch attempts to enlarge America's engagement in 
58 See appendix tables 5.3 and 6.3. 
59 See Rep. Ben Gilman (R-NY), House Committee on Foreign Affairs, op. cit. November 3,1993, p. 5. 
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peace operations was finding bipartisan approval in the House. 60 While partisanship 
did not impact on Senate voting, the conservative-liberal continuum was a strong 
voting predictor. The regressions suggest that neither chamber reflected a unified 
stance on Somalia. Rather than falling into line behind the president, most lawmakers 
either voted with party colleagues or with those of a similar ideological bent. 
Congressional Participation 
Parties served as an organising principle of House voting on this issue, whereas 
party did not seem as important in the Senate. Analysis of floor voting over Somalia 
shows that partisanship and ideology drove House and Senate opinion. There remain 
questions, however, about how decision making was constructed in the two chambers. 
How involved were party leaders in coordinating House voting? Were senators acting 
as freelance policy entrepreneurs? How active were foreign policy committee 
members in the response of Congress to the crisis? As adapting Hall's method of 
counting participation will provide answers, the following thus uses a range of 
primary and secondary data to count Somalia-related activities that each legislator 
took part in during the entire crisis. 61 
60 Olson, W, 1991. Rosner, J, 1995, p. 71. Smith, M. E, 1998, pp. 41-42. 
61 Hall, R, 1996. 
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Table 4.11. Percentage of House and Senate members who participated at least 
once on six activities on Somalia, Februmy 1992 to December 1993 
Percentage Involved 
Activity House Senate 
1 Floor Debates 23 59 
2 Extension of Remarks 4 1 
3 Introduce Resolution 1 5 
4 Cosponsor 0 46 
5 CQ 6 20 
6 Committee 8 31 
Did Nothing but Vote 74 32 
Sources: CQ and CR (http: //thomas. loc. goi/) 
House N=540. Senate N=113. House Democrats N=328; Republicans N=212. Senate Democrats N=65; 
Republicans N=49 
In table 4.11, almost every one of the six activities shows that only a minority of 
legislators took an active interest in Somalia during the twenty-month crisis. Only 
twenty-three percent (123) of the total of 540 representatives made at least one 
statement on the floor. 62 A further indication of low interest is that fifty-three percent 
of those who made statements did so only once. A higher proportion of senators 
engaged in this activity. Fifty-nine percent of the 113 senators gave at least one speech 
on the floor. However, as with the House, most (61%) only spoke once. Row two of 
table 4.11 demonstrates even lower levels of participation. Of the nineteen 
representatives (4%) who put statements into the Extension of Remarks, eleven did so 
once. As only Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-ND) submitted a written statement into the 
record, this is the only category in which Senate participation is comparatively lower 
than in the House. Senators do not commonly use this facility, and, as almost two- 
thirds made statements on the floor, there was little reason to submit a written 
62 By submitting the word `Somalia' into the search engine of the Internet version of Congressional 
Record, a comprehensive list of all relevant statements is available. As not every statement returned is 
relevant, all were read. To qualify, a statement must be primarily about Somalia rather than a related 
topic in which Somalia is merely mentioned. 
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account. The figures show that while a plethora of statements exist in the CR from 
1992 and 1993, a relatively small group of people are responsible for much of them. 
By typing `Somalia' into the Bills section of the Internet version of CR, a list of 
those involved with Somalia legislation is returned. The percentage of lawmakers who 
introduced or cosponsored at least one Somalia bill (regardless of whether it reached 
the floor) is then given in rows three and four of table 4.11 respectively. Only seven 
representatives (1%) and five senators (4%) introduced bills. As it is a much more 
onerous task than, for example, making a speech, it is unsurprising that so few 
introduced bills. Yet, the considerably less burdensome job of cosponsoring 
legislation also failed to attract any House members, while thirty-seven of the fifty- 
two senators who cosponsored the eight Somalia bills did so only once. It is 
understandable that very few members introduced legislation, but that so few even 
made an effort to cosponsor legislation is further evidence of the marginal interest in 
the issue. 
Row five reports that six percent of representatives and twenty percent of senators 
were cited in at least one of the twenty-four Congressional Quarterly (CQ) articles 
published on Somalia between February 1992 and December 1993. Continuing the 
theme of limited input, most of the representatives (63%) and senators (65%) who 
were mentioned were only cited in one article. Part of the explanation may be that for 
much of the crisis CQ hardly covered it. The first CQ reference to the Somali crisis is 
in mid-February 1992 when Rep. Tony Hall (D-OH) is cited in a short paragraph 
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calling for a UN force to intervene. 63 Thereafter, nothing substantial was published on 
Somalia until December 1992.64 A handful of references to legislators' concerns about 
an exit strategy and the command of US troops are buried within early 1993 articles 
on Clinton's foreign policy, but there is little specific consideration of Somalia. 65 The 
amount of reports- mostly citing lawmakers opposed to the deployment- picked up by 
mid-September. 66 The first post-October 3 Somalia article named several whips and 
leaders demanding an end to the mission, but, articles published in CQ between 
October and December 1993 still did not convey the impression of much activity 
among lawmakers. 67 
As with all the other activities in table 5.11, House committee participation is 
proportionally much lower than for the Senate. 8 The figures show that eight percent 
(45) of representatives attended eleven relevant committee hearings and thirty-one 
percent (35) of senators attended the thirteen committee hearings. Sixty-seven percent 
(30) of representatives and thirty-seven percent (13) of senators who attended relevant 
committee meetings only did so once. 
Finally, table 4.11 lists the number of lawmakers who participated in none of the 
activities in rows one to five. Of the 540 representatives who served during 1992 and 
63 ýnnn -- c. l. ý, h reoruary 1J, 177L, P. JJb. 
64 See, for example, Pat Towell, `Operation Puts Sealift Fleet In Glare of Global Stage, ' CQ, December 
12,1992, p. 3807. 
65 Elizabeth Palmer, '`Putting a Price on Global Aid Underscores Tight Budgets, ' CQ, January 23,1993, 
p. 186. `Senate Gives Belated Blessing to Somalia Intervention, ' February 6,1993, p. 277. 
66 Elizabeth Palmer, `Senate Demands Voice in Policy But Shies From Confrontation, ' CQ, September 
11,1993, p. 2399. 
67 Carroll Doherty, `Clinton Calms Rebellion on Hill By Retooling Somalia Mission, ' CQ, October 9, 
1993, p. 2750. 
68 The percentage of representatives and senators who attended at least one committee hearing or 
markup on the Somalia crisis that is listed in the Congressional Information Service index between 
1992 and 1993 are reported in row six. 
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1993,402 (74%) did nothing on the Somalia issue except possibly vote on the floor. 
Senators, whose interest in foreign policy is typically greater than representatives, 
showed higher levels of participation. Also, as there are fewer senators than 
representatives, individuals are more likely to get involved. The gap between 
participation levels in the two chambers on this issue is large, but it is still the case 
that practically one-third of the 113 senators did nothing regarding Somalia for almost 
two years. 
The crisis was only dealt with by a handful of members during 1992, and, while 
relative interest did increase throughout 1993, most of those who participated only did 
so in a cursory manner. President Bush had promised that the troops would be 
withdrawn by January 1993, yet over the nine months following this date- after 
control had nominally been handed over to the UN- Somalia did not generate much 
interest beyond the perfunctory. Even after October 3 most involvement amounted to 
little more than disparaging comments on the chamber floors. 
Congress's response to the October 3 disaster is often cited as a watershed in post- 
cold war foreign policy making. This is undoubtedly true, but any analysis must 
account for the fact that few members meaningfully engaged in the issue. That said, 
three caveats must be stressed. Firstly, table 4.11 includes only a limited assortment of 
public activities. It is highly likely that a wider search of behind-the-scenes work 
would reduce the number of lawmakers in the table who did nothing. However, while 
it is not exhaustive, table 4.11 does cover a sufficiently wide and varied sample of 
congressional activity to ensure robust confidence in the findings. 
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The second caveat is that because the crisis in Somalia was dealt with only 
sporadically during 1992, the high percentage of those who did nothing is partly due 
to table 4.11 including those who left before the 103rd Congress. However, members 
who left at the end of 1992 are included in the analysis as they still had several months 
to do something. This decision does not unduly distort the findings: even when 
Somalia became more prominent, 310 (71%) representatives and twenty-five senators 
did nothing between January and December 1993. 
The third caveat is that Hall's method only measures lawmakers' efforts in dealing 
with the crisis and not how much knowledge they had of the issue. It is entirely 
possible that many who did nothing about the Somalia crisis still sufficiently 
understood the situation. Issues like exit strategies were hardly new. Everyone serving 
in Congress was at least old enough to remember the Vietnam war, and many were in 
public office at the time. Lawmakers would thus have had prior opportunities to 
formulate opinions on troop deployments, and so be less dependent on expert 
guidance than they would be with more complex and unprecedented issues. However, 
the point is that most left scrutinizing of the administration and framing of legislation 
to others. 
Low involvement on this issue in both chambers is partly due to the extensive non- 
participation among majority Democrats. Nearly twice as many House Democrats 
(264 or 81%) than Republicans (137 or 65%) did nothing other than vote. Levels of 
non-participation are smaller in the Senate, but the party disparity is even wider. As 
twenty-eight (43%) Democrats but only nine (18%) Republicans did nothing, overall 
Senate participation was low. 
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As the mission lingered on, proportionally fewer Democrats and more Republicans 
engaged in the issue. This widening disparity was arguably due to the mission's 
original plan unravelling. As endorsement relied on UNOSOM's brevity, stronger 
Republican opposition was an inevitable consequence of the operation's protracted 
nature. The impending famine made it difficult to criticise the December 1992 
deployment, but once mass starvation had been averted in early 1993, Republicans 
increasingly saw Clinton's approach to the Somalia crisis and the UN as fair game. At 
the same time, as the mission devolved into a war with Aidid, the president did not 
give Democrats anything with which to defend the administration. In fact, by October 
3, most Democrats who engaged in the issue insisted on abandoning the region. 
Comparatively low participation was also the case among Democratic party leaders. 
To demonstrate this, table 4.12 adapts table 4.11 to report the extent of participation 
throughout the entire crisis among those listed in CQ as House and Senate party whips 
and leaders between 1992 and 1993. This is done to further explore the theme of how 
decisions are formed in Congress and is used as a basis to assess Cox and 
McCubbins's claims about party leaders policing members. 
Table 4.12 Percentage of House and Senate party leaders who either did nothing but floor 
vote or did only one activity from Table 4.11 on Somalia, February 1992 December 1993 
House Senate 
Denis Reps Denis Reps 
Did nothing but floor vote 71 55 50 6 
Did only one activity from Table 4.11 84 77 71 28 
or nothing but floor vote 
N= Senate Democrats (17), Republicans (19), House Democrats (98), Republicans (22). 
Sources: CQ and CR (http: //thomas. loc. gov/, 
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The results in Table 4.12 show a noticeable difference in both chambers between 
Democratic (Dems) and Republican (Reps) involvement. The gap is not so huge in the 
House, but half of all Senate Democrat leaders did nothing but vote, compared to only 
six percent of Republicans. The first row reveals that most House party leaders and 
half of Senate Democrats were not involved in the issue. Row one does give 
something of a distorted impression of partisan imbalance. The second row, which 
states how many did no more than one activity, reveals that a similar proportion of 
House Republicans were actually as fleetingly active as their Democratic counterparts. 
Put differently, while proportionally more Republicans did at least one thing, less than 
one quarter of leaders from either party undertook more than one activity. A 
comparable amount (71%) was found when counting those Senate Democrat party 
leaders who participated in only one activity. 
Even if every effort made by leaders was intended to advance a party agenda, the 
results in table 4.12 indicate that congressional party whips and leaders were not 
deeply involved in dealing with the Somalia crisis. In fact, the limited involvement of 
majority Democratic party leaders was actually lower than for Republican leaders in 
both chambers. As such, Cox and McCubbins's notion of majority parties creating a 
central authority to enforce decisions in the House is less persuasive in this case. 69 it 
may be that the senior leadership informally told members how they were expected to 
vote. This cannot be concluded from the activities in table 4.11, but the fact that even 
low level leaders were hardly involved suggests that the leaders of both parties were 
simply not interested enough to even delegate the former to encourage party votes. 
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Admittedly, Cox and McCubbins's model is more geared towards the latent use of 
power in which the majority party sets rules and procedures and allocates committee 
assignments to ensure the flow of legislation. However, if party unity on the issue of 
humanitarian use of force abroad was important to party goals (and could not be 
achieved without some form of leadership input) that leaders would implement special 
rules or create committees to ensure the supply of appropriate legislation, then it is 
reasonable to assume that party leaders would also engage in more active efforts such 
as making floor statements. Put differently, as the Somalia issue did not prompt much 
leadership or whip activity, there is reason to be confident that party leaders were not 
interested enough to exercise any latent powers. Neither does Cox and McCubbins's 
analysis of House behaviour translate to the Senate. While Senate Republican leaders 
were relatively more active than House leaders in voicing their views, as partisanship 
in the Senate was less powerful than ideology in shaping roll calls, their influence on 
colleagues is questionable. 
That most lawmakers took no active interest in Somalia and that too few party 
leaders were involved to sustain claims that voting was organised by the party 
hierarchy may appear at odds with the earlier argument that Congress asserted itself as 
a foreign policy partner and the House was partisan. However, as with Hall's notion of 
policy specialists, an issue only needs to be seriously engaged in by a handful of 
lawmakers. As the next section shows, foreign policy committee members were 
proportionally more involved in the issue than non-members. 
69 Cox, G& McCubbins, M, 1993. 
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Table 4.13 Percentage of House and Senate Foreign Policy Committee Members who 
tither did nothing but floor vote or did only one activity from Table 4.11 on Somalia, 
February 1992 December 1993 
Foreign Armed Appropriations Intelligence 
HS HS HS HS 
Did nothing but floor vote 19 9 56 15 65 26 40 25 
Did only one activity from Table 29 9 82 44 81 37 67 46 
4.11 or nothing but floor vote 
Sources: CQ and CR (htip: //thomas. loc. goi/) 
N=Foreign Policy; House (63) Senate (23): Armed Services; House (73) Senate (27): Appropriations; 
House (80) Senate (35): Intelligence; House (30) Senate (24). 
Table 4.13 finds that while a sizable percentage of the eight main House (H) and 
Senate (S) foreign policy committee members only marginally participated in the 
Somalia issue, members were proportionally more active than non-members. Row one 
shows that between forty and sixty-six percent of House committee members did 
nothing other than vote on the Somalia issue between 1992 and 1993. Involvement 
among House Appropriations and Armed Services members is lesser than for those on 
the Foreign Affairs and Intelligence committees, but, as seventy-four percent of all 
representatives did nothing on Somalia other than vote, action among members of the 
four committees is greater than for non-members. Participation was relatively and 
consistently higher in the Senate committees, where fewer than one-third of members 
from each committee did nothing but floor vote during the entire crisis. As thirty-two 
percent of all senators did no more than just vote, there is little difference between 
them and foreign policy committee members. However, this is to be expected as 
senators are more likely than representatives to engage in issues that are unrelated to 
their committee assignments. The second row shows that between sixty-five and 
eighty-two percent of House committee members either did nothing or did only one 
thing. In the Senate, only on the Foreign Relations Committee did a majority of 
members (56%) do no more than one activity. 
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Table 4.13 shows that foreign policy committee members were more likely to get 
involved in the Somalia issue than non-members. It is also the case that most of those 
who were heavily involved were from these committees. Members of the foreign 
policy committees introduced all but one of the eight (88%) Senate bills. Senior 
foreign policy committee members introduced nine of the twelve (75%) House bills 
(including all the key bills relating to the troop deployment). In particular, Reps 
Hamilton (D-IN) and Gilman (R-NY), Foreign Affairs Committee chair and ranking 
Republican, and Sens. Byrd (R-WV), Appropriations Committee chair, and McCain 
(R-AZ), Armed Services Committee, could reasonably be considered as Somalia 
specialists within their respective chamber and party. Each made numerous floor 
statements and was frequently referenced in CQ. As well as being responsible for nine 
bills between them, they also each introduced one of the four key withdrawal votes. 
This lends considerable weight to both the notion of policy specialists discussed by 
Hall and Krehbiel's argument that committees provide the chamber with informed 
legislation. Indeed, it would be worth concluding the analysis by briefly examining the 
relationship between those who introduced and those who actively supported these 
amendments. 
Even a cursory glance at those who participated in the key amendment debates is 
revealing about how voting majorities are formed. The BLR analysis finds 
partisanship was stronger in the House than the Senate on the withdrawal votes, and 
this pattern was present among floor speakers. At the main floor debate for Gilman's 
HAMDT. 384 and Hamilton's HAMDT. 385, twenty-seven Republicans and nineteen 
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Democrats contributed. 70 Twenty-five Republicans spoke in favour of Gilman's 
January 31 deadline, and all nineteen Democrats (and two Republicans) vocally 
supported Hamilton's March 31 option. This example suggests that active support for 
the amendments was almost entirely party orientated. In the Senate, conversely, party 
loyalty did not seem to dictate the choice of who to publicly endorse. Twenty-five 
spoke on the floor in support of Byrd's moderate SAMDT. 1042 to leave Somalia by 
March 31, of which fourteen were Democrats. 71 Floor support for McCain's 
SAMDT. 1043 to leave Somalia immediately was partisan as all but three of the 
twenty-one senators who spoke in favour were Republican. 72 Nevertheless, when 
deciding which legislation to champion, party membership appears more important in 
the House than the Senate, and this pattern was reflected in floor votes. 
This last section of the chapter's analysis highlights how voting majorities were 
formed in two chambers whose members did not greatly participate in the Somalia 
issue. It is evident from voting choices and decisions regarding whose legislation to 
support actively in this case, that party loyalty is a prevalent feature among lawmakers 
in the House. This does not, however, appear to have been induced by party leaders. 
Instead, representatives supported party colleagues from the foreign policy committees 
who supplied most of the Somalia legislation. Despite comparatively more active 
party leaders in the Senate, senators were unconcerned with partisan loyalty when 
making choices about roll calls and whom to endorse vocally on the floor. Senate 
foreign policy committees also produced most of the Somalia legislation, and chamber 
support was based on ideological preferences. Congress is a complex institution in 
70 `Removal of United States Armed Forces From Somalia, ' CR, November 9,1993, pp. H9040-H9063. 
71 `Department of Defense Appropriations Act 1994, ' CR, October 14,1993, pp. S13419-13480. 
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which policy making relationships between members vary, depending on the issue. 
This empirical investigation into how mostly non-participatory lawmakers reached 
assertive voting decisions on Somalia thus helps validate Shepsle and Weingast's 
recommendation that in order to capture adequately the decisional process in Congress 
a range of interpretations, such as party, informational and committee perspectives, 
should be considered. 73 
Conclusion 
This chapter considers the impact of Congress on the US involvement in Somalia 
between 1992-93. It looks at how assertive Congress as an institution was in dealing 
with administration ambitions in Somalia and what impact this had on long-term 
involvement in UNPE operations. Contradicting two presidencies interpretations of 
interbranch foreign policy making, the policy vacuum that was Somalia encouraged 
opposition in Congress towards the Clinton administration. Lawmakers became 
increasingly uneasy throughout 1993 about the way the mission was being handled 
and that UN endorsement of US action was being used as a substitute for formal 
congressional approval. Criticism intensified when the Rangers were killed in October 
1993, resulting in both chambers rescinding funding for the operation. Somalia, 
however, was not the death knell of America's involvement in UNPE operations. The 
chapter argues that the publication of PDD 25 demonstrates a more cautious approach 
to peace operations that satisfied many of UNOSOM II's harshest critics in Congress. 
72 Six members of each party cosponsored Byrd's amendment and all eighteen cosponsors of McCain's 
were Republican. 
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After the institutional level, the chapter considers the other theme of the research- 
individual voting behaviour and active participation. The chapter measures the 
strength of the independent variables discussed in chapter three on Somalia roll call 
decision making as a way of assessing voting behaviour. Running BLR tests find that 
party membership is a major predictor of House voting behaviour, whereas ideology is 
the most significant variable in the Senate. The chapter then looks at how much 
lawmakers participated in congressional efforts in dealing with the Somalia crisis. As 
with Hall's claim that few lawmakers are actively engaged in any given policy, the 
chapter finds that the majority of representatives and many senators did little more 
than vote on the Somalia crisis. That party leaders were also not greatly involved with 
the issue, arguably challenges Cox and McCubbins's notion of party leaders acting as 
a central authority by actively policing rank and file members. What also suggests that 
there is little relationship between the extent of leadership involvement and party 
voting is the Senate. Here, the party leaders were proportionally more involved than 
their counterparts in the House, but party voting was less strong in the Senate. 
Nevertheless, Somalia voting in the House does endorse Cox and McCubbins's claim 
that partisanship is an important voting cue. Based on greater observable participation 
than non-members, the chapter argues that foreign policy committee members served 
as policy specialists. These specialists doing most of the onerous tasks like producing 
legislation does suggest that Krehbiel's chamber-centred informational model has 
explanatory value in this case. In general, then, the chapter avoids emphasising 
differences between distributive, party government and informational perspectives, 
and follows Shepsle and Weingast's suggestion that congressional decision making 
73 Shepsle, K, & Weingast, B, 1994, pp. 166-167. 
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involves a range of committee, party and informational factors. 
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Chapter Five: Haiti and the American Intervention 
Introduction 
This chapter uses the 1991-1994 Haitian crises to research congressional decision 
making in issues relating to post-1989 humanitarian uses of force abroad. It begins 
with the Bush and Clinton administrations' half-hearted negotiations with the Cedras 
Junta and then looks at how Clinton finally stood up to the Junta after it rejected the 
1993 Governor's Island Agreement. The second part investigates what the crisis 
reveals about UNPE and domestic politics. It explains that while for much of the crisis 
the US was still rooted in a preference for military governments as guarantors of US 
interests in Latin America, the intervention shows there was still some interest in 
pursuing a conflict resolution relationship with the UN. 
The chapter argues that Congress's response to the crisis cannot be fully explained 
by the two presidencies interpretation of interbranch foreign policy making. Instead, 
the chapter will show that groups within Congress were assertive on the Haiti issue. 
As lawmakers were divided between those who obstructed military intervention and 
saw President Aristide as a psychotic dictator and those who were critical of Clinton's 
prolonged inaction, it is difficult to portray Congress as a wilfully subservient 
institution. Aristide's supporters in Congress were significant in pressuring the 
administration to take a tougher line with the junta. While those opposed to action 
ultimately failed to thwart attempts to station troops, their efforts to discredit Aristide 
as a civilian leader unworthy of US support were successful for some years. 
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In looking at individual behaviour within Congress, the research examines cue- 
taking on key roll calls and the extent of participation during the crisis. For roll call 
analysis, the binary logistic regression analysis on key roll calls on the Haitian crisis 
shows that partisanship was the most significant variable in the House, and ideology 
was the best predictor of Senate voting behaviour. On participation, the chapter tests 
Hall's argument that most lawmakers are only ever involved in a handful of issues and 
finds that almost half of all lawmakers did nothing more than vote on the Haitian 
issue. ' The chapter also looks at Cox and McCubbins' conception of party leaders 
policing the rank and file and finds that while party voting was strong in the House, 
party leaders in both chambers were not extensively involved with the Haiti issue? As 
foreign policy committee members were relatively more active, Hall's policy 
specialists and Krehbiel's chamber-based model seem to fit the Haitian issue more 
convincingly. 3 
Part One: OLD WORLD ORDER: 1991-1993 
After decades of the repressive Duvalier regime and years of instability from 
successive non-starter governments, a Catholic priest, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, 
won the presidency by a landslide in December 1990. Aristide's populist appeal 
stemmed from his criticism of corruption within the government, church and army. 
Unfortunately, attempts to deal with the corruption made him enemies within Haiti's 
elite. Responding to the new regime's attacks on military and business interests, on 
September 30,1991, General Raoul Cedras led a coup against President Aristide. As 
I Hall, R, 1996 
2 Cox & McCubbins, 1993. 
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well as forcing Aristide into exile (who moved to Washington D. C. in 1992), violence 
during the coup resulted in at least 2,000 deaths during the first six months. Haitians 
began fleeing in small boats to Florida in an exodus that reached 38,000 by May 1992, 
forcing US authorities to act to prevent an influx of refugees. 
While the Bush administration imposed a trade embargo in October 1991, in 
November it signalled that reinstating the president was not a priority. Aristide was 
asked to agree to a plan by the pro-Cedras Parliament to lift the embargo before 
setting a date for his return. Aristide's refusal to comply prompted the administration 
to accuse him of intransigence. In February, the administration pushed Aristide into 
accepting the Protocol of Accord. This, like subsequent plans, did not set a date 
certain for Aristide's return, but extracted concessions out of him, such as leaving in 
place all legislation passed by the junta. 
In May 1992 Bush ordered the interception and repatriation of all Haitian boat 
people without assessing asylum claims. This highly controversial decision was 
defended by both administrations because of the risk of Haitians putting to sea in 
unsafe boats, but was fiercely decried by the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). 
Troop deployment was never considered by the Bush administration. Bush deferred 
to conservatives in Congress and those in government agencies with allegiances to the 
Haitian military and business elite. The tactic was to adopt a dual policy of returning 
civilian rule either without Aristide as president or with his power downgraded. To 
maintain the pretence, the administration publicly encouraged the return of the 
3 Krehbiel, K, 1991. 
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democratically elected leader while at the same time permitting the junta to reject all 
deals. 
The new Clinton administration's Haiti policy amounted to a resumption of Bush's 
policy. The Clinton team talked about the return of Aristide, but was reluctant to set a 
date. During the election campaign, Clinton demanded a tightening of the economic 
embargo, yet, once in office, continued Bush's dual strategy of working with both the 
junta and Aristide. Clinton also criticised Bush during the election campaign for not 
doing enough to protect Haitian refugees. However, just prior to his inauguration, due 
to reports of thousands of Haitians preparing to sail to Florida in unsafe boats, Clinton 
declared he would temporarily continue Bush's repatriation policy. 
Once in power, Clinton's approach to the problem was to accept that the refugee 
problem would only be resolved with Aristide's return. As much as the administration 
distrusted Aristide, the exiled president had managed to convince them that Haiti 
would remain unstable and the refugee crisis would persist unless he returned. Like 
the previous administration's policy, however, this policy would not be pursued 
without the extraction of concessions from the exiled Haitian president. These 
lacklustre efforts with the crisis were at odds with a foreign policy professing a 
commitment to UN peace-enforcement. A porous trade embargo, a repatriation policy, 
and conciliation of a military junta were hardly in keeping with a humanitarian foreign 
policy. 
4 Alex Dupuy, Haiti in the New World Order: The Limits of Democratic Revolution, Westview Press, 
Boulder, 1997, p. 140. 
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As with the Bush administration, the Clinton team was divided on Haiti. The State 
Department and the NSC were favourable towards tough action, but the CIA and the 
Pentagon believed that the US allegiance should be to Haiti's elite, and that if Aristide 
were to return, the military should be professionalised enough to counterbalance him. 
The Haiti example is a continuation of the clash between post-Vietnam scepticism 
within the military and the Defense Department towards use of force, and the more 
interventionist stance adopted within the State Department. Opposition was reinforced 
by accusations of Aristide's mental instability, and the fact that US business interests 
were more closely linked to the Junta's supporters. This gave congressional advocates 
of action a more onerous task, as they had to present a convincing case for intervening 
to reinstate Aristide. 
More so in the Senate than in the House, there were some that thought the US 
should forcibly restore Aristide to power, and that stalling was tacitly assisting the 
Cedras regime. 5 Mostly, though, Haiti was not seen as vital enough to risk US lives. 
As the possibility of a military settlement was slim in 1993, opponents of action, 
whose attention was focused on Somalia, were not especially voluble on Haiti. Also, 
much of the clash between Clinton and Aristide's backers in Congress during early 
1993 centred not on an intervention, but on a hearing before the Supreme Court in 
which the administration was defending forced repatriation. Many legislators branded 
the repatriation policy as racist. 6 Nevertheless, even among those in the CBC who had 
vociferously attacked the Bush administration's policy on the Haitian refugees, there 
5 Rep. Stephen Solarz (R-NY), `The Situation in Haiti and U. S. Policy, ' House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, February 19,1992, p. 4. 
6 Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA), `U. S. Policy Toward Haitian Refugees, ' June 11,1992, p. 1. Rep. 
Donald Payne (D-NJ), ibid., p. 3. 
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was leeway given to Clinton. Party allegiance allowed Clinton time to formulate a 
comprehensive policy. Latitude was based largely on the fact that while his methods 
may not have been popular, it was understood that he was working hard to reach a 
diplomatic settlement. To further push the administration into action, Aristide 
addressed the CBC and met with Clinton during March, but neglected to press Clinton 
into setting a date for his return. 
By continuing the repatriation policy of the Bush administration, Florida was not 
inundated with asylum seekers. And, despite Clinton's election pledges, during his 
first year in office he showed no signs of ordering an invasion. This meant Clinton 
escaped criticism from those opposed to intervention, and, as a negotiated settlement 
seemed possible, Aristide's supporters were also satisfied that Clinton was trying to 
rectify a difficult situation. By mid-1993, however, the intransigence of the Cedras 
Junta became more obvious, and criticism of the Haitian policy of the Clinton 
administration intensified. 
US Policy 1993 May 1994: Pro-Junta 
The UN's role was low-key from the beginning. In December 1992, the UN/OAS 
for the first time appointed a joint representative, and jointly launched the 
International Civilian Mission to Haiti in January 1993. Both positive steps, but the 
UN was not especially active in coercing the junta into stepping down. 
In March 1993, Lawrence Pezzullo (Clinton's special envoy) and Dante Caputo (UN 
special representative) proposed a plan for a 1,000 strong multinational police force. 
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This, like other proposals, called for the resignation of the Cedras Junta and the 
formation of a new government with Aristide as president. It insisted on an amnesty 
for those involved in the coup, but, as it did not allow members to stay in the army, 
the junta leaders rejected it. 
For several years after the coup, the US and UN/OAS let the problem escalate to the 
point where the illegal junta thought it could reject deals with impunity. The rejection 
of the Pezullo-Caputo plan, however, led to the US and the UN imposing tougher 
sanctions in June, which brought Cedras back to the negotiating table. 7 What came out 
of this latest round of talks was the Governors Island Agreement (GIA). As well as 
agreeing to return Aristide, the GIA included lifting the UN embargo and placing 
1,300 international troops on the island to retrain the police. Signed by Aristide and 
Cedras on July 3,1993, the GIA included the nomination of a prime minister by 
Aristide. However, there were no mechanisms for enforcement, nor any penalties for 
non-compliance and it permitted the junta to remain in power until Aristide's return. 
With the GIA's signing, prospects of a return to democratic rule seemed attainable. 
In August, the illegally elected representatives left parliament, and the UNSC 
suspended the embargo. 8 But, after the Aristide-appointed prime minister, Robert 
Malval was sworn in, the junta instigated a killing spree. When this led the UN to pull 
its monitors out, Democrats in Congress increased pressure for action. 9 
As part of the GIA, the USS Harlan County was due to dock in Port au Prince on 
UNSC Resolution 841, June 15,1993. 
8 UNSC Resolution 861. August 27,1993. 
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October 11,1993 with a force of 200 American troops aboard. The action, authorised 
by UNSC Resolution 867, was an intervention under Chapter VI of the UN Charter 
prohibiting the use of force except in self-defence. 1° USS Harlan County was met by a 
dockside protest from the Front for Advancement and Progress in Haiti (FRAPH) a 
paramilitary group of neo-Duvalierists loyal to the junta. Without consulting the UN, 
Clinton ordered the ship to withdraw. 
That the UN was not informed of the decision to withdraw the Harlan County is 
telling in how marginalized the organisation had become. Abandoning a UNSC- 
approved operation demonstrates how the UN was not even aware of decisions made 
in its name. Yet happening so soon after the Rangers' deaths in Somalia, the 
administration undoubtedly was more cautious than usual about putting US troops in 
harm's way, regardless of the size of the mob. 
In February 1994, a `mini-plan' was announced by the US State Department that 
would name a new prime minister and form a national unity government. Once 
achieved, Aristide could return. The exiled president, however, proposed an 
alternative, which called for the nomination of a prime minister, the immediate 
departure of the junta leaders and his return to Haiti within ten days. Despite Aristide 
proclaiming his willingness to compromise, his rejection of their mini-plan provoked 
accusations of intransigence from the administration. 
During March, Congressional Quarterly reported that in addition to Clinton's 
9 See Rep. James Oberstar (D-MN), op. cit. October 20,1993, p. 16. 
10 Passed in UNSC, September 23,1993. 
Chapter Five: Haiti 174 
inability to win support among Republicans for an active US role in reinstating 
President Aristide, he was now attracting criticism from formerly loyal members of 
his own party for not doing enough. " Interventionists in the House fell into two 
camps. One group, which included many CBC members, called for military action 
against the junta. This group's profile was given a boost when in April 1994 Randall 
Robinson, director of TransAfrica (a black foreign policy lobby group), went on 
hunger strike to protest Clinton's policy towards the Haitian military. 12 Other 
lawmakers, however, preferred sanctions, and mobilised enough House support to 
introduce legislation (HR. 4114) demanding tougher measures against the Cedras 
Junta. A similar bill (S. 2027) was introduced in the Senate that included calling for a 
complete embargo. The bill did not get out of the Foreign Relations Committee, but 
there was now a growing number of legislators otherwise loyal to Clinton vocally 
criticising the administration. For example, one Democratic Senator felt that the 
administration was `well-intentioned, ' but lacked `backbone. ' 13 
US Policy May 1994- October 1994: Pro Aristide 
Both Republicans and Democrats in Congress were concerned that Clinton's Haiti 
policy was indecisive. By April, though, the administration had moved away from its 
policy of extracting compromises from Aristide and the Haitian military-as-part-of- 
the-solution approach. 14 As the junta could rely on the supply of goods from the 
II Carroll Doherty, `Democrats Hit Administration Over Aristide's Ongoing Exile, ' CQ, March 12, 
1994, p. 613. 
12 See Bayless, L, 21 May, 1994: http: //www. hartford-h%vp. com/archives/43a/065. html. 
13 Sen. Tom Harkin (D-IA). Quoted in Mary Kortanek, `Democrats Push Clinton To Toughen 
Embargo, ' CQ, April 23,1994, p. 1015. 
14 Carroll Doherty, `President Broadly Criticised For Talk of Military Action, ' CQ, May 7,1994, 
p. 1134. 
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Dominican Republic, increasing sanctions would have only worsened the plight of 
ordinary Haitians. However, while momentum for forcibly removing those threatening 
armed resistance was building through the early summer among Democrats in the US 
Congress, talk of possible military action encouraged Republicans to intensify their 
accusations against Aristide. 15 
Partly in response to the introduction of congressional legislation, on May 8, Clinton 
announced practical changes the administration would make in light of the Haitian 
policy review. While insisting Aristide should step down in February 1996 and ditch 
his populist socio-economic policies, the policy review marks a pivotal point in the 
crisis when the Clinton administration finally put its unequivocal support behind the 
deposed leader. Arguably bowing to CBC demands, fleeing Haitians could now board 
US ships or enter third-country processing centres where asylum cases would be 
assessed. Also, Clinton replaced Pezzullo with William Gray (former CBC chairman). 
Escalating the scale of hostility, the Cedras regime expelled the UN monitors on 
July 11. This led the US to lobby the UNSC to authorise a US invasion of Haiti. In 
July 1994, Resolution 940 authorised a multinational force to use `all necessary 
means' to remove the junta, secure the return of Aristide and create a safe 
environment. 16 Despite this, it was not until September 15 that Clinton announced the 
creation of an international effort to restore democracy in Haiti named `Operation 
Uphold Democracy. ' The US would lead a multilateral force from twenty-three 
15 Rep. Major Owens, (D-NY) op. cit. July 27,1994, p. 10. Rep. Carrie Meek (D-FL), ibid., p. 22. Sen. 
Jesse Helms (R-NY), Foreign Affairs Committee ranking Republican, organised a secret briefing for 
lawmakers at which a CIA Latin America intelligence officer confirmed Aristide's mental instability. 
Dupuy, A, 1997, p. 153. 
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countries legitimated by a UNSC resolution. Emulating UNOSOM, the Haiti mission 
was planned in two stages: a US-led peace-enforcement operation intended to restore 
order, followed by a UN-led peacekeeping force, which, Clinton claimed, would take 
over within a few weeks. Twenty thousand troops entered Haiti on September 19, but 
former President Carter, Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA), Armed Services Committee 
chairman, and Colin Powell negotiated an agreement so that the US mission amounted 
to little more than a friendly occupation. On September 29, the UN voted to end 
sanctions once Aristide was returned to Haiti. '7 Aristide returned on October 15; the 
first time the US had intervened militarily to reinstate an elected leader. 
Despite some opposition, Congress did not seek to block Uphold Democracy after 
troops had landed, but lawmakers did want to get their views on record. Neither 
congressional party was considering imposing a deadline on the mission, but both 
were working on bills. On September 28, the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 
along party lines 27-18 in support of Rep. Robert Torricelli's (D-NJ) amendment to 
HJ. Res. 416 to authorise the mission until March 1,1995. On October 6, the House 
and Senate sanctioned identical measures rebuking the administration for not seeking 
prior congressional approval, but imposed no limits on the duration of the operation. 18 
These were merely requests for reports on the costs, scope and timetable of the 
mission. On the same day, due largely to the military's success in convincing 
lawmakers that deadlines endanger US forces, Rep. Robert Torricelli's (D-NJ) 
amendment began to lose support on the House floor, finally dying 27-398. His effort 
also suffered from Rep. Ronald Dellums's (D-CA) amendment to HJ. Res. 416, which 
16 UNSC Resolution 940. Passed July 31,1994. 
17 UNSC Resolution 944. 
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was identical to the Senate measure. This was framed by a symbiotic coalition of pro- 
Pentagon lawmakers (who were reluctant to tie the military to a deadline), and the 
CBC and passed on the House floor 258-167. 
Part Two: Haiti, Congress and UNPE 
The above shows that Congress was divided on a US intervention, but was the 
legislature significant in shaping policy and were lawmakers driven by partisan 
rivalry? The statistical measures in chapter two show that congressional foreign policy 
was partisan, ideological and assertive in this period, but was this the case with Haiti? 
This section intends to shed light on congressional behaviour and how the US reaction 
to the coup fitted within new attitudes to the humanitarian use of force abroad. 
Whether Haiti shows that human rights abuses are not immune to congressional 
politics is hardly considered in the Congress-presidency literature. Hendrickson and 
Forsythe, for example, merely say that Congress `failed to take a formal position. ' 19 
Even one of the most thorough books on the crisis- Dupuy's Haiti in the New World 
Order- only notes that congressional conservatives favoured the junta and liberals 
sided with Aristide. 20 Maguire's Haiti Held Hostage, is a detailed analysis of the coup 
and the international response. 21 One of Maguire's conclusions is that the junta stayed 
in power for so long because `the international community demonstrated its lowest 
levels of effectiveness, ' but how much Congress influenced this ineffectiveness is not 
18 SJ. Res. 229 (91-8): HJ. Res. 416 (236-182). 
19 Hendrickson, R& Forsythe, D, 1996, p. 956. Peterson, P, 1994. Burgin, E, 1997. 
20 Dupuy, A, 1997. See also Virginia Leonard, `Back to the Future: Haiti 1915 and 1994, ' Low 
Intensity Conflicts and Law Enforcement, vol. 6, no. 3, Winter 1997, pp. 64-75. 
21 Robert Maguire, et at. Haiti Held Hostage: International Responses to the Ouest for Nationhood 
1986-1996, Occasional Paper no. 23, The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 
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investigated. 22 
Whether taking over three years to stand up to the junta signalled a repudiation of a 
humanitarian foreign policy or whether Uphold Democracy represented new steps in 
peace-promotion and the role of the UN are important questions. Yet, what bearing 
the congressional response to the crisis had on Clinton's commitment to 
humanitarianism is an issue typically overlooked in the US-Haiti literature. Smith 
does touch on this in an article on Haiti and Clinton's dedication to a Wilsonian 
promotion of global democracy. 23 Placing Haiti within the context of the new 
commitment to these beliefs, Smith argues that a deployment was both necessary and 
politically tenable. He asserts that as Clinton had been ineffective in Bosnia and 
Somalia, action in Haiti was needed to demonstrate American resolve. Smith's article, 
however, focuses on the promotion of democracy, only partly on human rights, and 
not at all on US-UN relations. Also, arguing that global human rights are in America's 
interests, Rotberg considered the importance of Haiti in showing the world that the 
US is serious about protecting human rights 24 These articles cover considerable 
ground, but they do not analyse what the Haiti intervention says about the post-cold 
war commitment to a humanitarian foreign policy. 
The lack of analysis of Congress's role is curious because it was arguably a major 
reason why aggressive action against the Cedras Junta was so slow. Many 
Republicans did not believe that the crisis warranted involvement, and, in light of the 
Brown University, 1996: http: //xv%v%v. broxvn. edu/DepartmentsAVatson_Institute/Publications/index. html. 
22 Ibid., p. 85. 
23 Tony Smith, In Defense of Intervention, ' Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 6, Nov-Dec 1994, pp. 34-46. 
24 Robert Rotberg, `Clinton was Right, ' Foreign Policy, vol. 102, Spring 1996, pp. 135-141. 
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Somalia debacle, were concerned about embarking on another hazardous mission. For 
example, although normally supportive of UN peace operations, Rep. Jim Leach (R- 
IO) said, `no compelling interest is at stake in Haiti... no clear strategy exists for 
extricating the US military from a potential Somalia-style quagmire. '25 Also, due to 
his use of violence against political opponents, the view that Aristide was no better 
than the coup leaders was popular in the Republican Party. This was bolstered by 
claims by senior Republicans like Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC), Foreign Relations 
Committee ranking Republican, that mental instability rendered Aristide unfit for 
office. 6 Many Democrats also saw it as a potential Somalia, where the US would 
become drawn into nation-building. 27 
Any claims of an assertive Congress effectively reining in presidential adventurism 
are undeniably challenged by the failure of Republicans to prevent Uphold 
Democracy. In fact, both pro- and anti-interventionists failed to some extent to win 
over the president, as the former only helped to convince the latter to take a tough line 
against the junta once all other options had been exhausted. A high point of 
congressional engagement with Somalia came with the vote to cut-off funding by 
March 1994, but nothing comparable happened with Haiti. Neither chamber led US 
policy, and Congress was only one of several Washington institutions lobbying the 
president. Its legislative response was weak; little more than rubber stamping the 
Clinton administration's policy, and the votes grudgingly sanctioning the mission 
25 Carroll Doherty, `Congress, After Sharp Debate, Gives Clinton a Free Hand, ' CQ, October 8,1994, 
pp. 2895-6. Rep. Joel Hefley (R-CO), `Haiti Could Become Somalia II, ' CR, September 20,1994, 
p. H9229. 
26 Helms goes on at great length about Aristide's failings during the Senate floor debate of the 1994 
Defense Appropriations Act, October 20,1993, p. S 13979. 
27 Sen. Robert Byrd (D-\VV), Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman, `Haiti, ' CR., October 7, 
1994, p. S 14646. 
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satisfied neither the CBC (who did not want even a nominal deadline) nor 
conservative Republicans (who wanted approval to include a meaningful threat to 
cut-off funding if the mission dragged on). One influential Democrat even described 
the Senate bill approving the mission (SJ. Res. 229) as `a shrug of the shoulders. '28 
This description of congressional post-cold war subservience would seemingly back 
up the view that presidents have a comparatively free rein in foreign policy. But, 
arguably, Congress was not wilfully deferring to the executive during the Haitian 
crisis. Merely because it did not immediately vote to end Operation Uphold 
Democracy does not mean Congress was neglecting its overseer role. This would 
assume that Congress knowingly stood back and unwillingly let the president lead the 
US into a quagmire. 
What should also be recalled is that not all lawmakers were against intervention. 
Pro-Aristide lawmakers used letters, hearings and media appearances to pressure 
Clinton to eventually restore democracy. Uphold Democracy was in many ways an 
attempt to win support among congressional Democrats who were troubled by the 
policy of allowing white Cubans to enter the US freely while black Haitians were kept 
in detention centres. Also, with the major crime and health care bills struggling in 
Congress, Clinton needed to shore up his core support. As adopting a tough stance 
against the junta that was popular among black Americans, backing for Aristide was 
most prominent among the CBC. 29 Indeed, it has been alleged that Clinton did not 
28 Sen. Robert Byrd (D-WV), Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman, quoted in Doherty, C, 
October 8,1994, p. 2896. 
29 Fifty-one percent of blacks believed the US had `vital interests' in Haiti, whereas only thirty-two 
percent of whites thought so. LA Times Poll, op. cit. 
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launch the mission to restore democracy, but `to get the [CBC] off his back. 00 The 
pressure the CBC put on Clinton when he announced the policy review in May 1994 
reinforces this. While Uphold Democracy demonstrated that in the post-cold war 
world right wing dictatorships could no longer expect US support, it was arguably 
domestic political pressure that led to the deployment. Clinton had been faulted for 
most of 1994 for his inability to take the lead in Bosnia and Haiti, and, with mid-term 
elections pending, he needed a gesture to boost his credibility among Democrats as an 
international leader. The mission may not have been universally popular, but decisive 
action helped repair Clinton's wishy-washy image. Simply, if a president wishes to 
sustain credibility, there are only so many times he can tolerate a Haitian junta 
cocking a snoop. 
The approach of the Clinton administration to humanitarian crises envisaged the US 
working with UN-sanctioned coalitions to protect human rights and pursue 
aggressors. By taking the action he did, Clinton's US response to the Haitian crisis 
emulated much about this new thinking about human rights abuses in states that may 
have been previously viewed as peripheral to US interests. Uphold Democracy was a 
significant attempt to operationalise UNPE as a foreign policy doctrine. As the 
deployment was the first intervention in the Western Hemisphere to restore a 
democratically elected government, the US was treading new ground in foreign 
policy. It is worth noting, however, that Haiti was not an example of ill-conceived 
adventurism for three reasons. Firstly, it was demonstrably apparent by September 
1994 that the junta would respond to nothing but force. The Clinton administration 
30 John Sweeney, `Stuck in Haiti, ' Foreign Policy, vol. 102, Spring 1996, pp. 143-151, p. 150. 
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had shown its preference for a negotiated settlement, but the junta's intransigence 
gave it no choice but to take forceful action. There were many points during the crisis 
when an armed response appeared justified. For example, in August 1993 when the 
junta escalated violence in reply to the appointment of Aristide's choice of prime 
minister or after the deadline for the GIA in January 1994. But, partly due to 
congressional conditioning, the desperate search for a diplomatic settlement over the 
previous eighteen months and the decision to recall the USS Harlan County had 
shown how circumspect the administration could be with troop use abroad. Had this 
been a rush decision then Congress may have asserted itself more thoroughly. To 
have launched a UNPE deployment earlier in the crisis required a compliant 
Congress, but by late 1994 it was becoming difficult for Clinton to justify prolonged 
bargaining with the Cedras regime. 
Secondly, Haiti was arguably more closely linked to traditional US interests than 
the other cases. That it is not some obscure country on another continent meant 
lawmakers backing action would be better protected electorally. Moreover, as black 
Americans were especially eager for the US to resolve the situation, Democrat 
legislators could safely support the operation. Thirdly, while there was unease among 
lawmakers about the merits of deploying 20,000 troops into a conflict with a nominal 
exit strategy, the mission was unlikely to be dangerous. Former President Carter's 
eleventh hour success in persuading the junta to step down and the mildly enthusiastic 
welcome for the troops from Haitians alleviated lawmakers' concerns. The mission 
quickly achieved its objectives: the Haitian military and police were neutralised 
within a few days of landing, and there were no American casualties. Despite the 
mission's unpopularity, there was little political advantage in tying the president to a 
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date for withdrawal. Operations like this are simply not worth instigating a 
constitutional challenge to the president's right to make foreign policy. As 
congressional elections were only a few weeks away, lawmakers would hardly want 
to take a stand against a mission that was running successfully. 
One area in which Republicans failed to restrain the president was the role given to 
the UN. The reaction to the Haitian crisis demonstrates that the UN had not been 
entirely sidelined by the US. The UN Secretary General's representative, Dante 
Caputo, played a high profile role in the negotiations with the coup leaders, and the 
UNSC resolutions 867 and 940 were the first time the UN authorised a military 
operation to install a government in a sovereign state. For all the criticism of the UN's 
conflict resolution limitations after the disaster in Somalia, Uphold Democracy was 
effectively a carbon copy of Operation Restore Hope in which the US, under a UNSC 
mandate, would secure the environment, and then pass the operation over to the UN. 
As the administration was aware that Latin American opinion would object to a 
unilateral intervention, the UN enhanced the appearance of multilateralism. 3I The 
significance of the UN's role has been questioned. Bennis argues that the US simply 
took the UN's initial approval as a blessing to do whatever it liked in Haiti. 32 On the 
contrary, the US invested diplomatic capital into securing UN endorsement before 
deploying troops. Haiti was the first time Chapter VII of the UN Charter had been 
invoked (with UNSC Resolution 940) in the Western Hemisphere to use military 
force in what was a domestic matter. Moreover, as a geographically close country and 
31 Rep. Robert Torricelli (D-NJ), op. cit. July 27,1994, p. 2. Rep. Bill Richardson (D-NM), ibid., p. 13. 
32 Bennis, P, 1996, p. 135. 
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the site of US business interests, that the administration allowed the UN to take charge 
of Haiti's long-term rehabilitation demonstrated faith in the UN's nation-building 
capabilities. It is possible that the administration was just seeking a token UNSC 
resolution, but as Article 51 of the UN Charter allows states with mutual assistance 
agreements (in this case, the OAS) to go to each other's defence, the US did not need 
UNSC authorisation. 
Uphold Democracy embodied much of the Clinton administration's purported post- 
cold war thinking on UN peace-enforcement and comparisons can be drawn with the 
Bootian `butcher and bolt' small wars method. 33 Neither approach to this level of 
warfare was about entrenching US forces in open-ended, risky conflicts. As the weak 
Haitian military meant an external military force could gain control with relative ease, 
there was little danger of a protracted and costly conflict. The US supporting the 
return of the democratically elected leader was an altruistic act, but this action was 
also partially motivated by more selfish desires, such as preventing an influx of 
refugees in Florida. Such double thinking is not, however, inconsistent with either the 
Clinton administration's or Boot's conception of democracy promotion and human 
rights as a way of advancing interests in regions not traditionally vital to US security. 
Uphold Democracy was intended as a peace-enforcement mission, involved a US- 
led multilateral force, its objectives could be achieved with little military risk, and the 
UN had a contributory role. However, the reaction in America to the Haitian coup 
also revealed that elements within the Washington elite sympathised with the de facto 
33 Boot, M, 2002. 
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government. As Haiti had long provided a buffer against communism spreading into 
Latin America from Cuba, relationships were formed between branches of the US 
security services and the Haitian military that outlived the cold war. Consequently, 
the administration initially sought a solution based on permitting the military a role in 
a coalition government because of the belief that Latin American armed forces are the 
best guarantors of stability during transitions of power. While the Bush and Clinton 
administrations were publicly espousing a moralistic stance about democratic values, 
covert elements, aided by congressional conservatives, were still thinking along cold 
war lines. The Haitian intervention may have showed that humanitarianism was not 
above politics, and what made it difficult to launch earlier was that America had 
friends in Haiti on both sides. 
The UNPE approach as discussed by Clinton officials embodied a belief that human 
rights abuses and refugees in regions of minimal strategic significance were to be 
taken seriously as threats to international peace. The ousting from power of an elected 
leader and the resulting deaths of thousands of Haitians was the type of attack on 
human rights and democracy that both Bush and Clinton promised to meet head-on. 
Aristide's failings aside, the coup against him was a blatantly illegal act. This could 
have prompted US action at the start, but that Uphold Democracy eventually did take 
place has much to do with the pressure from congressional Democrats. At the same 
time, the disparity between UNPE's call for swift, decisive action and the fact that it 
took over three years to dispatch troops has much to do with Republican opposition. 
A two presidencies interpretation could cite Clinton not seeking approval before 
launching the mission as evidence of a compliant Congress. However, such a reading 
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has to take into account the fact that considerable effort was made by the Clinton 
administration to avoid sending troops. This may not have been solely due to 
anticipated opposition from Republicans, but the response to the Haiti crisis was not 
an example of an interventionist administration and a weak, isolationist Congress. The 
administration would have preferred to negotiate a settlement, while Congress was 
divided between Aristide supporters and junta apologists. As such, the notion of a 
deferential Congress reluctantly condoning a reckless intervention is wide of the 
mark. That lawmakers on each side of the debate were not simply deferential towards 
the president and were effective in signalling their view points to a resurgent Congress 
interpretation. 34 
Congressional Voting Cues 
The previous section analyses the congressional and presidential response to the 
Haitian coup, but, in terms of decision making within Congress, it does not consider 
why lawmakers did what they did. For example, did their own consciences or party 
colleagues influence lawmakers when responding to the crisis? In developing the 
theme of individual decision making, the following section evaluates the factors 
associated with lawmakers' voting decisions. BLR tests measure partisanship in 
relation to other cues, but it would firstly be useful to take a brief look at how 
partisanship developed during the crisis. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 thus trace the variation in 
partisanship on all House and Senate Haitian floor votes between 1993-1994. 
34 Edwards, G, 1989. Olson, W, 1991. Smith, M. E, 1998, pp. 41-42. Fleisher, R et a!. 2000. 
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Figure 5.1: House Partisan Differentiation on all Haiti Floor Votes 1994 
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The Y-axis represents the partisan differentiation (PD) score between 0 and 200. 
Compiled from Congressional Quarterly, 1994 
Figure 5.2: Senate Partisan Differentiation on all Haiti Floor Votes 1993-1994 
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Figures 5.1 and 5.2 measure partisanship on all floor votes listed as `Haiti' in the 
CQ Almanac index between 1993 and 1994.35 Scores above 100 indicate party voting. 
Incidents of a majority of House Republicans voting against a majority of Democrats 
ii. I1. +i 
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are common in figure 5.1, with seven of the ten votes recording PD in excess of one 
hundred. Also, votes with high party differentiation mostly relate to more 
controversial troop deployment questions (495/497/498/500). The process is repeated 
for all floor votes in the Senate in figure 5.2. PD is low in the Senate. Only three of 
the nine roll call votes show PD above one hundred (172/194/263). Partisanship in the 
Senate peaks with vote 194 (which calls for a commission to report on conditions in 
Haiti), with the three remaining roll calls (including those approving the deployment) 
showing a sharp drop in party voting. The assumption that can be made from figures 
5.1 and 5.2 is that over the course of the crisis the response in the House was 
consistently more partisan than the Senate. 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are an intentionally brief, descriptive assessment of partisanship. 
Each of the roll calls is not analysed in depth, so the purpose is merely to give an 
impression of how party voting developed over the course of the crisis. While 
partisanship appears to be a factor on the key votes, to avoid presenting misleading 
evidence in the following BLR tests, it must be acknowledged that partisanship was 
not a factor for every roll call on Haiti. The following analysis explores the 
explanatory value of partisanship along with other potential independent variables. In 
doing so, House roll call number 500 (H. J. Res. 416) and Senate roll call 263 
(S. Amdt. 2460) are selected as dependent variables. Vote 500 is chosen for two 
reasons. Firstly, as it is the final passage of the four roll calls based on approving the 
use of force it is the key vote. Secondly, as roll call 500 has the third lowest PD of the 
four, it is not simply the case of selecting the vote with the highest partisanship. 
Senate vote 263 is chosen because it concerns the prohibiting of the use of American 
35 For the full list of votes, see Appendix tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
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troops in Haiti. Vote 263 was taken before roll calls 301 (commending President 
Carter's delegation) and 323 (approving the US intervention). However, as over 
ninety senators voted the same way on 301 and 323, the regressions did not run 
successfully. 
The analysis uses the same independent variables as in the Somalia chapter. There 
certain modifications, however. Firstly, for all 1994 roll calls, the ideology measure 
(ACU94) uses the American Conservative Union ratings taken from the 1994 
legislative session. Secondly, the analysis on the House test includes an additional 
variable based on the voting of Florida representatives. As the closest state to Haiti, 
Florida was the point of entry for the refugees. It is commonly thought that there was 
bipartisan support among Florida lawmakers for both the repatriation policy and for 
US military retaliation. 36 In testing whether Florida representatives voted together as a 
group to the extent that predictions of their roll call choices can be made, Florida 
representatives are given the number `1' and all others are `2' in the SPSS value box. 
As Florida was not the only southern state potentially affected by the influx of 
refugees, the analysis will further assess the impact of geographical origin on floor 
voting with a regional variable. For example, did West Coast representatives differ in 
their voting preferences to those from the South to the extent that it is possible to 
make predictions? Lawmakers (Hawaii and Alaska aside) are given the following 
values regarding their constituency location: South (1), West (2), Northeast (3), and 
Midwest (4). 
36 On the concerns of some Florida lawmakers, see Rep. Clay Shaw's (R-CT) letter to Clinton (CR, 
p. 7799, House of Representatives, October 13,1993). 
Chapter Five: Haiti 190 
Accounting for non-voters and missing independent variable values, the BLR test 
enters 415 participants for the House vote 500. As the most frequent result is `yes', if 
no regression is run then guessing that all the participants are in this category would 
be correct in only 237 (57%) of cases. Running the regression should improve the 
chances of predicting appropriate category membership. 
House Vote 500 Regression Analysis 
Table 5.1 Iteration History table showing that the Party (step 1) and Clinton (step 2) 
variables are included in the model 
Iteration History(a, b, c, d, e) 
Coefficients 
-2 Log Constant Party Clinton 
Iteration likelihood 
Step 15 305.249 -5.947 3.997 
Step 26 282.466 -2.745 3.387 -. 843 
a Method: Forward Stepwise (Likelihood Ratio) 
b Constant is included in the model. 
c Initial -2 Log Likelihood: 566.896 
d Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than . 001. 
e Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than . 001. 
Table 5.1 shows that Party is the first variable selected at step one and the Clinton 
variable is selected at step two. The drop in the -2 log likelihood from 566.896 to 
282.466 is not huge, but as the final iteration is not too high, there is no reason to be 
concerned about whether the model has performed well. Table 5.1 thus suggests that 
knowing a representative's party membership and Clinton's share of the vote in the 
1992 election in their district is enough to predict voting behaviour. 
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Table 5.2 Model Srurnnar3' table showing two measures of R square to compare hone much 
of the variance can be explained by the model and how much is due to error 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log Cox & Snell Nagelkerke R 
likelihood R Square Square 
1 305.249(a) . 468 . 628 
2 282.466(b) . 496 . 666 
a Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than . 
001. 
b Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than . 001. 
Table 5.3 The Hosmer and Lemeshow test of the model's goodness-of-fit to examine 
whether the pattern of results matches a predicted pattern 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 
2 
. 000 
2.802 
0 
4 . 592 
In table 5.2, the step two Nagelkerke value is . 666; meaning the model can explain 
67 percent of the variance. This is high enough to be confident that the majority of the 
variance is not due to unaccounted error. Hosmer and Lemeshow test in table 4.3 
checks for goodness of fit. For the model to be a good fit, the chi-square must be 
small and the Sig. column needs to be insignificant at P=>0.05. Step two shows a low 
chi-square value and that expected frequencies do not differ significantly from the 
observed frequencies, showing goodness of fit. 
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Table 5.4 The Classification Table calculating the likelihood of being able to correctly 
predict a representative's category membership based on that subject's score that is 
attained front the two predictor variables. 
Classification Table(a) 
Predicted 
HV500 Percentage 
Correct 
Observed Yes No 
Step 1 HV500 Yes 218 19 92.0 
No 31 147 82.6 
Overall 88.0 
Percentage 
Step 2 HV500 Yes 218 19 92.0 
No 31 147 82.6 
Overall 88.0 
Percentage 
a The cut value is . 500 
Step 2 in Table 5.4 shows that the model correctly predicted that 218 participants 
would be in the yes category, with only nineteen wrongly allocated to that category. 
Of the 147 predicted no votes, 116 were correct. The success rate is higher for the yes 
category, but the model was still able to predict the voting behaviour of 88 percent of 
subjects. As this is a large increase on the 57 percent expected success that would 
occur by merely guessing that a subject is in the yes category, the BLR test is an 
improvement. 
Table 5.5 Testing the significance of the Party and Clinton variables by examining if the 
model would be significantly affected by the removal of the two variables 
Model if Term Removed 
Variable Model Log Change in - df Sig. of the 
Likelihood 2 Log Change 
Likelihood 
Step I Party -283.448 261.647 1 . 000 
Step 2 Clinton -152.624 22.782 1 . 000 
Party -213.022 143.578 1 . 000 
The Sig. of the Change column in Table 5.5 shows no score greater than 0.05, and 
so it can be concluded that the model would be significantly affected if the variables 
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were removed. The table also shows that the Party variable (143.578) is by far the 
most powerful predictor. The change in the -2 log likelihood due to the Clinton 
variable (22.782), while significant, is too small to be considered as major predictor of 
voting behaviour. Overall, the model shows that knowing a which party a 
representative is from and how electorally popular Clinton was in their district would 
ensure correct prediction of voting behaviour in 88 percent of cases. 
Clinton's election result having a small influence on voting choices is perhaps due 
to the likelihood that districts that vote for Democrat presidents vote for Democrat 
representatives. Of the ten House votes on Haiti, Clinton's election result had an 
impact on five roll calls (8,424,497,498 and 499), but in all the cases, the 
significance was minute. 37 Party was the most significant factor on six of the ten 
votes. As such, party and not the Clinton variable should be considered as the best 
predictor of Haiti voting. 
The crisis was certainly perceived in a partisan manner outside Washington. Clinton 
may have been able to placate Democratic supporters, but poll data shows that 
Republicans were more cynical about a deployment to Haiti. In a series of Los 
Angeles Times opinion polls, twice as many Democrats (48%) than Republicans 
(24%) thought US interests in Haiti were vital. 38 Fewer Republicans (38%) than 
Democrats (54%) believed restoring democracy was an appropriate reason to invade, 
or that human rights was a worthy justification (Republicans-56%: Democrats-68%). 
Republicans (55%) were also less convinced by the need to stifle the influx of 
37 For a list of BLR results for all House and Senate see Appendix, table 4.3 (Somalia), table 5.3 
(Haiti), and table 6.3 (Bosnia). 
38 Los Angeles Times Poll, Survey #345, September 20-21,1994. 
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refugees than Democrats (63%), or the need to maintain US credibility as a reason to 
send troops (Republicans-30%: Democrats-511/o). 
The BLR test shows that the Election, Committee, Ideology and Region variables 
were not significant factors. This suggests that reelection concerns did not impact on 
voting decision. Nor was it the case that members of the foreign policy committees 
voted in a predictably different way to non-committee members. Like non-members, 
voting decisions among foreign policy committee members were most influenced by 
partisanship. It can also be assumed that knowing how conservative a representative 
was or their region of origin did not improve the ability to predict voting choices. 
Regarding the Florida variable, Sens. Graham (Democrat) and Mack (Republican) 
did vote the same way on all nine votes, but the regression reveals that Florida 
members of the House did not cross party lines to vote together. The Florida variable 
is not found to be significant on vote 500, and, of the other Haiti roll calls, it is only a 
minor variable on one symbolic vote- 424- which merely commends US troops. The 
analysis of the voting behaviour of Florida representatives illustrates how powerful 
partisanship was on this issue. Despite the potential refugee problem faced by the 
state, Florida representatives were as ready to vote along party lines as those members 
from other states. 
Partisanship appears to be a reliable indicator of lawmakers' positions on the 
Haitian coup. Instead of treating it in an altruistic fashion, the Haitian crisis was dealt 
in the House in a partisan manner. Rather than bipartisan efforts to employ US 
www. latimes. com/extras/timespoll/stats/pdfs/345ss. pdf. 
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diplomatic, political and military leverage to restore peace to a neighbouring state, the 
US response became buried in domestic political wrangling. The crisis never had a 
factor like the famine in Somalia that could unify lawmakers from both parties. 
Combining this with the fact that there were persuasive arguments to condemn both 
the junta and Aristide, representatives remained divided along party lines. 
Senate Vote 263 Regression Analysis 
Ninety senators were entered into the test for roll call number 263. As fifty-eight 
voted in support of vote 263, assuming that all the participants are in the `yes' 
category would be right in 64% of cases. This means that guessing that a lawmaker 
voted yes would be more likely than not to be correct, but there is still room to 
improve on this. 
Table 5.6 Iteration History table showing that the Ideology (A CU94) (step 1) and Region 
(step 2) variables are included in the model 
Iteration History(a, b, c, d, e) 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Coefficients 
Iteration Constant ACU94 Region 
Step 15 66.552 -3.433 . 504 
Step 26 62.316 -5.320 . 567 . 584 
a Method: Forward Stepwise (Likelihood Ratio) 
b Constant is included in the model. 
c Initial -2 Log Likelihood: 117.147 
d Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than . 001. e Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than . 001. 
Table 5.6 shows that the ACU94 and Region variables have been entered into the 
model. ACU94 is the 1994 American Conservative Union ratings that monitor 
conservative voting patterns and the Region variable allocates senators to one of four 
geographical areas. The value of the -2 log likelihood in the final step two iteration 
(62.316) is low and is almost half the original value (117.147), suggesting that the 
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model has performed well. Table 4.6 thus reveals that senators' ideological 
preferences and regional origin were found to be significant predictors of voting 
choices. 
Table 5.71llodel Sun mag table showing two measures of R square to compare how much 
of the variance can be explained by the model and how much is due to error 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log Cox & Snell Nagelkerke R 
likelihood R Square Square 
1 66.552(a) . 430 . 591 
2 62.316(b) . 456 . 627 
a Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than . 001. b Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than . 001. 
Table 5.8 The Hosier and Lent eshow test of the model's goodness-of-fit to gamine 
whether the pattern of results matches a predicted pattern 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 
2 
6.658 
8.811 
4 
7 
. 155 
. 267 
The Model Summary (table 5.7) has a Nagelkerke r-square step 2 value of . 627. 
This means that the two-step model can explain 63 percent of the variance. This is 
quite powerful in that only a minority of the variance is possibly due to error. As such, 
there is reason to be confident of the model's findings. The Hosmer and Lemeshow 
test (table 5.8) shows that the model adequately fits the data. The chi-square scores are 
not high and neither of the Sig. results are significant at p=<0.05. 
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Table 5.9 The Classification Table calculating the likelihood of being able to correctly 
predict a senator's categoly membership based on that subject's score that is attained fironi 
the two predictor variables. 
Classification Table(a) 
Predicted 
Vote 263 Percentage 
Correct 
Observed Yes No 
Step 1 Vote 263 Yes 51 7 87.9 
No 6 26 81.3 
Overall 85.6 
Percentage 
Step 2 Vote 263 Yes 51 7 87.9 
No 7 25 78.1 
Overall 84.4 
Percentage 
a The cut value is . 500 
The Classification Table (5.9) shows that fifty-one participants were correctly 
predicted as members of the yes category (with only seven wrong). Of the thirty-two 
cases that the analysis predicted would vote `no', twenty-five were right. As the model 
correctly guessed the voting decisions of seventy-six out of ninety participants, this 
gives a success rate of 84 percent. This is a large improvement on the 64 percent 
prediction of category membership if no regression analysis were run. 
Table 5.10 Testing the significance of the Ideology (ACU94) and Region variables by 
examining if the model would be significantly affected by the removal of the two variables 
Model if Term Removed 
Variable Model Log Change in - df Sig. of the 
Likelihood 2 Log Change 
Likelihood 
Step 1 ACU94 -58.574 50.595 1 . 000 
Step 2 ACU94 -58.369 54.423 1 . 
000 
Region -33.276 4.236 1 . 
040 
Table 5.10 shows that the model would be significantly affected if the AUC94 and 
region variables were removed. The two variables have significant changes in the -2 
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log likelihood, and so it can be accepted that the model would be affected if they were 
not entered. The changes in the -2 log likelihood scores also show that the Ideology 
variable (54.423) is so much more powerful predictor than Region (4.236) that the 
latter can be dismissed. As such, simply knowing the ideological preferences and the 
region of origin of a senator should ensure the correct prediction of voting behaviour 
in 84 percent of cases. 
The Party, Committee, Election and Clinton variables were not entered into the 
model. Members of the same party or the foreign policy committees did not vote in a 
sufficiently predictable way to make knowing party and committee membership 
enough to guess voting choices. Nor was there any relationship between senators' 
electoral margins of victory and voting on roll call 263. In other words, taking account 
of whether a senator had a safe or vulnerable seat does not improve the chances of 
correctly speculating on which way they voted. Clinton's 1992 popularity in each state 
also had no bearing on voting choices. 
The model finds that the region variable is a small, but significant, concern. It seems 
unlikely that the region of origin had an impact on senators' voting choices. While 
Florida was in a vulnerable location, the entire South (or any of the other regions) was 
not directly affected by the crisis. The summary in the appendix of the BLR test on all 
the Haiti floor votes shows that the region variable was only found to have a marginal 
effect on vote 479, which must be dismissed as the BLR test on this vote was 
unsuccessful. 39 
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The BLR analysis shows that in House voting Party was stronger than the other 
variables, and that Ideology was the principal variable among senators. The results 
from both chambers to some degree challenge the argument that congressional foreign 
policy voting in the 1990s was not particularly political in the sense of being 
motivated by partisan, ideological or institutional rivalries. 40 The evidence points 
towards the view that Congress underwent a resurgence in its foreign policy role, 
where UNPE is concerned. The congressional response to the Haitian coup suggests 
that lawmakers did not deferentially back the president, and instead voted with party 
colleagues or with those of a similar ideological viewpoint. 
Congressional Participation 
The BLR tests show that partisanship and ideology largely drove House and Senate 
floor voting on the Haiti crisis. This still leaves questions about whether party leaders 
worked to encourage partisan voting in the House or whether party colleagues 
spontaneously voted together. Also, were senators responding to the crisis free of any 
input from party leaders? And, what influence did the foreign policy committees have 
on congressional policy? By modifying Hall's analysis of participation the analysis 
seeks to address these points. 1 To begin assessing whether Congress's response to the 
Haitian crisis was dominated by a small group of members, the following table 
records activities in which lawmakers participated. 
39 The region variable appears as a minor variable in two Bosnia floor votes. See appendix 4.3 and 6.3. 
40 Silbey, J, 1997. 
41 Hall, R, 1996. 
Chapter Five: Haiti 200 
Table 5.11 Percentage of House and Senate members who participated at least once on six 
activities on the Haiti Issue, September 1991-October 1994. 
Percentage Involved 
Activity House Senate 
I Floor Debates 29 44 
2 Extension of Remarks 7 0 
3 Introduce Resolution 4 14 
4 Cosponsor 42 47 
5 CQ 6 22 
6 Committee 14 19 
Did Nothing but Vote 47 34 
Sources: CQ and CR (http: //thomas. loc. goi/) 
House N=548. Senate N=1 16. House Democrats N=334; Republicans N=214. Senate Democrats N=66; 
Republicans N=50 
To examine Hall's claim that most legislators are not involved in any given issue, 
table 5.11 details the extent of Haiti-related activities. Using the same categories as 
those used in the Somalia case, row one of table 5.11 reveals that a majority of 
legislators did not make floor speeches on the Haitian crisis. Typing `Haiti' into the 
CR search engine shows that only 29% (160) of the 548 representatives who served 
between 1991 and 1994 gave statements on the floor about the crisis in Haiti. With 
more than half (84) just speaking once, what interest there was in the issue was 
minor. 42 Forty-four percent (51) of all those who served in the Senate between 1991 
and 1994 offered opinions on the floor, of which eight did so only once. Row two 
shows that no senators used the extension of remarks, and only 7 percent (37) of 
representatives submitted written statements over the three year crisis. 
With only one-quarter of representatives and fewer than half of all senators making 
floor statements over the three years, the evidence of participation seems low. Even 
42 As the CR index returns both individual statements and floor debates, even if someone speaks several 
times during a debate it is counted as one statement. 
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lawmakers who left Congress at the end of 1992 still had over a year to speak on the 
subject, yet most did not. In fact, more lawmakers spoke on the chamber floors about 
Haiti between May and September 1994 than over the rest of the crisis suggesting that 
concern was more about getting something on record prior to an invasion than actively 
engaging with the issue. That there was no event on the scale of the Mogadishu 
incident to compel more lawmakers to vent their spleen or their anxieties on the floor 
is part of the reason. Nevertheless, this is an indication that most were not heavily 
involved. 
There does not seem to be a huge gap between the efforts made by Republicans in 
opposition to and Democrats in support of the forcible reinstatement of Aristide. 
Reading through the floor speeches and extension of remarks, several lawmakers 
expressed unequivocal views regarding an intervention. Seventy-three Republicans 
(34% of those who served in the House between 1991 and 1994) made 190 statements 
opposing an intervention, whereas only eight Republicans made twenty-two 
statements defending Aristide. In contrast, only sixty-five Democrats (20%) who 
served in the House during this time made a total of 120 statements supporting 
invasion, with ten making seventeen speeches against intervention. Eighteen Senate 
Democrats (27% of all Democrats who served in the Senate between 1991 and 1994) 
made fifty statements favouring action in support of Aristide, with only five 
Democrats speaking against him on six occasions. Only four Senate Republicans 
made seven statements siding with Aristide, and twenty-three (46%) made seventy 
statements against him. These figures do show that Republicans in both chambers 
were somewhat more cohesive on Haiti than Democrats. This difference may be due 
to it being easier for Republicans to speak out against a possible invasion to reinstate a 
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controversial president, but plenty of Democrats were prepared to argue in favour of 
the intervention. 
Row three shows that only twenty-one (4%) of representatives introduced at least 
one legislative measure dealing with the crisis, of which thirteen did so only once. 
Fourteen percent of senators introduced bills. This is quite high, but twelve of the 
sixteen did so only once. Involvement with legislation picks up with cosponsoring. As 
listed in row four, forty-two percent (231) of representatives and forty-seven percent 
(54) of senators put their names to at least one of the Haiti bills. That 140 
representatives and thirty-six senators respectively cosponsored more than one bill is 
perhaps evidence that lawmakers were attentive to the issue, but it may only have 
required them to put their names forward. Cosponsoring signifies a lawmaker's 
interest in an issue, but in most cases will not involve much effort. 
Thirty-five (6%) representatives are mentioned in Haiti articles in Congressional 
Quarterly (CQ). Of these, sixteen were named in only one article each. In the Senate, 
twenty-five members are mentioned in CQ, of which ten are in only one article. The 
low figures are partly due to CQ not publishing any articles about Congress and the 
Haitian crisis in 1991. In the six Haiti articles published in 1992, only Senators 
Kennedy and Hatfield's legal challenge to Bush's repatriation policy and seventeen 
representatives are cited. 43 The major Haiti articles in 1993 are concerned with the 
refugee case in the Supreme Court, with articles on intervention not appearing until 
October 1993.44 
43 See `Members Offer Legislation to Reverse Haitian Policy, ' CQ, June 13,1992, p. 1720. 
44 See Holly Idelson, `Administration Holds to Policy of Haitian Repatriation, ' CQ, February 27,1993, 
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By March 1994, annoyance with Clinton's continued procrastination meant that CQ 
reports showed a handful of House and Senate Democrats engaging with the Haiti 
issue. 5 But, even as moves progressed towards an invasion, little congressional 
activity is evident in CQ's reporting. When suspicions were aroused in July 1994 that 
a decision had been reached on the invasion, Sen. Bob Dole, Minority Leader, and a 
few whips are quoted as criticising attempts to use Haiti to restrain the president's 
commander-in-chief role, but few other lawmakers are mentioned. 6 It took until the 
invasion for a significant number of lawmakers to be quoted in the journal. For 
example, several members are cited in a five-page article as either being opposed to 
the administration's policy or reluctantly seeing the invasion as an opportunity to 
show that the US was capable of a successful intervention. 7 
Row six lists the percentage of representatives and senators who attended at least 
one committee hearing or markup relating to the Haitian crisis listed in the 
Congressional Information Service index between 1991 and 1994. The figures show 
that fourteen percent (79) of representatives attended nineteen relevant committee 
hearings and nineteen percent (22) of senators attended the five committee hearings. 
Of these figures, fifty-one percent (43) of representatives and fifty percent (11) of 
senators only attended one relevant committee meeting. 
pp. 462-3. Pat Towell, `Clinton's Policy is Battered, But His Powers Are Intact, ' CQ, October 23,1993, 
pp. 2896-2901. 
45 Carroll Doherty, `Democrats Hit Administration Over Aristide's Ongoing Exile, ' CQ, March 12, 
1994, p. 613. 
46 Carroll Doherty, `Senate Defeats GOP Proposal To Limit Clinton on Haiti, ' CQ, July 2,1994, 
pp. 1814-5. Carroll Doherty, `Senate Declines To Restrict Clinton's Options on Haiti, ' CQ, July 16, 
1994, pp. 1943-4. 
47 Carroll Doherty, `As U. S. Troops Deploy Peacefully, Clinton's Battle Has Just Begun, ' CQ, 
September 24,1994, pp. 2701-5. 
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Row seven reveals that forty-five percent (247) of representatives and forty percent 
(46) of senators did nothing on Haiti other than perhaps floor vote. Of those who did 
something, sixty-eight representatives and ten senators only did one thing. In fact, 
voting excepted, cosponsoring is arguably the least onerous task and was the only 
activity in which many were engaged. Events in one of the US's neighbour states 
between September 1991 and October 1994 included the forced removal of a 
democratically elected leader, a refugee crisis, the humiliating USS Harlan County 
incident, numerous failed peace initiatives, and the deployment of 20,000 troops. 
Most of these occurred under the command of a new president who had relatively 
little experience of foreign affairs, yet none of the above seemed to provoke much 
activity among individual lawmakers. 
As noted in chapter four, the participation measures incorporate only a narrow array 
of public activities. It is thus entirely plausible that lawmakers were involved in much 
more work than is considered. For example, Sen. Sam Nunn's (D-GA), Armed 
Services Committee chairman, help in negotiating the junta's step-down is not noted 
in table 5.11. However, the table's varied range of activities and lengthy timespan 
ensures some confidence in its findings. Hall's method also quantifies only the 
lawmakers' efforts and not interest in and understanding of the Haitian issue. 
Lawmakers would presumably have enough knowledge to be able to articulate their 
own opinions on the crisis, and not rely entirely on policy specialists. However, table 
5.11 shows that most members left the more time-consuming activities to others. 
Although participation in both chambers was higher among Republicans, the 
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differences are not large. Forty-six percent (155) of Democrats and forty-three percent 
(92) of Republicans who served in the House between 1991 and 1994 did nothing 
other than vote. In the Senate, twenty-five (38%) Democrats and fifteen (30%) 
Republicans did nothing but vote. Democrats in both chambers were also only 
moderately less unified than Republicans were between 1991 and 1994. To take the 
exploration of party involvement further, table 5.12 adapts 5.11 to just consider 
participation among party leaders between 1991 and 1994. 
Table 5.12 Percentage of House and Senate party leaders who either did nothing but floor 
vote or did only one activity front Table 5.11 on Haiti, September 1991-October 1994. 
House 
Denis Reps 
Senate 
Denis Reps 
Did Nothing But Floor Vote 44 31 50 35 
Did One Activity From Table 5.11 22 23 15 13 
N= Senate Republicans (23), Democrats (20). House Republicans (26), Democrats (115) 
Sources: CQ and CR (http: //thomas. loc. goti/ 
Table 5.12 lists the percentage of all party whips and leaders listed in CQ who 
either did none or just one activity from table 5.1148 As Republicans were 
proportionately more likely to participate, it is unsurprising that the first row of table 
5.12 reveals a gap between how much Democratic (Dems) and Republican (Reps) 
party leaders were involved in the Haitian issue. Of the 115 House Democrats who 
served as party leaders between September 1991 and October 1994, fifty (44%), 
including Speaker Foley and Majority Whip Bonior, did nothing but vote during the 
whole crisis. The second row shows that twenty-five (22%) of the remainder did only 
one thing each. Two of these (Hoyer and McCurdy) spoke once on the floor and the 
48 CQ did not publish a full list of House and Senate party leaders for the years 1991-1992. Although 
there are still some gaps, searching through CR produced the names of most of those who served as 
leaders during this time. 
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rest merely cosponsored one bill each. Adding these to the fifty who did nothing, 
seventy-five (65%) House Democratic leaders effectively did no more in three years 
than put their names on one bill each. The next column shows that eight (31 %) out of 
the twenty-six House Republican party leaders did not participate at all, and six of 
those left (23%) only cosponsored one bill each. House Republicans made 
comparatively more effort than Democrats did. However, fifty-four percent of 
Republican leaders not doing more than one thing in three years is hardly evidence of 
a concerted effort on the Haiti issue. 
Of the twenty Senate Democratic party leaders who served between 1991 and 1994, 
ten, including Majority Whip Ford, did no more than floor vote on the issue 
throughout the entire crisis. As regional whips Murray and Boxer only cosponsored 
one bill and Robb made one floor statement, sixty-five percent of Democratic leaders 
did no more than one activity. Of the twenty-three Senate Republican party leaders, 
eight (35%) did nothing and three deputy whips (Grassley, Kassebaum and Wallop) 
participated in just one of the activities during the crisis. This means that sixty-five 
percent of Democrat and forty-eight percent of Republican leaders either did nothing 
or no more than one activity from table 5.11. 
Participation was low for both parties in each chamber. Adding together the two 
rows in table 5.12 shows that between 48 and 66 percent of leaders participated in but 
one action from table 5.11. Only among Senate Republican leaders did a tiny majority 
do more than one thing. In fact, with the exception of House Republican leaders, the 
columns show that leaders were less likely to undertake at least one of the activities 
from table 5.11 than the rest of their parties. That so many party leaders from each 
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chamber were only casually involved in this case implies that the parties were not 
leading Congress on the issue. This also suggests that Cox and McCubbins's 
argument that majority parties create central authorities to direct legislative decisions 
is not necessarily appropriate in this case. 9 In fact, as with action over the Somalia 
crisis, the minimal involvement of majority Democratic party leaders was 
proportionally lower than for Republican leaders in both chambers. 
It may be the case that the actions in table 5.11 do not capture the full extent of 
leadership involvement. It is possible that leaders were participating in backroom 
dealings or had implemented rules and procedures in advance in order to ensure the 
production of favour legislation on this issue. However, even if every action was 
intended to rally party colleagues, table 5.12 indicates that congressional whips and 
leaders were probably more interested in dealing with issues other than Haiti. 
Table 5.13 Percentage of House and Senate Foreign Policy Committee Members who 
either did nothing but floor vote or did only one activity from Table 5.11 on Haiti, 
September 1991-October 1994. 
Foreign 
II S 
Armed 
II S 
Appropriation 
HS 
Intelligence 
HS 
Did nothing but floor vote 69 23 11 35 43 20 33 
Did one activity from Table 5.11 29 17 20 19 21 9 27 13 
Sources: CQ and CR (http: //thomas. loc. goti/) 
N=Foreign Policy; House (63) Senate (23): Armed Services; House (73) Senate (27): Appropriations; 
House (80) Senate (35): Intelligence; House (30) Senate (24). 
With so few party leaders energetically involved in the Haitian issue, it seems 
difficult to claim that Congress was assertive. However, table 5.13 finds that members 
of the eight main House (H) and Senate (S) foreign policy committees were 
49 Cox, G& McCubbins, M, 1993. 
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proportionally more active than non-members. Row one shows that between six and 
thirty-five percent of House committee members did nothing other than vote on the 
Haiti issue between 1991 and 1994. Involvement among House Appropriations 
members is much lower than those on the other committees, but this is still higher 
than the forty-seven percent of all representatives who did nothing but vote. Also, 
excepting the Appropriations committee, members of the foreign policy committees 
were much more likely than party leaders to participate in the Haitian issue. 
Participation levels were similar in the Senate foreign policy committees, where 
between nine and forty-three percent of members did nothing but floor vote during the 
entire crisis. As thirty-four percent of all senators did no more than just vote, members 
of every foreign policy committee except Appropriations were more likely to be 
involved in the Haiti issue than both non-members and party leaders. The second row 
shows that between twenty-one and twenty-nine percent of House foreign policy 
committee members who did something only did one thing. In the Senate, between 
nine and seventeen percent only undertook one activity from table 5.11. This means 
that a only a majority of members of the House (56%) and Senate (51%) 
Appropriations Committees either did nothing or only one thing on the issue. 
Neither of the Appropriations Committees reported much activity on the Haitian 
crisis, but, while more involved than non-members and party leaders, sizeable 
proportions of the other six foreign policy committees did no more than one activity 
from table 5.11. However, foreign policy committee members were involved in the 
more time-consuming tasks. Of the thirty-two House and twenty Senate bills between 
September 1991 and October 1994, members of the foreign policy committees 
introduced twenty-four (75%) and fourteen (70%) respectively. As well as showing 
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that members of these committees gave more of their time to the Haitian issue, how 
support was built for their legislation is also informative about how collective 
decisions are made. As most lawmakers were largely inactive on the issue, who 
opposed or supported key legislation on the floor highlights how voting majorities are 
formed. The comparatively more partisan trends in House voting found in the BLR 
analysis were present among those who contributed to the main amendment floor 
debates for Rep. Torricelli's (D-NJ) HJR. 416 (vote 500) that endorses the mission and 
Rep. Ben Gilman's (R-NY) HAMDT. 922 (vote 497) that states that the president 
should not have deployed troops. 50 At the lengthy floor debate forty-seven Democrats 
spoke in favour of Torricelli's bill and only four supported Gilman. Almost all 
Republicans who spoke on the floor supported the Foreign Affairs ranking 
Republican's resolution. In fact, only two of the fifty-four Republicans who 
contributed spoke in favour of Torricelli's bill. 
The partisanship surrounding the House debates was not repeated in the Senate. 
Senators' views regarding approval for the intervention were expressed at the 
extensive September 21,1994 floor debate . 
51 The debate centred on Senators Bob 
Dole (R-KS), Minority Leader, and George Mitchell's (D-ME), Majority Leader, 
measure supporting the deployment of troops (S. Res. 259 vote 301). Although not 
members of the foreign policy committees, their resolution highlights how such issues 
are dealt with in a bipartisan manner. None of the five who voted against it spoke on 
the floor, while ten Republicans and twelve Democrats endorsed the bill, thus 
50, Limited Authorization for the United States-Led Force in Haiti Resolution, ' CR, October 6,1994, 
pp. H 10972-11122. 
51 'Commending the President and the Special Delegation to Haiti, ' CR, September 21,1994, 
pp. S13048-13090. 
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indicating bipartisanship in the Senate chamber. 
This helps illustrate how voting majorities are formed in a Congress that managed to 
operate as an effective foreign policy power despite the fact that most members were 
not greatly involved with the Haiti issue. In the House, partisanship is a prominent 
feature both in roll call voting and in how representatives decide whose legislation to 
support actively. Yet, rather than prompting from party leaders, representatives 
clustered around party colleagues from the foreign policy committees who introduced 
most of the key legislation on the Haitian crisis. Despite comparatively more active 
party leaders, senators were much less partisan in both when deciding how to vote and 
who to endorse on the floor. Foreign policy committee members also provided most 
of the Senate legislation, for which chamber support was driven mainly by ideological 
preferences. 
Conclusion 
This chapter applies the research on the role of Congress in the US's post-cold war 
approach to a humanitarian foreign policy regarding the 1991-94 Haitian Cedras 
regime. At the institutional level, the chapter evaluates congressional-presidential 
interactions on this issue. Congress never led US policy, nor was it united on what the 
US response should be to the junta. Many lawmakers were against the forcible 
reinstatement of Aristide, which encouraged the Clinton administration to adopt a 
cautious stance on an intervention. Conversely, both chambers eventually voting to 
authorise Uphold Democracy after Clinton had despatched troops to the island does 
not necessarily support the two presidencies interpretation of foreign policy making. It 
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was, in fact, a reflection of how many legislators had wanted the US to compel the 
junta to step down. Uphold Democracy was thus evidence that UNPE was not 
completely discarded after Somalia and the UN's relationship with America did 
improve somewhat with Haiti. 
The chapter also deals with the other main theme of the research: voting decisions 
and individual participation within Congress. This is addressed by examining cues on 
floor votes and measuring the amount of participation on issues relevant to the Haitian 
coup. Regarding individual lawmakers' efforts in response to the Haitian coup, the 
research reveals- as with Hall's findings- that a sizeable proportion of representatives 
and senators did no more than vote on the issue. Party leaders were also not greatly 
involved in the issue, which suggests that party voting in the House occurred due to 
representatives freely voting with party colleagues, rather than because they were 
compelled to do so by the type of authoritarian leadership described by Cox and 
McCubbins. Whereas ideology is the most significant variable in the Senate, the 
regression analysis of key Haitian floor votes does find that partisanship is the most 
reliable predictor of House voting behaviour. The research also finds that the 
chamber-centred informational perspective is useful in explaining the role of 
committees on the Haitian issue. As foreign policy committee members were more 
active on the Haitian issue than non-members and supplied most of the relevant 
legislation, it could be argued that they served as policy specialists. The regression 
tests not reporting committee members voting in a pattern different to the wider 
chamber is further evidence that of a committee system is of the type described in 
Krehbiel's informational rationale. 
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Chapter Six: Bosnia and UNPE in the 104th Congress 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses interactions between Congress and the presidency in three 
areas that are used to assess the legislature's role in 1990s humanitarian use of force 
issues. The first part of this chapter looks at peacekeeping policy at the start of the 
104th Congress. It describes how House Republicans pursued legislation aimed at 
squeezing the UN out of US foreign policy and restricting the power of the 
commander-in-chief. It argues that the collapse of the legislation did not necessarily 
diminish the impact of anti-UNPE feeling in Congress as this was due to reluctance 
among senators to constrain the president, rather than support for UN peace- 
enforcement. The chapter then shifts attention to the main topic of analysis: the war in 
Bosnia. It explains that 1995 debates with the administration regarding the unilateral 
lifting of the UN-imposed Balkans arms embargo reveal much about attitudes towards 
a humanitarian foreign policy. The debates demonstrate widespread disregard in 
Congress for UNSC resolutions and that the main objective was to write America out 
of the crisis. Finally analysis of the debates leading to the IFOR troop deployment in 
Bosnia illustrates how Congress helped steer policy away from an intervention earlier 
in the crisis, and how IFOR represented an abandonment of any commitment to UN 
peace-enforcement in the Clinton administration. In particular, the section argues that 
endorsement of the IFOR operation was not due to deference to the president as IFOR 
was a NATO peacekeeping mission, not a UNPE operation. 
The other purpose of the chapter is to examine legislators' decisions about how to 
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vote and how much effort to make in dealing with the Bosnian war. The logistic 
regression tests find that partisanship was the main predictor in the House and 
ideology was the key variable in the Senate on Bosnia votes. The chapter then 
considers how much lawmakers participated in the Bosnia issue. While the chapter 
finds that most lawmakers were interested in the Bosnia crisis, supporting Hall's 
argument, the majority were not highly involved. As neither leaders nor whips in 
either chamber were heavily involved with Bosnia, it does not seem that party leaders 
provided policy leadership. Members of the foreign policy committees, however, were 
much more involved in the issue than non-members and produced most of the Bosnia 
legislation. All this is used to advance the claim that congressional analysis should 
incorporate elements of party, ideology and committee explanations. 
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Part One: Peace Operations and the 104th Congress 
The notion of employing US military power to help failing states had lost much of 
its immediacy by mid-decade. Matters such as nuclear proliferation and rogue states 
were expected to be more vital foreign policy concerns in 1995 than strategically 
peripheral conflicts. ' The Somalia debacle had been a bloody nose for an America still 
high on the triumph of the Gulf War. The concomitant outcry put UNPE under threat, 
but from the congressional perspective, withdrawing from Somalia had eased many 
concerns about entanglement in UN operations. At the same time, pressure to 
intervene in Bosnia was mounting. Even though fighting in the Balkans started in June 
1991, due to the belief that it was a problem for the European powers to solve, its 
presence on the US political agenda had hitherto been overshadowed by events 
elsewhere. By 1995, it was demonstrably clear that the EU alone was unable to 
resolve the crisis. 
Many in the Democratic-led 103rd Congress protested their distaste for excessive 
involvement in peacekeeping, and, using legislative and non-legislative tools, both 
chambers managed to rein in albeit dwindling presidential ambitions in peacekeeping 
without forcing a major dispute with the White House. A restrained approach to 
UNPE was being pursued, but the administration would continue the relationship with 
the UN. This stance was clarified by the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. 
Shalikashvili, who said the administration needs `to strengthen the United Nations so 
I Brad Roberts, `1995 and the End of the Post-Cold War Era, ' Washington Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 1, 
Winter 1995, http: //Nvww. mtholyoke. edu/acad/intrel/roberts. htm. 
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they can do more on their own without always having to call upon us. '2 
Regardless of the tempered attitude towards UNPE, before considering the Bosnian 
crisis it would be worth illustrating how US involvement in UN peace operations was 
used in 1995 by congressional Republicans to attack the Clinton presidency. House 
Republicans targeted UN peace-enforcement as a foreign policy tool when creating 
the Contract with America. The Contract's framers believed that discrediting Clinton 
and the congressional Democrats was not enough, and that Republicans would have to 
offer an alternative programme of policies. Achieving unity and offering policies that 
maintained a distance from the Democrats required issues favourable to the 
congressional party. Thus, to avoid making promises that could never succeed in 
Washington, Republicans had to find policies they could rush through within one 
hundred days. This meant passing up potentially divisive policies like abortion and 
voluntary school prayer in favour of restricting US participation in UNPE. 
What further threatened UNPE was that it was one of the few aspects of defence- 
related spending not deemed off-limits. The House Republican Party made two key 
budgetary promises: a middle-class tax cut and a reduction in the budget deficit. 
Money would have to be found to carry out these promises, but Republicans were 
reluctant to touch entitlements, and so had about $500bn in spending to target. This 
figure, however, was further reduced after extracting the $260bn defence budget. As a 
discretionary expenditure, the peacekeeping was in a prime position to see its budget 
shrink. In an era when a balanced budget was an immediate policy objective, 
2 Victoria Holt, `Pay-More-Later Plan, ' The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 51, no. 3, 
March/April, 1995, http: //www. thebulletin. org/issues/1995/ma95/ma95. holt. html 
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peacekeeping was becoming increasingly linked to foreign aid, which, unlike the 
proposed missile systems and the projected $15bn defence budget rise, was seen as 
fair game. 
Republican opposition to the UN was a thinly veiled attack on the Clinton 
presidency. Despite its origins in the previous administration, and that Clinton had 
relaxed his eagerness for assertive multilateralism, UNPE policy was still perceived as 
a Democratic initiative. Consequently, the anti-UNPE proposals in the 104th Congress 
served the three aims of the Contract: reject the Clinton presidency, show that 
Republicans can operate the House differently to Democrats, and demonstrate that the 
GOP was unified and disciplined. 3 
House Republicans wasted no time trying to legislate UNPE off the agenda. While 
both chambers introduced almost identical anti-peacekeeping legislation on the first 
day of the new Congress (January 4), it was the House that launched the most fervent 
attack with its National Security Revitalization Act (NSRA). The bill, part of the 
national security section of the Contract, challenged the UN's function as a mediator 
of global stability in three key areas: 
Firstly, slashing the US's annual contribution to the UN's peacekeeping budget from 
31 to 25 percent in 1994 percent failed to satiate House Republicans, so the NSRA 
called for the US to charge the costs of its own contribution to UN missions against its 
3 John Bader, `Contract With America: Origins and Assessments, ' eds. Dodd, L& Oppenheimer, B, 
1997, pp. 347-369, p. 352. 
4 Titles IV and V refer to peacekeeping. The bill's other major measures include the creation of a 
missile defence programme (paid for by cutting social programmes), the expansion of NATO, and the 
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part of the assessed bill. 5 This would deduct the costs of stationing forces from the 
US's share of the annual UN peacekeeping bill; effectively wiping out 25 percent of 
the UN's peacekeeping budget. Secondly, the practice of US troops serving under UN 
commanders was targeted. It was unlikely that the UN would ever command and 
control US military personnel, but preventing US troops serving under UN command 
was designed to constrain the president's right to lead and restrict UN input in US 
foreign policy. Thirdly, the sharing of US intelligence information with the UNSC 
was addressed. The NSRA originally requested that the president and the UNSG agree 
on the type of information to be shared, and that the former notifies Congress thirty 
days in advance of any agreement. There had been no constraints hitherto on 
intelligence sharing with the UN, and admittedly the proposal failed in committee, but 
that it was put forward at all says something about Republican thinking in 1995. 
As demands amounted to little more than changes in the way the US assessment is 
calculated, ensuring that Clinton commands US troops, and preventing the executive 
from sharing information with the UN, Republicans could satisfy anti-UN voters 
without entirely alienating those with pro-UN sympathies. The Republican position on 
peacekeeping should not be considered merely an electoral ploy designed to cash-in 
on popular hostility to the administration's foreign policy. Instead, the intention was 
to take expanded commitments to peacekeeping out of American foreign policy. 
The NSRA began in the House International Relations Committee (HIRC) on 
January 4. Partisan division was visible from its early stages. Voting during the bill's 
creation of a committee to review foreign policy strategy. 
5 PL103-236 HR2333 Foreign Relations Authorization Act FY1994-95. Section 404 (B2). 
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mark-up was invariably along party lines; with Republicans eager to push through 
Contract legislation, and Democrats slowing the process down with a `blizzard of 
amendments. '6 There was concern among HIRC Democrats that the bill would 
constrain the president, and, by preventing America from engaging with the UN, 
would mean the US having to respond unilaterally to crises. 7 Defending the bill, 
committee chair, Rep. Ben Gilman (R-NY), said the legislation ensured prior 
consultation, rather than Congress being `handed the bill after the fact. '8 
While the HIRC was struggling to agree on its mark-up, the House Intelligence 
Committee (HIC) reviewed a proposal that appeared in early versions of the bill. 
House Republicans sought to impose restrictions on the sharing of information with 
the UN, but a compromise amendment was drafted after objections from the 
administration and HIC Democrats. The new amendment required that the president 
set formal guidelines governing the release of information to the UN, and report to 
Congress every six months detailing the purpose of the intelligence. The compromise 
won bipartisan backing 11-0 in the committee. 
Along party lines (23-18), on January 30 the HIRC sanctioned the bill and its 
peacekeeping measures. The House National Security Committee (HNSC) endorsed 
the bill (41-13) on the same day. After two days of debating, the NSRA passed in a 
6 Rep. Gary Ackerman (D-NY) offered an amendment that would create an exception to the rule about 
placing troops under UN command if fewer than fifty US troops were used. Rep. Engel put forward 
another that would exempt operations commanded by NATO officers. Both amendments failed 15-21. 
Cam, January 28,1995, p. 291. 
7 Rep. Sam Gejdenson (D-CT), `HR. 7, National security Revitalization Act, ' House of Representatives, 
Committee on International Relations, ' January 24,1995, p. 2. 
8 Quoted in National Journal, November 3,1995, p. 616. 
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partisan vote on the floor (241-181) on February 16.9 It was, in the words of Tim 
Haines, `the most battered piece of legislation to be passed from the Contract during 
the much-heralded one hundred days. ' 10 The aspects of the NSRA that involved 
checking the practice of US troops serving under UN officers and the slashing of the 
US's contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget to twenty-five percent survived 
largely unaltered. However, although Republicans succeeded in getting the NSRA 
through the House, it never found a way into the Senate. 
The 104th Senate and UNPE 
House Republican leaders were not heavily involved in the NSRA, but arguably the 
key figure on peacekeeping in the Senate was Majority Leader Bob Dole. He 
introduced a pair of bills on the first day of business; one called for the lifting of the 
Balkans arms embargo (S. 21), and the other was the Peace Powers Act (PPA). 11 The 
PPA placed restraints on the president's right to put US troops under UN command, 
and reduced funding for UN peacekeeping missions. Disgruntled that the UN had 
become an `international entitlement program, ' like the NSRA, the PPA called for the 
US's assessed peacekeeping costs to be reduced by the amount the US had spent on 
past missions, and contained a cap on peacekeeping spending that required the 
administration to disclose how it would fund new operations before obtaining 
congressional approval. 12 
9 Republicans: (223-4): Democrats: (18-176). 
10 Tim Hames, `Foreign Policy and the 104th Congress, ' International Relations, vol. 13, no. 1, April 
1996, pp. 29-48, p. 33. 
11 S. 21: The Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995. S5 Peace Powers Act. 
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Sen. Bob Dole's (R-KS), Majority Leader, bill is more telling in how he sees the 
US's role in UN peacekeeping than it may initially appear. The bill permitted the 
president greater latitude in foreign affairs than the House version by including the 
repealing of War Powers. It proposed to apply restrictions only to UN-led operations 
such as Somalia, and not US-led missions like Haiti, which merely had the UN's 
blessing. In short, unlike the House bill, the PPA was not so much an attack on the 
president's foreign policy making power, but on the UN itself. 13 Put differently, 
involvement of the `incompetent' and `anti-American' UN in operations was 
additional to concerns associated with any non-UN multilateral mission. 
The PPA was viewed as a workable alternative to the rule that the president should 
obtain congressional approval within sixty days of stationing troops abroad. It also 
allowed the president to waive the restrictions in the interests of national security, but, 
as it demanded that he at least consult with Congress prior to all deployments and to 
produce regular reports on military operations, the PPA was not designed to allow him 
total freedom in non-UN foreign policy. 
On March 21, the Committee on Foreign Relations debated the PPA and the NSRA, 
and simply dropped them. Failure was because Democrats were unified in rejection, 
while support among Republicans was patchy. As with their House colleagues, Senate 
Democrats saw the legislation as an attack on presidential discretion. For example, 
Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE) stated: 
12 Sen. Don Nickles, `The Peace Powers Act of 1995, ' CR, January 5,1995, p. S522. 
13 CO Review, January 7,1995, p. 44. 
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`Dole's bill is premised on two seemingly contradictory assumptions, that 
the president can be trusted to use force abroad, but he cannot be trusted to 
use that force in cooperation with other countries via the UN. ' 4 
Conservative Democrats would promote measures curtailing US involvement in 
UNPE, but not Republican attacks on the presidency. Some Republicans, such as Sen. 
Richard Lugar (R-IN), who expressed fears in the previous Congress about 
undermining the president's right to conduct foreign policy, shared this concern. Sen. 
Bob Dole's (R-KS), Majority Leader, initiatives, he said, `would effectively tie up the 
president's ability to take action. ' 15 
The Administration Responds 
At the start of the 104th Congress, the administration's foreign policy was seen to 
lack consistency: seemingly wavering between unilateralism and global leadership in 
pursuit of both humanitarian and traditionally interest-led ends. Without a clear vision 
from the executive branch, Congress had an opportunity to take the initiative. 
However, the administration was anxious about attempts to push the UN out of US 
foreign policy. And on January 26, in front of the HIRC, Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher condemned the reduction in funding. Cutting the US's annual 
peacekeeping bill by the amount the Pentagon spends on peacekeeping missions 
would, Christopher claimed, reduce it to zero and `would threaten to end U. N. 
peacekeeping overnight. ' 16 With Sen. Dole's (R-KS), Majority Leader, bill, even with 
14 CO, March 25,1995, p. 879. 
15 CO Review, January 7,1995, p. 44. See also Lee Casey & David Rivkin, Washington Times, January 
30,1995. 
16 CO, January 28,1995, p. 291. Christopher and Perry wrote in the New York Times (`Foreign Policy: 
Hamstrung, ' February 2,1995, p. A19) that they would recommend the president veto NSRA. 
Madeleine Albright made similar comments in National Journal, January 28,1995, p. 231. 
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its provision on War Powers, it was equally not welcomed by the administration 
because to repeal it at the price of restrictions on UN actions was too high. '7 Signals 
indicated that a veto would be recommended if the PPA placed unconstitutional 
restraints on the president. One administration official said the PPA's provisions 
would `attack our ability to mount coalition operations. ' 18 
Republican calls for Clinton to notify Congress before placing US troops in UN-led 
operations was too much for the administration. 19 Restrictions on funding UN 
operations were also equally perceived as an attack on the presidency. An unnamed 
administration official said, 
`it could require the US to deduct from its peacekeeping assessments the 
cost of a very wide range of activities which are UN-endorsed but which 
'20 we... undertake independently of the UN and for our own missions. 
Judging by the amount of statements threatening vetoes, the administration was on 
the defensive both in terms of its relationship with the UN and Clinton's right to lead 
foreign policy. Referring to the bills, NSC staffer Susan Rice said, `they were 
certainly sources of concern. We worked to try to keep them from becoming law. 21 
Indeed, the NSRA and PPA's failure may not appear to endorse the argument that 
congressional impact on foreign policy was in the resurgence after 1989. But, the 
NSRA's success shows that the House was prepared to politicise foreign policy, and, 
17 Q, January 7,1995, p. 44. 
18 Quoted in National Journal, November 3,1995, p. 616. Expressing concerns about jeopardizing UN 
support for maintaining sanctions against Iraq, Albright told the Foreign Relations Committee (March 
21), `S5 is a bad bill. ' CO, March 25,1995, p. 878. 
19 See Secretary of State Perry in National Journal, November 3,1995, p. 616. 
20 Ibid., November 3,1995, p. 616. 
21 Susan Rice, Director for International Organizations and Peacekeeping at the National Security 
Council at the White House, 1993-1995. Interview with author, September 18,2003. 
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contrary to the view that the president has comparatively more flexibility in foreign 
than domestic policy, the aborted legislation still warned the chief executive about 
opposition to expanded involvement in UN peace operations. A majority of House 
Republicans showed that UNPE was an issue that they were hostile towards. The 
103rd Congress had seen failed attempts, such as the Nickles and the Byrd 
Amendments, to curtail presidential flexibility. 22 Conversely, the NSRA promised to 
embed into law permanent restrictions on the president's power and it at least had the 
appearance that it would succeed. Consequently, the administration's design for an 
empowered UN was becoming evermore difficult to justify in the face of 
congressional aggression. 
The bills failed in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee due to a combination of 
their anti-UNPE components and a reluctance to constrain the president. Lawmakers 
who see global peace as America's responsibility and have fewer qualms about either 
sharing the costs of operations or enabling foreigners to command US troops are more 
influential in the Senate. For example, with the pro-UN Sen. Claiboume Pell (D-RI), 
Foreign Relations Committee ranking Democrat, the PPA was thus likely to come up 
against tough opposition. Had the PPA progressed, its anti-UNPE measures would 
have been challenged more forcefully than in the House. 
A further possible reason why the bills failed in the Senate, but the NSRA passed in 
the House is due to participation levels. Considering the NSRA was just one bill, a 
22 The Nickles Amendment (1051 to 3116 Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1994) failed 
33-65 on the Senate floor on October 19,1993. It demanded the president gain congressional approval 
thirty days in advance of placing troops in UN operations. Byrd (HR240111298 FY1994 defense 
authorisation bill) tried to attach an amendment that would have given the administration thirty days to 
win congressional approval or funding would be cut-off. 
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fair number of lawmakers were involved. For instance, 138 co-sponsored the bill and 
110 lawmakers spoke about it on the chamber floor. With no evidence that the vast 
majority had any involvement with the bill, Senate participation on the PPA was 
minuscule. Only Sens. Dole and Nickles made relevant statements on the chamber 
floor. 23 The only other activity in the chamber amounts to fourteen senior Republicans 
cosponsoring the bill and eleven attending the March 21 Foreign Relations Committee 
hearing. For what was intended as a flagship foreign policy bill, only 23 senators gave 
any time to it either in committee or on the floor. 
With only one floor vote in the House and almost no involvement in the Senate, it is 
not worth undertaking measures of participation and cue-taking. The discussion on the 
1995 UNPE legislation has been used to highlight congressional attitudes to the 
perceived attempts by the Clinton administration to expand US involvement is this 
area. Due to their failure, the PPA and NSRA have largely been ignored in the 
academic literature, but they remain informative about legislative attitudes towards 
UNPE at the start of the Republican-controlled Congress. Regardless of foreign 
policy's low saliency among lawmakers, the assault on peacekeeping took a sharpened 
partisan form particularly in the House in 1995. With their first congressional majority 
in forty years, Republicans were confident they could take on Democrats in both 
Congress and the White House. Also, the Bosnian issue made fears about 
entrenchment in unwinnable wars particularly prominent. What should also be 
remembered is that while previous attempts to attack the president and the UN had 
been rank and file efforts, both bills were fully endorsed by the party leadership. 
23 Sen. Nickles `The Peace Powers Act of 1995, ' CR, January 5,1995, p. S522. Sen. Dole, `Statements 
on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, ' ibid., January 4,1995, p. S 102. 
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UNPE was under intense pressure in this belligerent atmosphere. As the chapter shifts 
to Bosnia, a picture emerges of an administration battling with the legislature. 
Part Two: Bosnia and UNPE in the 104th Congress 
The war in the Balkans began in June 1991 and continued until the signing of the 
Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995. Through a combination of the sporadic and 
complex nature of the violence, the prominence of the Somali and Haitian crises, and 
the assumption that this was a problem that Europe could solve, the Bush 
administration was under little pressure to act in the early stages 24 But, by 1995, with 
the other crises off the agenda, Bosnia became a backdrop to the ongoing conflict 
between Congress and the presidency over America's UNPE role. 
A thorough dissection of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia is beyond the realms of 
this chapter. Focusing on 1995 is appropriate because it includes the events arguably 
most revealing to a study of congressional-presidential foreign policy making: the 
embargo debates and the process leading up to the IFOR deployment in December. 
Both show how the crisis had developed into an interbranch struggle over dominance 
of foreign policy. Before looking at the conflict's final stages, it would be worth 
briefly documenting events prior to 1995. 
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Background to the Yugoslav Crisis 
Josip Broz Tito founded the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of 
six republics- Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and 
Macedonia) in 1945. Centuries-old tensions between the various ethnic groups were 
kept in check, but with Tito's death in 1980 the bonds that held the republics together 
began to break. The system that replaced the dictatorship was a rotating presidency, 
with representatives of the major ethnic groups taking turns heading the federal 
government. This practice encouraged ethnic nationalism and led to calls for increased 
decentralisation. Countering these calls was Serbia, which sought to re-centralise the 
federation, aggravating the fears of other ethnic groups about Serbian domination. 
When Serbia blocked the confirmation of the moderate Croatian Stipe Mesic as 
chairman of the federal presidency in 1991, Croatia declared independence from the 
federation. In July 1991, fighting started in Croatia between Croats and the local Serb 
minority. In addition to protecting Serbs, the Yugoslav National Army began seizing 
areas in which Croatians were the majority, and within a few months had control of 
one quarter of Croatian territory. 
The response of the international community was three-fold: 
- Restricting the ability of the warring parties to escalate the violence 
Encourage all sides to negotiate 
24 See Thomas Halverson, `American Perspectives' International Perspectives on the Yugoslav 
Conflict, eds. Danchev & Halverson, Macmillan Press, London, 1996, pp. 1-29. p. 4. 
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- Back up negotiations with a show of force. 
On the first goal, in a decision that would cause considerable tension between 
Congress and the Clinton administration, the UN imposed an arms embargo. 25 With 
the other two, the UN negotiated a ceasefire in January 1992 between the Croatian 
government and the rebel Serbs, and placed 14,000 troops as UNPROFOR (UN 
Protection Force) in the Serb-controlled regions of Croatia. However, UNPROFOR 
could not return the land to Croatian control. The Serb-held land would eventually be 
returned to Croatia in August 1995 after a US military strike lasting a few days. 
The War in Bosnia 
As well as expanding their autonomous regions into parts of northern and eastern 
Bosnia, the Serbs began arming themselves in 1991 in anticipation of the Bosnian 
government declaring independence. Although boycotted by Serbs, Muslims and 
Croats voted for independence for Bosnia in a March 1992 referendum. The 
subsequent declaration of independence provoked fighting between Bosnian 
government forces and the Serb minority. As well as holding Sarajevo under siege, 
sixty percent of Bosnian territory was occupied by Serbian nationalists, who raped, 
displaced, or murdered thousands of Muslims and Croats. 
The UN's reaction to the Bosnian crisis was much the same as for the rest of the 
Balkans. As well as seeking a negotiated settlement, sanctions were imposed on 
Belgrade in April 1992 for aiding the Bosnian Serbs, and a month later 7,000 
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international troops were deployed as part of UNPROFOR. 26 The purpose of 
UNPROFOR was to distribute humanitarian supplies and create a series of UNSC- 
sanctioned safe-areas. 27 Throughout 1993, the UN tried a series of initiatives to end 
the violence- indicting war crimes suspects and establishing safe-areas- but even with 
24,000 troops, UNPROFOR was unable to protect these areas from Serb attacks. 
Congress and the Bosnian Arnis Embargo 
For much of 1995 the focus of the Bosnia debate was not about intervention but 
about the UN-imposed Balkans arms embargo. The 1995 congressional-presidential 
battle over the Bosnian arms embargo says much about attitudes to peace-enforcement 
missions and the policy making relationship. It highlights the distance between the 
aspirations of a commitment to UN peace-enforcement and the reality of post-cold 
war US foreign policy. Prospects of a defeat on the embargo, forced the 
administration to renew attempts to secure a peace deal. 
The UNSC sanctioned a Balkans-wide arms embargo in September 1991 28 By 
containing the violence it was hoped that a settlement could be reached swiftly and 
that the republics would return to unitary rule. By 1994, with the Serb army occupying 
seventy percent of Bosnia, lifting the embargo was seen as a necessary course of 
action. However, most lawmakers did not follow the embargo issue very closely. 
Apart from Sen. Bob Dole (R-KS), Majority Leader, and a few others, many in 
25 UN Security Council Resolution 713. September 25,1991. 
26 UN Security Council Resolution 757, May 30,1992. 
27 Srebrenica (UNSC Res. 819, April 16,1993). Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla, Gorazde and Zepa (UNSC Res 
824: May 6,1993). 
Chapter Six: Bosnia and UNPE in the 104th Congress 229 
Congress did `not have a clue what they were doing, ' and viewed the lifting of the 
embargo as `an easy and cheap way to handle' the crisis 29 Certain lawmakers- 
particularly senators- had been requesting that the president unilaterally lift the 
embargo since January 1994. They did not make any formal challenges to the 
president in 1994, but by mid-1995 opposition peaked with over two-thirds majorities 
in both chambers demanding a cessation to the embargo 30 
The Senate's major embargo legislation in 1995 was S. 21. Introduced on the first 
day of the new session by Senators. Bob Dole (R-KS), Majority Leader, and Joe 
Lieberman (D-CT), Deputy Whip, it called on the president to lift sanctions 
unilaterally and let the Bosnian Muslims arm themselves. 1 The main House measure 
was Rep. Steny Hoyer's (D-MD) amendment to HR. 1561, which supported the 
Bosnian government's right to defend itself against aggression and directed the 
president to lift the embargo. 32 
To many lawmakers, the right of the Bosnian Muslims to defend themselves 
justified lifting the embargo. It was perceived as a morally correct course of action 
that would permit the Bosnian government to protect its people. Justification was 
based on the argument that by recognising the embargo the US was sanctioning the 
mistreatment of Bosnians. Rep. David Bonior (D-MI) expressed the view of many, 
saying, `We have become unwitting accomplices to a mass genocide of more than 
28 UNSC passed Resolution 713. Unanimously approved 25 September 1991. 
IO 
" George Kenney (a State Department official who in 1992 resigned in protest at the administration's 
handling of the crisis), quoted in Q, July 8,1995, p. 2009. 
30 For a discussion of the 1994 Embargo debates, see Hendrickson, R, 1997, pp. 213-221. 1t 
+' S. 21: The Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995. 
32 FY1996-97 Foreign Aid and State Department Authorization/Bosnia Arms Embargo (H. Amdt 420). 
Chapter Six: Bosnia and UNPE in the 104`h Congress 230 
200,000 people. '33 Though they were not calling for US troops, they did have 
humanitarian concerns. 
Within the disengagement camp, another group viewed ending the embargo as a 
convenient way for America to wash its hands of the crisis. Arming the Muslims 
would even the balance. Once able to defend themselves, the pressure on the US to 
intervene on their behalf would diminish. Underlying this was the desire to write 
America out of the crisis. For instance, Sen. Charles Robb (D-VA), deputy Whip, said 
that lifting the embargo would lower the `risk of having the United States pulled 
incrementally into a full-scale war. .. where the costs in lives and 
dollars would be far 
more than we could justify. '34 This has isolationist tones, but leaving Bosnians to fight 
for themselves is hardly comparable to the way the UNOSOM operation in Somalia 
ended. Firstly, Bosnia had an army of 110,000 troops. Secondly, although less 
supportive of a withdrawal of UN forces, the Bosnian government was anxious for the 
embargo to be lifted. 35 Lastly, those campaigning to lift the embargo understood that 
many countries would be willing to arm the Bosnians 36 Neither chambers' legislation 
called for the US to supply arms to the Bosnian government, as most lawmakers 
agreed that arming and training the Muslims would drag America into the war. 
Blaming the UN was used to justify unilaterally lifting the embargo. Rep. newt 
Gingrich (R-GA), House Speaker, said, `I think the United Nations has proven itself a 
Introduced June 8,1995. 
33 CO, July 8,1995, p. 2008. See also, Sens. Gramm and Lieberman, CR, August 1,1995, p. H8076. 
34 Senate Armed Services Committee, op. cit. p. 10. 
35 See testimony by Bosnian Premier, Haris Silajdzic, CR, June 7,1995,1995 Senate p. S7880. 
36 Sen. Dole said `Countries like Turkey, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Pakistan would offer 
financial and military assistance. ' Ibid., p. S7880 
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failed instrument in Bosnia. It wont allow the Bosnians to defend themselves and it 
hasn't defended the Bosnians. I think we should arm the Bosnians. '37 This was typical 
UN-bashing from Republicans, but even the liberal Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D- 
NY) agreed that the UN had no power to stop the US from unilaterally lifting the 
embargo. 38 The UN was so rarely mentioned that it would be inaccurate to give the 
impression that hostility to the organisation was motivating congressional actions 39 
Due to a belief that doing so would escalate the war, there was opposition in 
Congress to lifting the embargo. This was partly from worries about empowering the 
Serbs by allowing more weapons in the region. As Rep. Randy Cunningham (R-CA) 
said, `increasing arms into an area is not going to help us to a peaceful solution. '40 
Moral questions about the Muslims' plight were one thing, but most embargo 
supporters were motivated by more interest-based views. As Britain and France 
announced they would pull out if America acted unilaterally, lifting the embargo was 
problematic for some lawmakers. The overriding concern was that if UNPROFOR 
withdrew, then pressure on America to intervene would grow. Sen. Richard Lugar (R- 
IN) said: 
`If the Dole amendment passes and the British and the French pull out, we're in 
the war... Do the American people realize even if we lift the embargo and level the 
playing field, we can't walk away, we're walking into a war? 01 
37 Quoted in Kathy Sawyer, 1994. Sen. Dole, `Bosnian Arms Embargo, ' CR, July 24,1995, P"S 10537. 
38 Quoted in Kathy Sawyer, 1994. 
39 See Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN), International Relations Committee ranking Democrat, CR. August 1, 
1995, pp. H8086-88. 
40 Rep. Randy Cunningham (R-CA), `Bosnia-Herzegovina Self-Defense Act 1995, ' CR, August 1, 
1995, pp. H8076-8109. 
41 CQ, March 11,1995, p. 763. See also Sen. Leahy, `The Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act, ' 
CR, Senate, July 25,1995, p. S 10614. Rep. Bill Hefner (D-NC), op. cit. August 1,1995, p. H8082. 
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In short, most defenders of the embargo were primarily concerned about 
Americanising the war. Also, preserving NATO unity was not a priority, but some 
legislators were aware that acting unilaterally would undermine the alliance. 2 The 
embargo supporters' actions were similar to those with more humanitarian concerns: 
perspectives about America's global responsibilities may have differed, but essentially 
they were requesting no less US involvement than Rep. Bonior et al. 
The Administration and the Balkans Arms Embargo 
Whether they were for or against it, many Republicans used the embargo to attack 
the Clinton administration. 3 The tone of Republican statements was often one of 
dictating foreign policy to Clinton. This had less to do with a fight over who controls 
foreign policy, and more about the perception in Congress that the administration did 
not have a policy. As with Somalia, Republicans were trying to fill a gap by framing 
their own policy. In addition to faulting the UN for its inability to provide sufficient 
protection, legislators rebuked the administration for backing the toothless 
UNPROFOR as an alternative to US action. Rep. Hoyer said the UN force had 
become `a substitution for a policy of confronting aggression. '44 
The burgeoning dissatisfaction with the policy shortfall meant that in contrast to 
previous votes requesting that the president unilaterally abandon the embargo, S. 21 
was a directive to the administration. As earlier legislation had either foundered or 
42 Sen. Nunn warns of the risk to the NATO alliance if the embargo is unilaterally lifted. Armed 
Services Committee, op. cit. p. 4. 
43 David Riesman, `Western Responses to the Current Balkan War, ' in Cushman, T& Mestrovic, S, 
1996, pp. 350-7. p. 353. 
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was too flexible to be effective, Congress was never previously in a position where it 
directly challenged the president. With S. 21, despite its negligible effects in 
alleviating the crisis, it carried symbolic value in terms of challenging the president's 
prestige as an international leader. 
The administration defended the embargo for two main reasons. Firstly, ending it 
would escalate the conflict. Warren Christopher said, lifting it `will only lead us to 
further bloodshed and bring us not an inch closer to a settlement of this dreadful 
conflict. AS Secondly, acting unilaterally would threaten America's relationship with 
its NATO allies. Lake revealed that `we did argue a lot with the Congress, "do not 
unilaterally lift it, because all hell would break loose with the alliance". '46 Rather than 
ditch sanctions, Clinton promised to enact a decision made at a NATO meeting in 
London (July 20) to enhance UNPROFOR through expanding air strike targets and 
prohibiting UN officials from approving NATO missions. 
The administration had worries about the proliferation of weapons, but had 
previously expressed tentative support for lifting the embargo in April 1993. There 
was concern in 1993 that the Serbs would have an advantage in the short-term, and so 
air strikes were needed to allow time for the Muslims to arm. The plan, referred to as 
`lift and strike, ' would level the military playing field between Muslims and Serbs. 
However, both Britain and France had told the administration that they would extract 
their troops if the embargo was lifted. Thus the administration had to keep the 
44 M, June 10,1995, p. 1654. See also `The Abdication, Again, ' The New Republic, June 19,1995. AC 
" Quoted in John Diamond, `Senate Rebukes Clinton, Lifts Arms Embargo' Associated Press. 
http: //thomas. loc. gov/home/rlO8query. html. 
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embargo intact to sustain unity with NATO allies. The problem came down to trying 
to provide leadership for the Europeans, without `Americanizing' the conflict. 
Voting on the Embargo 
On June 8, the House passed Hoyer's amendment to HR. 1561 (318-99), which 
requested the president to lift the sanctions unilaterally if the Bosnian government 
requested it. The passage of the bill was immediately met with a threat of a 
presidential veto. The House majority exceeded two thirds, but, as it was only a 
request that the embargo be lifted, it is unclear whether it was an empty gesture. 
On July 26, the Senate approved S. 21 69 votes to 29. Despite last minute lobbying 
of Democrats by the administration and the Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D- 
SD), the result was enough to override a presidential veto. Nevertheless, like the 
House bill, HR. 1561, the Senate's action was to a certain degree toothless. It 
authorised the use of US troops to assist with a NATO evacuation, but, in order to 
broaden support, the actual lifting of the embargo would not be implemented 
immediately. In fact, it was agreed that the embargo could remain for up to twelve 
weeks after the Bosnian government's request for the UN force to leave. 
As the two chambers passed their own versions of the bill, the House needed to 
sanction S. 21. The fact that Hoyer's HR. 1561 achieved a two-thirds majority in the 
House meant S. 21 was never likely to fail, but the administration's inability to deter 
the Senate from reaching a two-thirds majority prompted senior officials to lobby the 
46 Anthony Lake, telephone interview with author, September 16,2003. 
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House. The day after the Senate vote, Secretaries Christopher and Perry went to the 
House to meet with Republicans. Stressing the consequences of ending the embargo, 
they said that the US would have to launch a $900m operation to extract the UN 
forces from Bosnia if the bill succeeded. Such efforts were successful because when 
S. 21 passed (298-128) on August 1 it did so with twenty fewer votes than the June 8 
version; falling short of a two-thirds majority. 
Clinton vetoed S. 21 on August 11, stating that it would `undermine the chances for 
peace in Bosnia, lead to a wider war, and undercut the authority of the [UNSC]. '47 
Senior Democrats like Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA), Armed Services Committee ranking 
Democrat, stated that their endorsement of S. 21 did not necessarily mean they would 
vote against a presidential veto. But, indications suggested that there were sufficient 
votes in both chambers to override it. However, neither chamber passed legislation 
that would have an immediate impact, and the upcoming recess meant there would not 
be a vote to contest the veto until September. This gave the president time to lobby 
support, and as events in the Balkans were moving faster than in Washington, this was 
crucial in averting a standoff. A combination of the air strikes around Sarajevo and the 
success in getting the Serbs to the negotiating table had broken the deadlock, and so 
the override vote was put on hold. 
The Arms Embargo, Congress and UNPE 
That the embargo is rarely considered in the literature is surprising as it reveals a lot 
about US decision makers' attitudes towards regions of peripheral security interests. 
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Disputes about the unilateral lifting of sanctions are incompatible with the ethos of 
UNPE. Both Bush and Clinton talked of a type of conflict resolution in which the US 
would `Americanize' crises by taking responsibility for settling them. However, the 
embargo shows how the decision makers avoided US involvement, either by 
maintaining it to give the impression that the conflict was being contained, or to lift it 
and leave the Bosnians to fight it out 48 
S. 21 directly confronted the administration's policy of keeping the embargo intact 
for as long as NATO demanded. In the weeks prior to the advances towards a peace 
settlement in September, disagreements between Clinton and many in the 104th 
Congress over the implications of unilaterally lifting sanctions resulted in a 
constitutional battle. Until Hoyer's HR. 1561, Congress did not urge Clinton to act 
unilaterally, and the latter's allegiance to the European alliance was stronger than his 
commitment to `lift and strike. ' However, efforts to act unilaterally demonstrated a 
lack of co-ordination with the UN, and indicated how Congress was sapping the 
concept of a US-UN partnership. 
The legislature was increasingly trying to dictate the running of US foreign policy, 
so had the peace negotiations broken down, the administration may have been forced 
to yield on the embargo. Four years after President Bush anticipated expanded 
responsibility in international humanitarianism, a twenty-month legislative battle over 
one aspect of the bloodiest civil war in European since the second world war was just 
concluding. The underlying objective of supporters and opponents of the embargo 
47 CO Almanac, 1995, p. D-27. 
48 For excellent examples of why lawmakers wanted to avoid Americanizing the conflict: `Bosnia- 
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was to avoid Americanizing the war. Concern within both the executive and the 
legislature about the embargo's effect on Bosnians disappeared from the debate in the 
weeks of S. 21. Instead, the president's international reputation, the extent of 
congressional power, and possible financial costs dominated discussions. Before 
considering voting behaviour and participation on the embargo issue, the chapter 
shifts attention to the process leading to the IFOR troop deployment. 
Herzegovina Self-Defense Act 1995, ' CR, August 1,1995, pp. H8076-8109. 
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Part Three: The IFOR Intervention 
It would be misleading to portray the debate surrounding the use of force in Bosnia 
as one of an interventionist president and an isolationist Congress. There was diversity 
within the new administration, and even congressional Republicans were hardly of 
one mind on the issue, but neither branch was seeking to install pre-settlement troops. 
Such senior administration officials as Madeleine Albright, Anthony Lake and Al 
Gore lobbied for a tougher stance, but many in the Pentagon were more cautious. In 
between, Clinton and Christopher tried to balance domestic demands with the need to 
maintain NATO harmony. It was apparent by 1995 that the violence could not be 
checked without US action. 
Indecisiveness in Washington and reluctance among NATO allies were reasons why 
a US-led enforcement operation was not pursued, but the anticipation of congressional 
opposition was a factor. Lawmakers spent the crisis trying to impose restrictions on 
the president's ability to station troops in the Balkans. Consequently, part three 
evaluates the role Congress played in restraining the executive, and what Bosnia 
revealed about the UNPE approach. 
Despite Clinton's desire to keep US troops out of Bosnia, it was apparent that in 
1995 the UN mission was not working effectively. Its limited mandate and military 
weakness left it unable to defend Bosnian Muslims against Serb aggression. More 
worryingly for Clinton, polls in mid-1995 showed the public was becoming more 
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critical of his handling of the crisis. 9 Eager to pursue a more proactive line, Clinton 
announced in May that 25,000 ground troops would be used if an evacuation of 
UNPROFOR were required. To placate legislators, Clinton insisted that any decision 
to send troops would only be made `after consultation with Congress. 50 However, 
even a small-scale intervention was treated with scepticism in Congress. 
A cadre of high-profile foreign policy Republicans worked on guidelines for a 
withdrawal operation. 51 The guidelines, framed to secure Democratic support, 
included NATO command and robust rules of engagement that provided for massive 
retaliation to attack on US forces. With many Republican senators obstructing military 
action there was a possibility that the plan would collapse, so Sen. Bob Dole (R-KS), 
Majority Leader, put the guidelines on hold to concentrate on lifting the embargo. 
However, the establishment of ground rules prior to an intervention is typical of the 
ongoing demands by Congress to be part of the consultation process, and, as the 
stipulations show, fear of an initial approval being used to countenance a much 
broader involvement was prevalent. 
Events moved faster than Washington's cumbersome decision making process. The 
plan to use US troops to assist with a withdrawal of UNPROFOR faded when a 
workable peace deal seemed obtainable by late 1995. Signs of a peace deal meant 
lawmakers were resigned to the fact that the president would eventually send a force. 
49 In a June poll, 43 percent disapproved of Clinton's handling of the crisis; 41 percent approved. Cited 
in National Journal, July 8,1995, p. 1796. 
so Remarks at the United States Air Force Academy Commencement Ceremony in Colorado Springs, 
Colorado, May 31,1995. 
51 Headed by Sen. Dole (R-KS), the senators were; Strom Thurmond (R-SC), Jesse Helms (R-NC), 
John McCain (R-AZ) and Richard Lugar (R-IN). See Sen. Thurmond's opening remarks, `Situation in 
Bosnia, ' op. cit. June, 6,1995, pp. 1-6. 
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Although American soldiers would be keeping an agreed peace, there was still a 
danger they were walking into a quagmire. What was left for Congress was to 
influence the mission. It would be unlikely that War Powers would be invoked for a 
policing operation, but many in Congress were unconvinced of the operation's 
security, and, even among those unopposed to sending troops, support was dependent 
on strict ground rules. On the same day (September 29) that Clinton expressed 
confidence that Congress would back efforts to implement a negotiated settlement, 
senators passed an amendment (94-2) calling on the president to seek advance 
approval for sending troops. 52 
Signals from both Capitol Hill and the White House in early October suggested that 
while neither branch wanted a showdown, they would be sticking to their positions. 
The president said he would welcome Congress's backing in an October 6 statement, 
but added the caveat that the mission would go ahead regardless, stating, `if the 
United States does not lead, the job will not be done. ' This did not deter lawmakers. 
One week later, Sen. McCain said: 
`What we'll be seeking is a formal request for authorisation from the president 
and a full-scale debate. It would be foolish of the president not to do that, 
because they know we have too many ways to block it. '53 
The same sentiment permeated the House. On October 30, the House approved 
HR. 247 (315-103), which insisted that the peace negotiators should not presume that 
US troops would be deployed without advance congressional approval. The 
interbranch dispute was about when Congress would be given an opportunity to 
52 CQ, September 30,1995, p. 3018. HR 2076. 
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debate an operation. HR. 247 (along with its companion bill HR. 2606 to withhold 
funds unless Congress approves a deployment) was symbolic, standing little chance of 
becoming law, but in what was a non-binding vote, lawmakers were repeating a 
process that they commonly used to include themselves in decision making. 54 The 
vote was a warning that the legislature would not rubber-stamp any settlement 
regardless of its conditions. Rep. Gingrich said, `It was an effort to say to the 
president, "Don't believe that you can manipulate us into having to say `yes'. "155 
On November 21, a peace deal was reached in Dayton that would preserve Bosnia as 
a single state with a Muslim-Croat federation and a Bosnian Serb Republic. The deal, 
though, required an international force to police it. To secure implementation, the US 
would contribute troops to the International Implementation Force (IFOR). The 
NATO deployment was a peacekeeping mission that resembled Chapter Six of the UN 
Charter: it was not intended to entail peace-building and was expected to last one year. 
The administration's immediate task was selling it to Congress and the public. 
Indeed, Clinton worked hard to build support for IFOR. Emphasising its long-term 
benefits, in a letter to the House Speaker, he said, `If the negotiations fail and the war 
resumes... there is the very real risk that it could spread beyond Bosnia, and involve 
Europe's new democracies. ' 56 On November 27, Clinton delivered a television 
address on the importance of US inclusion in a peacekeeping mission. 57 Although 
53 CO, October 14,1995, p. 3158. 
54 HR. 2606 passed 243-171, November 17,1995 (rejected in the Senate, December 13,22-77). 
55 CO, November 4,1995, p. 3390. 
56 Letter from President Clinton to Newt Gingrich, November 13,1995. 
57 Address on the Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, November 27, 
1995. 
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Clinton said, `If the NATO plan meets with my approval, I will immediately send it to 
Congress and request its support, ' the speech did highlight two points making it 
difficult for lawmakers to reject a deployment. Firstly, Clinton stressed that America's 
reputation as a global leader was at stake. 58 This tactic did impact on Republicans: 
`I specifically thought that once the president had made the commitment it 
would be more damaging to our national security for us to pull away support 
for the president. '59 
Secondly, he declared that within a week he would authorise a small detachment of 
American troops in a NATO advance mission. Playing on congressional reluctance to 
cut off funding once soldiers are in the field, an advance force restricted lawmakers' 
manoeuvrability. 
Voting on IFOR 
Four committees held hearings on the peace deal (the Senate Armed Services and 
Foreign Relations, and the House Armed Services and International Relations) 
attended by numerous senior administration officials such as Christopher, Perry, 
Holbrooke, and Gen. Shalikashvili. This was intended to convince committee 
members of America's interest in protecting the peace plan; that only America could 
lead the operation; that the mission would go to plan; and that Congress would be 
regularly consulted. 
58 Clinton said `America's commitment to leadership will be questioned if we refuse to participate in 
implementing a peace agreement we brokered right here in the United States. ' Ibid. 
59 Rep. Peter King (R-NY). Interview with author, January 31,2001, Washington D. C. 
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Committee members had three broad concerns. Firstly, most on the committees 
were adamant that America had no interests in Bosnia. 60 The second concern was that 
the administration was using the legislature as a rubber stamp Rep. Christopher Smith 
(R-NJ) said, `no matter what the Congress thinks about this.. . this deployment is going 
to happen. '61 Finally, scepticism was expressed at the claim that the operation would 
be over within one year. 62 If the mission is clearly defined beforehand then the danger 
of mission-creep could be circumvented, and the placing of even nominal deadlines 
partially removes quagmire fears by allowing opportunities to gauge progress. But, as 
IFOR was about policing borders, the moment the mission achieved its aims would be 
uncertain. Although in November 1996 Clinton announced that the US presence 
would be scaled down to 8,500 troops as part of SFOR (Stabilization Force), most 
members did not believe the US's commitment would end in 1996.63 
As with the committees, many legislators did not accept that deployment was fait 
acco111pli. 64 A series of floor votes held in both chambers on December 13 indicate 
how support for IFOR was marginal. In the Senate, Dole and McCain rushed through 
a resolution (SJ. Res. 44) limiting the mission to a policing role and stipulating that US 
troops not engage in nation-building. SJ. Res. 44 passed 69-30, which was effectively 
the Senate's approval for the mission, but S. Con. Res. 35 (expressing opposition to 
Clinton's decision, but support for the troops) failed by a narrow margin of 47-52. The 
House rejected HR. 2770 (prohibiting the use of federal funds for the deployment) and 
60 Rep. Doug Bereuter (R-NE), `U. S. Policy Towards Bosnia, ' House Committee of International 
Relations, op. cit. November 30,1995, p. 28. Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL), ibid., pp. 31-32. 
61 Rep. Christopher Smith (R-NJ), ibid. p. 36. Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN), ibid., p. 36. 
62 Rep. Bob Menendez (R-NJ), ibid. p. 26. Rep. Berman, ibid., p. 26. 
63 See Banks, W& Straussman, J, 1999, p. 210. 
64 See Sen. Phil Gramm (R-TX), National Journal, December 2,1995, p. 2990. 
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HR. 306 (expressing support for the troops) 190-237 and 210-218 respectively. The 
House endorsed the mission 287-141 with HR. 302, which stated that while it had 
concerns about the president's policy, it supported the troops. Crucially, then, while 
SJ. Res. 44 and HR. 302 were not unconditionally in favour of the mission or the 
president, they were majority votes backing IFOR. 
Part Four: Bosnia and UNPE 
The above has outlined the main points of the congressional-presidential response to 
the Bosnia crisis. Part four will now link that discussion to the themes raised in the 
first three chapters. It considers Bosnia in relation to UNPE policy as envisaged earlier 
in the 1990s and then applies the Bosnia case to analysis of congressional-presidential 
foreign policy making and consideration of voting behaviour and individual 
involvement. 
This chapter places Congress more centrally into the study of US involvement in the 
Bosnia crisis. It explores committee and floor debates, statements and votes to explain 
the legislature's influence on the US response and what lifting the embargo and the 
NATO deployment reveal about attitudes to humanitarian-led conflict resolution. 
Surprisingly, though, the literature on this subject rarely takes account of Congress. 
The maintaining of an arms embargo against the express wishes of the Bosnian 
government and Congress's role in the post-peace decision to deploy troops are two 
largely overlooked areas. On the embargo, Noel Malcolm, an exception, discusses 
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what it says about Western attitudes to the Balkans. 65 He describes the West's view of 
the crisis as a `doctrine of equivalence, ' in which the Balkans-wide embargo rested on 
the suspicion that every group was in some way guilty, and therefore should be 
`punished' equally. Of those focusing on the US and the war, few even mention the 
embargo, and none discuss what Congress's response says about the US-UN 
relationship. Others write on 1993's aborted `lift and strike' policy and the 
disagreements with the European powers, but completely overlook the 1995 debates. 66 
Outside of the conflict's warring sides, the inaction of the UN, the international 
community and the Clinton administration have generally been the focus of criticism. 
With the UN, Michael Barnett argues that the mindset of its officials was tuned to 
evading enforcement actions and sticking to traditional approaches to conflict 
resolution that had the parties' consent. 67 The inability to contain the Balkans conflict 
is also attributed to the failure of the great powers either to resolve the problem 
independently or at least help galvanise a UN undertaking. 68 
Of particular interest are articles specifically blaming the US for ineffectual 
retaliation to the violence. One argument is that insufficient security interests justified 
65 Noel Malcolm, `Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure, ' National Interest, vol. 39, Spring, 1995, 
pp. 3-14, pp. 7-8. 
66 Gompert, D, 1996. 
67 Michael Barnett, `The Politics of Indifference at the United Nations and Genocide in Rwanda and 
Bosnia, ' in Thomas Cushman & Stjepan Mestrovic, This Time We Knew: Western Responses to 
Genocide in Bosnia, New York University Press, 1996, pp. 128-162. On why the UN failed, Susan 
Lamb, `The UN Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia, ' A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping 
in the 1990s, eds. Ramesh Thakur, & Carlyle Thayer, Westview Press, Boulder, 1995, pp. 65-84. 
68 David Riefl', Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West, Simon & Schuster, New York, 
1995. James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1997. 
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an attitude of non-intervention. 69 Bennis argues that it was the US that prevented the 
UN from playing a meaningful role, while at the same time using the organisation as a 
cover for inaction. 70 Others acknowledge the difficulty Clinton had in winning 
congressional and public support for tough action against the Serbs, but most analysts 
focus on the American/European relationship and how diversity prolonged the war. 
Bosnia is an informative case about Congress's influence in foreign policy decision 
making, yet the crisis is rarely mentioned within the Congress-presidency literature. 
Lindsay, for example, argues that Clinton revised his Bosnia policy for fear of 
congressional legislation. 71 Others present a two presidencies argument that Congress 
allowed the president to send troops without authorisation or proper funding 
approval. 72 It is fair to say, as Ripley does, that despite such intense Republican 
hostility to IFOR, Congress was given little choice in going along with the plan. 73 
Clinton arguably paid lip service to consultation prior to launching IFOR, with the 
decision being made at NATO meetings before the congressional hearings. This raises 
questions about a congressional resurgence within interbranch foreign policy making. 
The above seemingly confirms Hinckley's two presidencies claim that Congress 
pontificates opposition but will eventually back down. 74 However, the Bosnian case 
demonstrates elements of both congressional assertiveness and deference towards the 
executive branch. Many lawmakers retreated from their previous position, but 
69 Wayne Bert, The Reluctant Superpower: United States' Policy in Bosnia, 1991-95, Macmillan Press, 
London, 1997. 
70 Bennis, P, 1996. 
71 Lindsay, J, 1995, pp. 82-85. Stevenson, C, 1996, p. 530. 
72 Fisher, L, 1999. Avella, J, 1996. Ripley, R, 1998, pp. 256-260. 
73 Ibid., p. 200. 
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legislative endorsement of IFOR showed more than executive omnipotence. As 
America led the negotiations, it could hardly not contribute to IFOR, and Congress 
could have obstructed it, but did effectively vote to approve it regardless of public 
opposition. Congress is not assertiveness only when a majority of lawmakers 
challenge the president. That lawmakers got behind the chief executive is not 
reverence, it was, in many cases, a grudging but shared acceptance that a deployment 
was needed. 
There are four key reasons why Congress was not deferential. Firstly, it did not 
supinely accede to the executive. The president cannot have hoodwinked all 
lawmakers as 103 representatives voted against the need for the president to seek 
approval before committing troops (HR. 247). Lawmakers are sophisticated enough to 
appreciate that three-way peace deals are vulnerable and require policing. Secondly, 
Congress was not completely out of the loop. The legislature had signalled 
disapproval by passing Bosnia amendments aggressively opposed to US military 
deployment during 1995 and the administration worked hard at courting congressional 
support, with many senior officials attending hearings. 5 The anti-UNPE rhetoric 
emerging from Congress in 1995 showed how Clinton was up against it. His increased 
efforts to keep legislators informed partially assuaged Congress, but there were still 
concerns about the impracticalities of modifying an agreed settlement. By leaving 
consultation until the end, would lawmakers feel compelled to accept any deal? IFOR 
was perhaps inevitable, but Congress still managed some input. HR. 302 stated that the 
troops should remain neutral, and SJ. Res. 44 included various stipulations. Thus by 
74 Hinckley, B, 1994. 
75 Anthony Lake (telephone interview with author, September 16,2003) confirmed that extra effort was 
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imposing limits, Congress was covering itself if the mission went wrong. 
Thirdly, IFOR was a peacekeeping operation. UNPE was about taking swift, 
resolute action to enforce peace in conflicts of peripheral strategic importance. This 
was not the case with Bosnia. Crucially, a peace had already been reached when 
Congress sanctioned the mission, and so US troops would only be serving in a 
policing capacity. As there were opposing armies in Bosnia, it would be inaccurate to 
portray the mission as a risk-free exercise. However, IFOR was more analogous to the 
ongoing operations in Cambodia and the Golan Heights, than Restore Hope or Desert 
Storm. America did undertake air strikes and negotiations to end the conflict, but not 
sending troops earlier emphasises a repudiation of the more controversial aspects of 
post-1989 thinking on US involvement in UN peace-enforcement operations. Due to 
this, congressional support at the main deployment debates was more forthcoming. 76 
Of all the Washington institutions, Congress was the most outspoken in criticising 
the Serbs, but paradoxically was the most opposed to stationing US combat troops in 
Bosnia. What can be learnt from the couple of months leading up to IFOR is how 
Congress will assert itself to gain concessions from the administration, but is reluctant 
to intrude too far on the president's constitutional power. Congress may have voted 
for IFOR, but trampling over a peace deal was not the only possible expression of 
congressional authority. Lawmakers had some influence by employing legislative and 
non-legislative tools such as letters and speeches to signal opposition and make it 
made to win Congress's approval. See also Hendrickson, R, 1997, p. 256. Boyd, W, 1998, p. 54. 
76 See `Expressing Opposition of Congress to President Clinton's Planned Deployments of Ground 
Forces to Bosnia, ' CR, December 13,1995, pp. S18449-S18549. `Sense of House Regarding 
Deployment of Armed Forces to Bosnia, ' CR, December 13,1995, pp. H14860-H14871. 
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difficult for Clinton to create a deployment policy before the Dayton negotiations 
succeeded. 
By helping prevent a pre-settlement deployment, Congress went some way to 
confirm the prediction that post-1989 it would aggressively protect its foreign policy 
role. 77 Clinton said in 1993 that he would not consider combatant units, but much had 
happened by late 1995, such as five failed peace deals and the Srebrenica massacre. It 
was also clear that the conflict would not naturally run out of steam and that the 
Europeans could not solve the crisis without US leadership. 
Another reason this was not deference is that when Congress granted support for the 
1995 mission the UN did not have the influence on US foreign policy that it had when 
troops were sent to Somalia in 1992. After the cold war it was thought that the UN 
would mediate only in Third World conflicts, so its initial involvement in resolving 
the Bosnia situation was a step forward. But, by 1995 even Boutros-Ghali's attempts 
to reverse the `London rule' stipulating that NATO commanders no longer required 
his permission before launching air strikes met with disapproval from the 
administration. As Warren Christopher coolly recalls in his memoirs, `I intervened 
with Boutros-Ghali, and after two firm phone conversations, he finally relented. '78 
The eventual replacement of the UN with NATO as the primary multilateral body in 
Bosnia represents a watershed in post-cold war US-UN relations. As IFOR had the 
blessing of the Northern Atlantic Council, the UN's moral authority was not deemed 
77 Hastedt, G& Eksterowicz, A, 1993. 
78 Christopher, W, 1998, p. 349. 
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worth seeking. This sidelining of the UN placated many in Congress. Even 
internationalist lawmakers were describing the UN as `feckless' for not allowing 
NATO to do its job. 79 
The UN's reaction to the crisis was ineffective, based on trying to alleviate the 
suffering rather than stopping the fighting. The complexity and scale of the conflict 
was too much for the international organisation. Two-thirds of the UN's peacekeepers 
were in the region, yet it was only able to enforce sporadic breaks in the violence. In a 
war that ended ostensibly through Croatian military victories, NATO bombing and 
American diplomacy, the crisis in the former Yugoslavia ensured the UN would not 
be a major player in global diplomacy as envisaged in the early 1990s. Instead, the 
crisis was evidence that the UN would be reverting to its role of humanitarian 
assistance. 
Bosnia also reveals that building support for widely unpopular operations is more 
easily done through regional collective security organisations like NATO. The UN's 
diminished standing and the inability to take swift action to protect human rights 
damaged UNPE as a substantive element of US foreign policy. As the 60,000 troops 
were put under the overall command of US Army Gen. George Joulwan, perhaps the 
only aspect of UNPE that remained intact was that America would be the leading 
nation in IFOR. 
Bosnia showed that lawmakers are more likely to oppose the president's right to 
79 Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE), `The Fall of Srebrenica, ' CR, July 11,1995, p. S9708. 
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station troops abroad if the UN is involved. As in the previous Congress, the UN in 
the 104th was condemned from various ideological strands. At one extreme, freshman 
Republican Rep. Joe Scarborough (FL) introduced legislation on the day of the UN's 
fiftieth anniversary demanding the US leave the organisation within four years. 80 Rep. 
Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) summed-up the view of many lawmakers when he said, 
`It's a collection of tin-pot dictatorships and corrupt regimes. '81 A tiny minority 
demanded secession, but the congressional mood was of bipartisan agreement that 
America was not getting its money's worth. 82 The more moderate line was neither to 
curtail nor to escalate US participation in the UN, but to seek reductions in the overall 
scope of the organisation. 83 
Although some Republicans were unequivocally opposed to it, there was still a 
broad level of support for a limited role in UN peacekeeping in the 104th Congress. 
The language of the NSRA and the PPA envisage a continued US engagement in UN 
peace operations. The House- measure, for instance, still authorised America's 
payment of 25 percent of the peacekeeping budget, but when compared to notions of 
America and the UN jointly planning and executing missions, these proposals stated 
unambiguous objection to operations based on Chapter Seven of the UN Charter. The 
UN still had fans among liberals, who described it as a system that `has worked well 
within the construct of an international community dedicated to conflict resolution. '84 
Undeniably, though, by 1995 executive branch support for the UN and multilateral 
8o United Nations Withdrawal Act of 1995 (HR 2535). It was referred to the Subcommittee on 
International Operations and Human Rights on November 7,1995 but was not reported out. 
81 Cam, October 21,1995, p. 3214. 
82 Sen. Phil Gramm (R-TX), ibid., p. 3215. 
83 Rep. Sonny Callahan (R-AL), ibid., p. 3216. 
84 Rep. Sam Farr (D-CA), `National Security Revitalization Act, ' CR, February 15,1995, p. H1798. 
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peace operations was deteriorating. 
Congressional Voting Cues 
As the above has focused on congressional action at the institutional level, the 
remainder of this chapter further explores congressional attitudes towards the 
humanitarian use of force abroad by looking at how decisions were reached and how 
much lawmakers, party leaders and foreign policy committee members participated in 
the Bosnia issue. Before widening it to consider a range of possible voting cues, the 
analysis will briefly illustrate the relative extent of partisanship across all 1995 
embargo and deployment votes. 
Figure 6.1 House Partisan Differentiation Scores on all 1995 Floor Votes on Balkans 
Arms Embargo* and Troop Deployment Issues 
200 
150 
100 
50 
362* 608* ot-MEL, 745 813 814 855 
Roll Call Vote Number 
0 PD Scores 
856 857 858 
The X-axis gives the roll call number for each floor vote The Y-axis represents the partisan 
differentiation (PD) score between 0 and 200. The roll calls marked '*'refer to votes only on the arms 
embargo. Compiled from Congressional Quarterly, 1995 
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Figure 6.2 Senate Partisan Differentiation Scores on all 1995 Floor Votes on Balkans 
Arms Embargo* and Troop Deplo; 'ment Issues 
329* 
ý® fifl 479 601 602 603 
Roll Call Vote Number 
PD Scores 
The X-axis gives the roll call number for each floor vote. The Y-axis represents the partisan 
differentiation (PD) score between 0 and 200. The roll calls marked '*'refer to votes only on the arms 
embargo. Compiled from Congressional Quarterly, 1995 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 measure party voting for all 1995 Bosnian embargo and 
deployment floor votes. 85 Using the same method employed in the Somalia and Haiti 
chapters, both figures reveal a number of insights. Firstly, party voting is higher in the 
House. Five House votes have PD scores above 100, whereas only two Senate votes 
are over 100. Also, the average PD result for all the House votes is 114, and the mean 
PD score for all Senate votes is seventy-eight. Thus, as with Somalia and Haiti, 
interparty conflict is noticeably lower in the Senate. Secondly, PD is higher in both 
chambers for deployment than for embargo votes. None of the five House and Senate 
embargo votes reaches higher than eighty-eight. Seven of the eleven deployment votes 
reveal partisan differentiations above 100. The embargo was perhaps too subtle to fit a 
partisan framework. Lawmakers' positions on the embargo came down to individual 
reading of a unique situation, rather than party loyalty. However, on all five embargo 
votes, the majority results were against the president's position; indicative of 
interbranch rivalry. 
330* 331* 
Chapter Six: Bosnia and UNPE in the 104 `h Congress 254 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show that partisanship was a factor on some, but not all Bosnia 
votes. As partisanship was not as evident in the upper as in the lower chamber, it is 
likely that some other factor had a stronger influence on Senate voting. Moreover, 
even on votes where partisanship appears as a factor other cues could still have 
influenced voting choices. As such, the following analysis uses binary logistic 
regression (BLR) to assess the impact on key roll call votes of the five independent 
variables discussed in chapter three: party membership, ideological ratings, and 
foreign policy committee membership, Clinton's share of the vote, and winning 
election margins. These are the same variables used in chapter four, with only the 
ideology variable (ACU95) updated to 1995 conservative voting ratings. The two 
models use House vote 858 (HR. 306) and Senate vote 603 (S. J. Res. 44) as dependent 
variables. Both bills are suitable to illustrate how voting was formed on the Bosnia 
issue. As the Senate vote was the final passage of the bill that approved the decision to 
deploy troops in the region, it relates to support for the president because it involved 
the use of force abroad. With three contradictory voting results, the choice of House 
vote is less straightforward. The failure of Rep. Dornan's H. 2770 (vote 856) to 
withhold funding for the deployment was, according to CQ, the main deployment vote 
as it signified Congress's reluctant approval. 86 The BLR test for this vote, however, 
does not show a goodness of fit, and therefore its findings are unreliable. 87 The Party 
variable was found to be significant in the other two deployment House votes (857 
and 858). Both relate to tacit approval by supporting the troops, but the final vote was 
roll call number 858. Although 858 failed because it was thought too lenient on the 
85 For the full statistics, see appendix tables 6.1 to 6.2. 
86 Pat Towell & Donna Cassata, `Congress Takes Symbolic Stand On Troop Deployment, ' CQ, 
December 16,1995, pp. 3817-8. 
87 For all BLR test results for House and Senate 1995 votes relating to the Bosnian crisis, see appendix 
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administration, it was part of a block of votes that indirectly approved the mission by 
supporting the troops. In other words, had 858 not included elements relating to the 
administration, it would have passed. 88 
House Vote 858 Regression Analysis 
Subtracting non-voters and missing independent variable values, 420 cases are 
entered into the regression for the House vote 858. Voting `no' is the most frequent 
result, so simply guessing that all the participants are in this category would be correct 
in only 231 (55%) of cases. The BLR test will increase the chances of correctly 
predicting category membership. 
Table 6.1 Iteration History table showing that the Party (step 1) and Ideology (ACU95) 
(step 2) variables are included in the model 
Iteration History(a, b, c, d) 
-2 Log Coefficients 
likelihood 
Iteration Constant Party ACU95 
Step 16 203.279 8.285 -5.317 
Step 26 180.491 1.856 -2.837 . 
473 
a Method: Forward Stepwise (Likelihood Ratio) 
b Constant is included in the model. 
c Initial -2 Log Likelihood: 578.037 
d Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than . 001. 
Table 6.1 finds that two variables serve as predictors of voting choices: Party 
variable is selected at step one and the Ideology variable, ACU95, at step two. As the 
fall in the -2 log likelihood from 578.037 to 180.491 is large, there is reason to be 
confident that the model has performed well. It appears, then, from table 6.1 that 
table 6.3. 
88 For clarification of this point, see Towell, P& Cassata, D, December 16,1995, p. 3818. 
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being able to predict how a representative voted on roll call 858 requires knowledge 
of their party membership and whether they adopted a conservative or liberal position 
on the twenty-three votes selected by the American Conservative Union in 1995. 
Table 6.21Nodel Sunimary table showing two measures ofR square to compare how much 
of the variance can be explained by the model and how much is due to error 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log Cox & Snell Nagelkerke R 
likelihood R Square Square 
1 203.279(a) . 590 . 790 
2 180.491(a) . 612 . 819 
a Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than . 001. 
Table 6.3 The Hosuter and Lemeshow test of the model's goodness-of-fit to examine 
whether the pattern of results matches a predicted pattern 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 
2 
. 000 
1.276 
0 
5 . 937 
In Table 6.2, the more reliable Nagelkerke value is . 819 
in step two, meaning the 
Party-ACU95 model can explain 82 percent of the variance in vote 858. As this is 
very high, there is reason to be confident that the majority of the variance is not due to 
unaccounted error. Table 6.3's Hosmer and Lemeshow test shows that the model fits 
the data well. The model is a good fit as the chi-square is small at 1.276, and, as the 
Sig. column is insignificant at P=>0.05, expected frequencies do not differ 
significantly from the observed frequencies. 
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Table 6.4 The Classification Table calculating the likelihood of being able to correctly 
predict a representative's category membership based on that subject's score that is 
attained from the two predictor variables. 
Classification Table(a) 
Predicted 
Vote858 Percentage 
Correct 
Observed Yes No 
Step 1 Vote858 Yes 178 11 94.2 
No 17 214 92.6 
Overall 93.3 
Percentage 
Step 2 Vote858 Yes 176 13 93.1 
No 17 214 92.6 
Overall 92.9 
Percentage 
a The cut value is . 500 i 
Step two of Table 6.4 shows that the model correctly predicted that 214 participants 
would be in the no category, with only seventeen wrongly put in that category. Of the 
189 predicted yes votes, 176 were correct. The success rate is even for both the yes 
and no categories, and so the model rightly predicted the voting behaviour of 92.9 
percent of subjects. As this is a huge increase on the fifty-seven percent expected 
success that would occur by merely guessing that a subject is in the no category, the 
regression is an improvement. The Nagelkerke R-square at 82 percent and 
classification tables at 93 percent are perhaps over-optimistic, but, as mentioned with 
the House BLR test illustrated in chapter four, the figures are high enough to be 
genuinely confident that most of the variance is not due to unaccounted error. 
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Table 6.5 Testing the significance of the Party and Ideology (ACU95) variables by 
examining if the model would be significantly affected by the removal of the two variables 
Model if Term Removed 
Variable Model Log Change in -2 df Sig. of the 
Likelihood Log Change 
Likelihood 
Step 1 Party -289.018 374.757 1 . 000 
Step 2 ACU95 -101.640 22.788 1 . 000 
Party -103.461 26.430 1 . 000 
The Sig. of the Change column in Table 6.5 shows no score is greater than 0.05, and 
so it can be concluded that the model would be significantly affected if the variables 
were removed. Table 6.5 also shows that the change in the -2 log likelihood due to the 
Party variable is the more powerful predictor (26.430), but ACU95's impact (22.788) 
is similar. In the first step, the Party variable has a huge effect on the model, but 
diminishes in step two. Nevertheless, knowing a representative's party membership 
and their ideological preferences would allow correct prediction of voting behaviour 
in 93 percent of cases. 
The Committee, Election and Clinton variables were not significant factors. This 
means that knowing a representative's committee assignments, election majority and 
Clinton's share of the district's 1992 presidential vote does not improve the ability to 
predict voting choices in this case. The Election variable does not appear as a 
significant predictor on the other eight Bosnia House votes. The summaries in 
appendix 6.3 show that Committee and Clinton are entered into some of the BLR 
models, but in all cases their impact is tiny. The three variables can be assumed to be 
largely irrelevant as guides to Bosnia voting. Instead, knowing a representative's party 
and their voting behaviour on the ACU-selected votes is enough to correctly predict 
category membership of vote 858 in 93 percent of cases, and this trend was generally 
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present in the other 1995 House votes on the Bosnian war. Leaning more towards 
ideology, all the other eight votes listed in figure 6.1 reveal that Ideology and Party 
were the most significant variables. 
Senate Vote 603 Regression Analysis 
Ninety-seven senators were entered into the test for roll call 603. As sixty-nine 
senators voted in support of vote 603, assuming that all the participants are in the 
`yes' category would be right in seventy-one percent of cases. This means that 
guessing that a lawmaker voted yes would be likely to be correct in almost three- 
quarters of cases. There is obviously only limited room for improvement with the 
regression, but it would still be worth assessing the relative power of the variables. 
Table 6.6 Iteration Histo, y table showing that the Ideology (A CU95) variable is included in 
the model 
Iteration History(a, b, c, d) 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Coefficients 
Iteration Constant ACU95 
Step 16 70.568 -4.728 . 554 
a Method: Forward Stepwise (Likelihood Ratio) 
b Constant is included in the model. 
c Initial -2 Log Likelihood: 116.584 
d Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than . 001. 
The Iteration History (table 6.6) shows that only the ACU95 variable is entered into 
the model. The sixth iteration value of 70.568 is low; signifying that the model 
performed well. This ACU95 variable is the 1995 American Conservative Union 
ratings that monitor conservative voting patterns for all members of Congress. Table 
6.6 thus reveals that senators' ideological preferences was found to be a significant 
predictor of voting choices in this particular case. 
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Table 6.7 Model Sunnnaty table showing two measures of R square to compare how much 
of the variance can be explained by the model and how much is due to error 
Model Summa 
Step -2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 70.568(a) . 378 . 540 
a Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than . 001. 
Table 6.8 The Hosmer and Leuteshow test of the model's goodness-of-fit to examine 
whether the pattern of results matches a predicted pattern 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df ) Sig. 
1 2.584 4 . 630 
The Model Summary (table 6.7) has a Nagelkerke r-square value of . 540; meaning 
that the BLR test can explain 54 percent of the variance in vote 603. This is not a 
particularly high percentage but it does mean any variance is most likely due to the 
model and not unaccounted error. Also, as over half the variance in vote 603 can be 
explained by variance in ideological voting, there is reason to be confident about the 
strength of ideology as a predictor of voting behaviour. The Hosmer and Lemeshow 
test (table 6.8) shows that the data comfortably fits the model. The chi-square score of 
2.584 is low and the Sig. result is not significant at p=<0.05. 
Chapter Six: Bosnia and UNPE in the 104`h Congress 261 
Table 6.9 The Classification Table calculating the likelihood of being able to correctly 
predict a senator's category membership based on that subject's score that is attained fioni 
the two predictor variables. 
Classification Table(a) 
Predicted 
Vote603 Percentage 
Correct 
Observed Yes No 
Step 1 Vote603 Yes 57 12 82.6 
yo 5 23 82.1 
Overall 82.5 
Percentage 
a The cut value is . 500 
In the classification table (6.9), fifty-seven participants were correctly predicted as 
members of the yes category (with only twelve wrong). Of the twenty-eight cases that 
the analysis predicted would vote `no', twenty-three were right. As the model 
correctly guessed the voting decisions of eighty out of ninety-seven participants, this 
gives a success rate of 83 percent. While not a huge improvement on the 71 percent 
prediction of category membership if no regression was run, there is still reason to be 
confident about the strength of the ideology variable. 
Table 6.10 Testing the significance of the Ideology (A CU95) variable by examining 
if the model would be significantly affected by the removal of the variable 
Model if Term Removed 
Variable Model Log Change in -2 df Sig. of the 
Likelihood Log Change 
Likelihood 
Step 1 ACU95 -58.292 46.016 1 . 000 
As table 6.10 shows that the Ideology variable has significant changes in the -2 log 
likelihood at P=<0.05, the BLR model would be significantly affected if the AUC95 
variable were removed. As such, knowing a senator's ideological preferences would 
ensure correct prediction of voting behaviour in 83 percent of cases. 
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Only the Ideology variable was entered into the analysis of Senate voting behaviour. 
This means that neither party colleagues nor members of the four foreign policy 
committees voted together to the degree that predictions could be made. Bosnia does 
not seem to be an issue on which senators felt the need to toe the party line. Nor, if 
senators were members of a foreign policy committee, did they vote with party rivals 
from their committee. Nor was there any relationship between senators' electoral 
majority or state-level results of the 1992 presidential election and voting on 603 to 
the extent that predictions can be made. Being seen by constituents to be either 
supporting or opposing the president on this issue was not deemed important. 
It is possible to predict 71 percent of Senate category membership without a 
regression and 46 percent of the Nagelkerke r-square test reveals unexplained 
variance. This is not a strong result, but the model reveals that Senate preferences are 
influenced primarily by ideological views. What further enhances confidence in the 
regression for vote 603 is that the ideology variable was significant in other Bosnia 
roll calls. The BLR tests for the other Senate votes were of mixed success, but the 
summaries in the appendix of the other two deployment votes (601 and 602) also 
show that Ideology was the main predictor of voting behaviour. 
The regressions address the thesis's exploration of congressional voting behaviour. 
The above discussion and statistical findings illustrate the importance of partisanship 
in figure 6.1, and helps explain why figure 6.2 did not report comparable levels of 
partisanship among senators. The weaker interparty conflict could be attributed to 
'senators viewing troop deployments as above party politics, but the conservative- 
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liberal continuum was a strong voting predictor. Post-1989 two presidencies theorists 
argue that congressional voting in this era is geared towards supporting the 
executive. 89 Silbey argues that partisanship was low in the 1990s, but neither was the 
case with 1995 Bosnia votes. 90 The BLR results for both chambers show that 
congressional voting does not stop at the water's edge. Rather than falling into line 
behind the president, most lawmakers either voted with party colleagues or with those 
of a similar ideological bent. 
i 
Loyalty among Democrats ensured that support for Clinton was forthcoming, but the 
strength of partisanship and opposition to the president may make it difficult to 
explain why forty-eight Republicans not vote to cut funding by supporting HR. 2770? 
However, the deadline for withdrawal would clash with the 1996 presidential election, 
Republicans were potentially in a win-win situation. A timely withdrawal would take 
the issue off the agenda, and reduce possible electoral damage that supporting it could 
bring, but a prolonged entrenchment could also be exploited as another Clinton 
foreign policy failure. 
Analysis of the floor voting on Bosnia shows that partisanship and ideology were 
central to congressional choices, but it seems worthwhile to examine how decisions 
were arrived at in the two chambers. Were committees and/or party leaders 
coordinating House voting, with senators functioning in a more independent 
environment? To explore these points, the following discussion adapts Hall's method 
of counting participation to measure Bosnia-related activities that each member took 
89 Hinckley, B, 1994. 
90 Silbey, J, 1997. 
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part in during 1995. 
Congressional Participation 
Table 6.11 Percentage of House and Senate members who participated at least once on six 
activities on Bosnia, 1995 
Percentage Involved 
Activity House Senate 
1 Floor Debates 39 83 
2 Extension of Remarks 7 0 
3 Introduce Resolution 2 8 
4 Cosponsor 50 41 
5 CQ 8 23 
6 Committee 6 32 
Did Nothing but Vote 33 12 
Sources: CQ and CR (lzltp: //lhomas. loc. goi/) 
House N=435. Senate N=100 
The BLR tests reveal that partisanship and ideology were factors in House and 
Senate Bosnia floor voting choices, but there are still questions about how many 
lawmakers were involved in the issue and the role of committees and party leaders. 
Table 6.11 thus classifies lawmakers' efforts on Bosnia throughout the whole of 1995. 
The table uses the same range of activities as in the other case chapters and includes 
congressional activity on both the embargo and deployment issues. 
The House column shows that only a minority of representatives participated in any 
one of the activities. The first two rows give the percentage of lawmakers who placed 
statements in the Congressional Record (CR). Only 170 (39%) of the 435 
representatives made at least one relevant floor speech. That seventy-six only gave 
one statement means that less than one-quarter of the total House membership were 
concerned enough to speak more than once on the floor. Moreover, as there were two 
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major Bosnia issues in 1995, this means that over three-quarters of representatives did 
not speak about both the embargo and the deployment. The second column shows that 
proportionally more senators (eighty-three) gave at least one speech. This is the only 
activity that a majority from one chamber participated in, which perhaps explains why 
row two's Extension of Remarks (which is normally used by lawmakers unable to 
attend debates) was not used by senators. That only thirty (7%) representatives used 
the Extension of Remarks is further evidence that participation was low. Indeed, while 
many representatives made statements, their involvement in the deliberative process 
was limited. More than seven hundred Bosnia statements were placed in the CR 
during 1995, yet a relatively small number of people was responsible for most of 
them. Even in the Senate, seventy-one members made no more than two speeches. 
The percentage of representatives and senators who introduced or cosponsored at 
least one Bosnia bill are in rows three and four respectively. Typing `Bosnia' into the 
Bills section of CR produces fourteen and ten relevant pieces of House and Senate 
legislation introduced during 1995. Only ten representatives (2%) and eight senators 
introduced the twenty-four bills. The less onerous task of cosponsoring legislation 
attracted 218 (50%) representatives, of which 103 did so only once. In the Senate, 
forty-one cosponsored Bosnia legislation, of which only thirteen did so more than 
once. So a considerable number of lawmakers from each chamber were interested 
enough in the issue to put their name to a bill, but in most cases cosponsoring 
involved no more effort than this. 
Row five reveals that eight percent of representatives are named in at least one of 
the thirty relevant 1995 Congressional Quarterly (CQ) reports as being involved with 
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the Bosnia issue. Twenty-one representatives are mentioned only in one article, but 
that thirty-three are cited in total is relatively high. In fact, more are mentioned in 
1995 on this issue than are named in the journal in relation to the Haiti issue over the 
entire three-year coup. Twenty-three senators were also named in CQ in 1995. This is 
also more than are mentioned in the publication during the entire Somalia and Haiti 
ý 
crises. Part of the reason, however, may be that CQ published more reports on Bosnia 
in 1995 than on the other two crises. 
Only four representatives are cited as engaging with the matter in the ten 1995 CQ 
reports specifically on the embargo, and all of them in only one article each. Also, 
when CQ first considered House involvement with the embargo, no party leaders are 
named either supporting or opposing the legislation. 91 Democrat whip, David Bonior, 
was reported in July as building support for the embargo, but, even after S. 21 passed, 
no House party leader is reported commenting on it. 92 The embargo prompted more 
activity in the Senate, with nineteen senators named in CQ as participating in some 
capacity. The issue also instigated considerable leadership involvement; Sen. Dole's 
determination to get the embargo lifted is emphasised from the start of 1995.93 Sens. 
Dole and Lieberman are mentioned in July as modifying S. 21 to allow peacekeepers 
to leave before ending the embargo, and Sen. Daschle is quoted expressing concern 
that the majority leader's measure would drag America deeper into the conflict. 94 The 
final two articles on the issue were about the possible veto override and cited 
91 Donna Cassata, `Congress Bucks White House, Devises Its Own Bosnia Plan, ' CQ, June 10,1995, 
p. 1653-4. 
92 Carroll Doherty , 
`Congress' Foreign Policy Role At Issue in Veto Override, ' CQ, August 5,1995, 
pp. 2386-7. 
93 Carroll Doherty, `Dole's Blueprint Takes Aim At Relationship with U. N., ' CQ, January 7,1995, 
pp. 44-45. 
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numerous senators including Dole and Daschle. 95 
Sending troops to Bosnia is not discussed in CQ during the first half of the year, but 
as the crisis escalated in the summer Sen. Helms and Rep. Hyde are reported as 
offering amendments against intervention, and numerous others are named in a later 
article as joining the debate to withdraw UN troops from the region. 96 In early 
September 1995, CQ reported how NATO air attacks on Bosnian Serb targets would 
increase the possibility that US troops would be deployed. 97 Numerous lawmakers are 
quoted on the subject, but brief statements from Sens Dole and Daschle are the only 
leadership input. When the warring sides in Bosnia were moving towards peace talks 
in late September, the possibility of putting US troops in a post-settlement 
peacekeeping force intensified, but CQ did not report much congressional activity. 
Sen. Dole is quoted on the subject, but Rep. Hamilton and Sen. Gregg are the only 
others mentioned. 98 As the Dayton peace talks neared, a few lawmakers were reported 
as trying to prevent moves towards intervention. 99 While leaders (Reps Gingrich and 
Gephardt) were, according to CQ, becoming more engaged and partisan, few 
lawmakers are quoted once the Dayton negotiations got underway. 100 Many members 
were named in Towell and Cassata's four December articles on the impending 
94 Carroll Doherty, `In Stinging Rebuff To President, Senate Votes to Lift Arms Ban, ' CQ, July 29, 
1995, pp. 2282-2284. 
95 Doherty, C, CQ, August 5,1995, p. 2386. `Clinton Vetoes Bill Forcing Him to End Arms Embargo, ' 
CQ, August 12,1995, p. 2455. 
96 Carroll Doherty, `Bosnian War Propels Congress, Clinton Toward Own Battle, ' CQ, June 3,1995, 
p. 1587. Cassata, D, CQ, June 10,1995, p. 1653. 
97 Carroll Doherty, `Hill Warily Awaits Outcome of NATO Strikes on Serbs, ' CQ, September 2,1995, 
p. 2668. 
98 Carroll Doherty, `Lawmakers Nary of Balkan Role, ' CQ, September 30,1995, p. 3018. 
99 Pat Towell, `U. S. Readies for Peace Talks; Lawmakers Remain Wary, ' CQ, October 28,1995, 
p. 3319. 
100 Pat Towell, `House Opposes Peacekeeping Role, Delays Vote on Cutoff of Funds, ' CQ, November 
4,1995, pp. 3390-1. Pat Towell, `White House Tries to Head Off Hill Curbs on Peacekeeping, ' ibid. 
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deployment, but Sen. Dole is the only party leader cited. 101 
Row six reports the percentage of representatives and senators who attended at least 
one committee hearing or markup on either the Bosnia embargo or troop deployment 
listed in the Congressional li formation Service index during 1995. The figures show 
that twenty-seven (6%) representatives and thirty-two senators attended relevant 
committee hearings during 1995. On the one hand, this shows that senators were 
much more likely to attend committee hearings on Bosnia, but twenty-seven senators 
as opposed to fourteen representatives only attended one committee meeting. Overall, 
then, committee participation in both chambers was low on this issue. 
Row seven of table 6.11 shows that 142 (33%) representatives did nothing in 1995 
on the Bosnia issue other than floor vote. Senators had much higher levels of 
participation: only twelve senators did nothing during 1995 on the Bosnia issue. The 
difference is large, but participation was not necessarily extensive in the Senate. For 
example, twenty-six of the thirty-eight Democrats who spoke on the Senate floor did 
nothing else. Also, although participation in both chambers was comparatively higher 
with the Bosnia case, it is still remarkable that despite it being only the third time that 
US troops were sent to a European theatre of war, one-third of representatives said or 
did nothing on it other than vote. The use of troops seemed inevitable all through 
1995: even the mid-1995 controversy to lift the embargo was really about the 
possibility of US action. Yet, most senators were only superficially interested and a 
sizable amount of the House membership was not involved at all. 
November 11,1995, pp. 3467-8. 
101 See, for example, Pat Towell, `Congress Reluctantly Acquiesces in Peacekeeping Mission, ' CQ, 
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While most of those who participated only did so in a cursory manner, a few 
members dealt seriously with Bosnia. Table 6.11, however, does not amount to an 
exhaustive assessment of participation. Lawmakers undertook plenty of other Bosnia- 
related activities. For example, several mention in the CR that they had recently 
visited Bosnia. It is not suggested, then, that only those who presented legislation 
were the experts who provided guidance to an otherwise ignorant legislature. Rep. 
Funderburk, for instance, did not offer any legislation, but is a Balkans historian who 
lived in the region for six years. The measures of participation nevertheless cover a 
wide range of activities and, while it can be expected that every member understood 
the issue, not everyone was actively involved. 
The two parties show differing levels of participation on the Bosnian issue. Party 
disparity is not particularly large in the Senate- 15 percent of Democrats and 9 percent 
of Republicans did nothing- but a wide gap is apparent in the House. Only 24 percent 
of Republicans did nothing, whereas 42 percent of Democrats were not involved. 
There is also a difference between the parties concerning how unified they were on the 
issues. The statements on the floor and in the Extension of Remarks show that on the 
deployment issue, Republicans were more cohesive in their views than Democrats. 
Eighty-six House Republicans made a total of 205 statements demanding that the US 
not send troops to the region and only three Republicans made four statements arguing 
the opposite. In contrast, House Democrats were divided between the fifty-seven who 
went on record eighty-one times in favour of an intervention and the twenty-two who 
made thirty-seven demands to stay out of Bosnia. Senate Republicans were less 
December 2,1995, pp. 3668-71. 
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unified in their opposition to action in Bosnia. While twenty-seven Republicans made 
forty-two floor statements opposing the deployment of US troops, fifteen made a total 
of sixteen statements in support of an intervention. Thirty Senate Democrats made 
thirty-seven statements condoning the mission with only five Senate Democrats 
speaking once each against it. Based on the evidence here, House Republicans were 
much more cohesive in presenting one policy stance than the Democrats. They were 
more solidly opposed to the use of force than the Democrats were more supportive of 
intervention. 102 That Republicans in the Senate were less committed to opposing 
IFOR helps explain why it was approved. 
Especially after the disastrous operation in Somalia, it was easy for Republicans to 
express opposition to a Democratic president's deployment of troops in Bosnia. 
Democratic lawmakers, conversely, had to decide between party loyalty and criticising 
an unpopular action. What further encouraged so many Republicans to get involved 
was specific opposition to the UN and the non-traditional, humanitarian objectives of 
the deployment. This is in contrast to broad foreign policy issues, in which there was 
little interest in 1995. Most incumbent Republicans had a record of attacking 
Clinton's handling of foreign policy, but there was certainly no interest in reshaping 
structural and strategic foreign policy. This is not to say that Republicans would not 
challenge the president, but there was not a sense of urgency about foreign policy. 
There was also little cohesion: the party incorporated a muddle of internationalists, 
passive and assertive isolationists, cold war hawks, and the indifferent. As Hames 
says, `While all, or more likely most, might agree at any one time that they disliked 
102 A similar count was done for the arms embargo and found that Republicans in both chambers were 
much more unified in their floor statements on the embargo (mostly in favour of lifting it) than 
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various Clinton initiatives, they rarely did so for the same reasons. ' 103 Diversity of 
opinion on UN operations, however, was more narrowly defined. Indeed, expending 
US troops on UN operations was the `most visible target' of Republican opposition to 
Clinton's foreign policy. ' 04 
The evidence in this chapter suggests that House Republicans were unified in 1995 
in their animosity towards UN peace operations, but was this something members 
simply agreed on, or was opposition imposed by the party leadership? Did the party 
leadership, for example, actively encourage House Republicans to oppose the 
president on the arms embargo and the IFOR intervention? Did the other party leaders 
work to encourage rank and file members to adopt a particular viewpoint? The 
following table and discussion addresses this by examining participation among 
House and Senate party whips and leaders during 1995. 
Table 6.12 Percentage of House and Senate party leaders who either did nothing but floor 
vote or did only one activityfront Table 6.11 on Bosnia, 1995 
House Senate 
Denis Reps Denis Reps 
Did nothing but floor vote 45 25 22 14 
Did only one activity from Table 4.11 70 57 78 29 
or nothing but floor vote 
N= Senate Democrats (9), Republicans (14), House Democrats (92), Republicans (60). 
Sources: CQ and CR (http: //thomas. loc. gov/) 
Table 6.12 shows that in both chambers involvement among Republicans (Reps) is 
higher than for Democrats (Dems). The gap is not so high in the Senate, but one- 
quarter of House Republican whips and leaders compared to nearly half of Democratic 
Democrats. 
103 Haines, T, 1996, p. 47. 
, p. 
66 
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party leaders did nothing. What is also noteworthy is that non-participation for each of 
the four parties' whips and leaders is proportionally higher than for rank and file 
members. It is thus difficult to argue that leaders controlled congressional actions 
when they were less likely to participate in the issue than the rest of their party. This is 
also evident in the second row that states how many did no more than one activity. In 
the House, seventy percent of Democrat leaders and whips only engaged in one action, 
but this was the case with only fifty-seven percent of Republicans. The party disparity 
is much higher in the Senate. Seventy-eight percent of the Democratic party leaders 
participated in one activity, compared with only twenty-nine percent for Republicans. 
Some Senate Republican leaders were reasonably active on the Bosnia issue. In fact, 
Sen. Dole was one of the most committed members on Capitol Hill. He spoke twenty- 
eight times on the floor, introduced three bills and is mentioned twenty-four times in 
CQ. Republican leaders were more active than their Democratic counterparts, but, 
even assuming each official was advancing a party agenda, the percentages in table 
6.12 indicate that the war in Bosnia did not greatly distract congressional whips and 
leaders. There does not seem to be a relationship between the extent of House and 
Senate leaders involvement and party voting. Their lack of interest in any floor, 
committee, legislative or media activity suggests that neither leaders nor whips were 
policing the rank and file, nor offering rewards or punishments to ensure party loyalty 
at key roll calls. As partisanship was not the case in the Senate, the fact that party 
leaders were more involved in the Bosnia issue than House leaders suggests that the 
link between party leaders' participation and party voting on the floor is weak. 
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Table 6.12 makes it difficult to argue that either the House or Senate was driven by 
leaders and whips actively lobbying rank and file votes. As is noted in the other case 
chapters, the lack of observable participation suggests that it is unlikely that leaders 
were either privately lobbying support or imposing rules to ensure the production of 
legislation. This challenges Cox and McCubbins's argument that a central authority 
enforces decisions. '°5 I- 
Despite instigating a highly partisan atmosphere, the 1995 senior House Republican 
leadership did not energetically attack Clinton in one of his weakest policy areas. In 
fact, the leaders were not noticeably more or less interested in the UNPE issue before 
or after the 1995 congressional reforms. They were opposed to UNPE and action in 
Bosnia, but simply had limited foreign policy experience and interest. Although cited 
in ten CQ articles on Bosnia, House Speaker Gingrich only placed one statement in 
the extension of remarks, Majority Whip DeLay spoke once on the floor and 
cosponsored one bill, and Majority Leader Armey did nothing but vote. However, 
congruent with Hall's concept of policy specialists and Krehbiel's chamber-based 
informational perspective, even if the vast majority of both party leaders and rank and 
file members were not deeply involved with the issue, it is still arguable that the 
institution was assertive even if an issue is only seriously engaged in by a few 
lawmakers. As such, the following shows that foreign policy committee members 
were proportionally more involved than non-members. 
105 Cox, G& McCubbins, M, 1993. 
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Table 6.13 Percentage of House and Senate Foreign Policy Conunittee Members who 
either did nothing but floor vote or (lid only one activity front Table 6.11 on Bosnia, 1995 
Foreign Armed Appropriations Intelligence 
HS HS HS HS 
Did nothing but floor vote 70 20 0 29 14 13 6 
Did only one activity from Table 24 17 33 5 45 32 25 18 
4.11 or nothing but floor vote 
Sources: CQ and CR (http: //thomas. loc. goi/) 
N=Foreign Policy; House (41) Senate (18): Armed Services; House (54) Senate (21): Appropriations; 
House (56) Senate (28): Intelligence; House (16) Senate (17). 
Table 6.13 finds that a proportionally higher percentage of the main House (H) and 
Senate (S) foreign policy committee members participated in the Bosnia issue than 
non-members. Row one shows that between seven and twenty-nine percent of House 
committee members did nothing other than vote. As 33 percent of all representatives 
did nothing on Bosnia, participation is somewhat higher on each of the four House 
committees. Participation is high for the Senate committees, where fewer than 15 
percent of members from each committee did no more than floor vote during 1995. In 
fact, every member of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees did at 
least one activity from table 6.11. Only participation on the Senate Appropriations 
Committee is slightly lower than the whole chamber. However, as just twelve percent 
of all senators only voted, the slightly lower participation among Appropriations 
members is still high. Also, in all the cases except for the Senate on the Somalia issue 
both House and Senate Appropriations were the lowest participating committee. This 
is to be expected as Appropriations have a much wider non-foreign policy jurisdiction 
than the other six committees. The second row shows that between five and forty-five 
percent of committee members did either nothing or only one activity from table 6.11, 
and that one-quarter and one-third respectively of the House International Relations 
and Armed Services Committees participated in only one issue. On the other hand, 
that at least a majority of members of the eight committees made more than one token 
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gesture is some evidence of relatively higher participation than non-members. 
It is also the case that, as with congressional decision making during the Somalia 
and Haiti crises, the more heavily involved legislators were from the eight foreign 
policy committees. Members of these committees introduced seven of the ten (70%) 
Senate bills and their House counterparts introduced eleven of the fourteen (80%) 
House bills on Bosnia during 1995. Looking at who vocally opposed or supported 
such legislation from both parties and chambers is informative about how voting 
majorities are formed. The BLR analysis finds partisanship on floor votes was 
stronger in the House than in the Senate, and this pattern was present among those 
who spoke on the floor during the main amendment debates relating to the IFOR 
deployment. At the main floor debate for Rep. Hamilton's HR. 306 (vote 858), all 
fourteen Republicans who spoke were opposed and all but one of the twenty 
Democrats who contributed supported the Foreign Affairs ranking Democrat's 
resolution. 106 In a blatantly partisan act, all thirty Republicans who spoke at the debate 
concerning Armed Services and Intelligence Committees member Rep. Doman's 
HR. 2770 (vote 856) were in favour and twenty-three of the twenty-six contributing 
Democrats were opposed to this Republican resolution to withhold funding. 107 
The examples show active House support for Bosnia legislation was partisan, but 
this did not seem to be repeated in the Senate. Even though all the Senate deployment 
bills were introduced by Republicans, it would still be worth considering who actively 
supported or opposed them. Discounting vote 601 (as it was introduced by Rep. 
106 Sense of House Regarding Deployment of Armed Forces to Bosnia, ' CR, December 13,1995, 
pp. H14860-H14871. 
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Hefley), 602 and 603 represented divergent views on the deployment. Sen. 
Hutchison's S. Con. Res. 35 (vote 602) opposed the deployment and Sens. Dole and 
McCain (Armed Services) were responsible for SJ. Res. 44 (vote 603), which endorsed 
the president's decision to deploy troops. Senators' views on these resolutions were 
expressed at the extensive December 13 floor debate. 108 Twenty Republicans and two 
Democrats supported Hutchison's failed resolution, essentially suggesting a pattern of 
partisanship. However, a mixture of thirteen Republicans and twenty-eight Democrats 
supported Dole and McCain's more moderate resolution. In both floor voting and 
among those who actively supported resolutions, representatives generally followed 
party colleagues when choosing how to vote and who to support at floor debates, but 
senators were less partisan when making these decisions. 
Counting the number of lawmakers who championed legislation on the IFOR 
deployment introduced by party colleagues bolsters claims in this chapter about how 
voting decisions were reached in Congress. Policy making in Congress is complex and 
the relative influence of committees and party leaders, for example, depends largely 
on the issue. As such, this investigation into how lawmakers made voting decisions on 
Bosnia helps justify Shepsle and Weingast's recommendation that a range of 
perspectives should be considered when analysing congressional behaviour. '09 
Judging by voting choices and floor debates on the IFOR deployment, partisanship is 
a key feature of House behaviour. The relative lack of involvement of party leaders, 
however, suggests that party line voting occurred without much prompting from 
107 CR, December 13,1995, pp. H14825-14860 
108 CR, December 13,1995, pp. S18449-518549. 
109 Shepsle, K, & Weingast, B, 1994, pp. 166-167. 
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leaders and whips. Instead, representatives supported party colleagues from the 
foreign policy committees who supplied most of the Bosnia legislation. Party leaders 
were more active in the Senate, but, as senators did not act in a partisan manner when 
voting and speaking on the floor, the influence leaders had over the rank and file 
seems weak in this case. A9 with the House, Senate foreign policy committees 
produced most of the Bosnia legislation, but, rather than along party lines, chamber 
support was based on ideological preferences. 
Conclusion 
This chapter explores the impact of Congress on the declining commitment to 
UNPE by looking at House and Senate legislation, the Balkans arms embargo and 
IFOR deployment issues during 1995. One purpose of the analysis is to evaluate what 
each issue says about the congressional-presidential relationship. With the analysis of 
legislation, it is claimed that the NSRA and PPA failed due to senators' reluctance to 
challenge the president's foreign policy role, but it did signal to the White House that 
opposition to UNPE was solid in the House. On the US attitude towards the Balkans 
arms embargo, the chapter argues that excepting a few- members, by demanding it be 
lifted, legislators were attacking this new thinking towards peripheral regions. Most 
lawmakers were not motivated by humanitarian concerns, and were instead trying to 
keep America out of the conflict. The discussion on the deployment decision argues 
that the administration did not seriously consider a UNPE operation, but the incessant 
congressional opposition made it clear that it would not be endorsed. The culmination 
of this was that the UN was pushed out of its relatively influential role in US foreign 
policy and IFOR's use of peacekeeping, rather than peace-enforcement, troops 
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confirms that UNPE was sidelined as a doctrine. 
The chapter also examines how decisions on the Bosnian war were formed in the 
House and Senate. It looks at cue-taking on key floor votes and the extent of 
participation among individual lawmakers. In assessing cues on key Bosnia votes, the 
research finds that partisanship was the main predictor in the House and ideology was 
the most significant variable in the Senate. In looking at participation, Hall's claim 
that most lawmakers are not actively engaged in any given policy is less convincing 
with the Bosnia case. Most legislators did at least one thing on the issue. More 
supportive of Hall, however, is the evidence that a handful of lawmakers were 
responsible for the more burdensome tasks. It does not, however, seem that party 
leaders provided energetic policy leadership. The research suggests that leaders and 
whips in each party and chamber were generally less likely to be involved with Bosnia 
than ordinary members of their party. Instead, the most active lawmakers were from 
the foreign policy committees. Members of these eight committees were 
proportionally more involved in the issue than non-members and committee 
specialists framed almost all the Bosnia legislation. Overall, the chapter supports the 
argument that congressional behaviour is influenced by party, information and 
committee elements. For example, as representatives were more likely than senators to 
support bills introduced by members of their own party, there is some evidence 
backing up Cox and McCubbins's emphasis on party behaviour in the House. The 
importance of foreign policy committees in supplying legislation fits Krehbiel's 
informational rationale. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis investigates the impact of Congress on the failure of the Clinton 
administration to develop UNPE into a lasting doctrine. The research charts the 
progress of UN peace-enforcement as a foreign policy tool from its early proclamation 
to its testing in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. It appraises the political obstacles to 
deploying US troops into strategically marginal countries and explores congressional 
foreign policy making at the institutional and individual level on use of force and 
humanitarian issues in the early 1990s. This conclusion has two purposes. One, to 
reiterate the main themes of the research (America's role in UN peace-enforcement 
operations; Congress's influence on foreign policy, voting cues and participation 
among lawmakers) and explain what the cases say about them. Two, to discuss the 
strengths and weaknesses of the key texts consulted in the thesis in describing 
congressional behaviour in the three case studies. 
The thesis firstly defines, explains and affirms UNPE's place within US foreign 
policy history. UNPE was a method of responding to new post-cold war conflicts in 
strategically peripheral regions that required relatively limited input from America, 
and chapter one summarises this into five themes of official US thinking in the early 
1990s regarding conflict resolution: 
1) US-UN partnership 
2) Protecting human rights and the pursuit of aggressors 
3) US-led UNPE coalitions 
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4) Defence of democracy and rule of law 
5) Swift, resolute action 
As well as defining UNPE, the research considers whether there actually was a 
serious reassessment of foreign policy objectives. It is perhaps unlikely that 
humanitarian interventions were considered desirable at a time when prominent 
commentators were warning of a decline in America's global influence. ' The main 
response to this is that UNPE in many ways actually embodied traditional US foreign 
policy thinking. It is argued that conceptualising human rights abuses as a threat to 
global peace and stability was in fact a variation on cold war communist containment. 
Another reason it was more than empty rhetoric is that the UNPE approach is arguably 
the natural American way of fighting wars. Recent works are cited- most notably 
Boot's Savage Wars of Peace- that have reassessed America's combative history, 
insisting that short-term policing actions, rather than full-scale vanquishing wars, have 
commonly been the preference. 
UNPE was never a major component of Clinton's global ambitions; representing 
less of a doctrine or policy than a somewhat nebulous rethink about peripheral wars. 
Furthermore, this rethink quickly faltered, and the case chapters comment on how the 
commitment to humanitarianism eroded between 1992 and 1995. 
The main focus of why UNPE failed is Congress. Showing that the legislature 
impacted on the cases justifies this study and observations on the political extent of 
I For example, Kennedy, P, 1988. Tucker, R& Hendrickson, D, 1992. 
2 Boot, M, 2002. Mead, W. R, 2001. 
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foreign policy making are introduced in chapter two. In addressing the perennial 
problem of who controls foreign policy, the research considers two competing 
interpretations of congressional foreign policy making in the 1990s. The thesis 
concedes that the two presidencies argument that the chief executive has more power 
in foreign than domestic affairs and that the post-cold war Congress was not seeking 
to overhaul foreign policy. 3 Several scholars argued this during the 1990s, but this 
aspect of the research concentrates on Hinckley's claim that lawmakers profess an 
intention to challenge the executive in foreign policy, but invariably defer to the 
president. The thesis sides, however, with those who argue that the end of the cold 
war encouraged lawmakers to contest presidential primacy. 4 The chapter demonstrates 
statistically that especially with use of force abroad, Congress was comparatively 
more conservative, partisan and more likely to challenge the president during the early 
1990s than the 1980s and late 1990s. It also considers the non-legislative tools that 
lawmakers use against the president. Drawing on the work of Scott et al. the chapter 
explains that theories based on the two presidencies notion of interbrach relations 
ignore Congress's subtle use of power, such as the threat of opposition. 5 
In assessing the legislature as a foreign policy partner, the role of Congress in the 
failure of the Clinton administration to commit to a lasting involvement in UN peace- 
enforcement operations is addressed in the case studies. As Somalia was not the site 
of security interests, this was the first primarily humanitarian use of force in modem 
US history. America led the peace-enforcement mission, but the UN was given a role 
3 Hinckley, B, 1994. Fisher, L, 1996. Banks, \V & Straussman, J, 1999. 
4 Edwards, G, 1989. Scott, J, 1997. Smith, M. E, 1998. Fleisher, R et al. 2000. 
5 Scott, J, 1997. Lindsay, J, 1994. Burgin, E, 1997. 
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beyond that of a rubber stamp. In a pragmatic and popular plan, the US mission was 
expected to conclude quickly, with the UN monitoring the long-term peace. This did 
not provoke a major debate between the congressional parties. Stationing troops was 
mostly welcomed in Congress as a chance to capitalise on what was viewed as a new 
era in global security cooperation. Indeed, lawmakers used hearings, statements and 
visits to the region to pressure Bush into sending troops. It was thus not so much 
reverence as shared concern with the Somalia situation that led to lawmakers 
acquiescing in the deployment. 
Continuing congressional patronage was based on a short-term policing action of the 
Bootian butcher and bolt type to prevent a famine, not nation-building. By May 1993, 
American troops being drawn into the Somali civil war confirmed the perception that 
many lawmakers had of Clinton as a foreign policy amateur who was sub-letting the 
US military to the UN. This concern was reflected in the House's version of 
SJ. Res. 45, which limited the president's ability to deploy troops, and the Senate's 
S. Amdt. 790 requiring the president to gain congressional approval for the continued 
operation by November 15. The relationship soured further after the eighteen Rangers 
were killed in Mogadishu in October 1993. The peace-enforcement action in Somalia 
demonstrated that American lives were being squandered in a country that the 
administration had no command over and that the UN had hoodwinked the US into a 
war with Gen. Aidid. Lawmakers felt they had been overly patient with the 
administration. As the latter seemingly had no policy, statements on both floors, and 
two bills (H. Con. Res. 170 and S. Amdt. 1042) to cut funding were used to ensure that 
UNOSOM II was scrapped. However, while it ensured tougher questions would be 
posed in Washington about future deployments, the October 3 disaster did not 
Conclusion 283 
eradicate the quasi-partnership with the UN, the US would still lead UNPE coalition 
forces. 
While UNPE embraced defending democracy, resolute action was avoided during 
the Haitian crisis for three years because an enforcement action was presumed by 
congressional Republicans in particular to be disproportionate to any US interests at 
stake. As both administrations were reluctant to pressure the Cedras Junta to leave, the 
reaction to the Haitian coup was a step away from UNPE idealism. This is partially 
explained both by the fact that for most of the crisis it seemed that the junta was 
serious about a negotiated settlement and that there were reasonable doubts about 
Aristide's suitability. The US response to the crisis also exposed how the defence of 
democracy and human rights was not central to foreign policy thinking. Conversely, 
the coup in Haiti was resolved with an intervention that allowed unprecedented 
powers for the UN, and was the first time America intervened militarily in the 
Western Hemisphere to restore a democratic government. An unnecessary UNSC 
resolution (940) was sought, and in an endeavour that Boot would describe as `butcher 
and bolt', the US would restore order prior to passing control over to the UN. 6 
Until September 1994, lawmakers against a Haitian invasion succeeded because 
they likened President Aristide to a thug. They were able to burden the more fractured 
supporters of the repatriation of Aristide with justifying why American lives should be 
put at risk to succour a thug. This was arguably picked up by the Clinton 
administration as it is quite possible, for example, that the anticipation of 
congressional opposition influenced the order to withdraw the USS Harlan County in 
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October 1993. By spring 1994, Clinton came under increasing criticism from both 
Republicans and Democrats (most notably the Congressional Black Caucus) for his 
indecisiveness, prompting him to take a tougher line with the Cedras Junta. 
Nevertheless, Clinton's failure to request congressional approval for the intervention 
has been cited as evidence of presidential primacy. 7 Eventual sanction of the 
deployment (SJ. Res. 229 and HJ. Res. 416) could be seen as rubber stamping, but, as 
many lawmakers wanted US troops to restore democracy, that Clinton did not seek 
approval before Uphold Democracy is not necessarily congressional weakness. 
From the start of 1995, a now Republican-controlled Congress attacked the 
administration on UNPE issues. Although ultimately unsuccessful, Republicans in 
both chambers introduced the Peace Powers Act (PPA) and the National Security 
Revitalization Act (NSRA) aimed at constraining the president's right to deploy 
troops in UN peace operations. House Republicans used UNPE as a foreign policy 
issue that almost all of them could oppose. That Senate Republicans strove to restrict 
the president's ability to allocate troops to UN-led (but not US-led) operations 
exposed anti-UN feeling among senators. The legislation fizzling out demonstrates 
how Congress can extract a few concessions from the administration, but is ultimately 
hesitant to intrude on the president's constitutional powers. Indeed, the NSRA and 
PPA's preference for a restrained presidency and anti-UN measures appealed to 
broader anti-humanitarian sentiments, but their failure is hardly conclusive proof of a 
solid anti-UNPE bias. As protest gestures they were nevertheless effective in showing 
the president that the new Congress would not tolerate ever-expanding participation in 
6 Boot, M, 2002. 
7 Fisher, L, 1999, p. 153. 
Conclusion 285 
UNPE operations. 
As the only European conflict and the most protracted of all the cases, that even 
Bosnia did not prompt an enforcement action is further confirmation of how UNPE 
was unsustainable as a foreign policy doctrine. This was expressed in the mid-1995 
arms embargo debates, where, although several views emerged, most members sought 
to keep America out of the conflict. The votes (HR. 1561 and S. 21) to lift unilaterally 
the UNSC-sanctioned embargo were an indication of how many in Congress did not 
take seriously the UN and international law. With the more controversial matter of a 
military deployment, the emphasis was on trying to get the aggressor- the Serbs- to 
accept a peace deal. In a mission reminiscent of the approach described by Boot's 
small wars model, 20,000 troops were sent to police the region in December 1995. US 
troops were dispatched to the region as part of a multilateral force, but this was not a 
UNPE endeavour as it was a NATO-led peacekeeping operation that was only 
intended to last for one year. 
The institutional confrontation over Bosnia undermines Hinckley's two presidencies 
view of congressional deference. Congress thought Clinton had no embargo policy, 
and so stepped in. It provoked a presidential veto, but, had events not superseded, a 
congressional override would have likely resulted. Also, even though a force was 
eventually installed in December 1995, Congress's blessing was by no means a 
formality. The crisis prompted Republican majorities in both chambers to demand 
Clinton gain approval before sending troops, and administration officials consulted 
extensively with Congress prior to the IFOR deployment. As US forces would be 
policing borders, Bosnia is an example of how Congress allows the commander-in- 
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chief flexibility in foreign affairs, but ensures that he does not wilfully deploy troops 
into high-risk conflicts. 
Hinckley claims that in foreign policy making Congress is a `slightly more 
privileged public. '8 However, all three cases show that in the area of humanitarian use 
of force, Congress served as an effective foreign policy partner in the 1990s. It was 
not the dominant player, but each case presents evidence of groups in Congress 
employing mostly non-legislative powers to influence policy. The two presidencies 
interpretation of interbranch foreign policy making offered by Hinckley is too focused 
on binding legislation and does not value the importance of informal measures. 
Perspectives on foreign policy making that envisage a resurgent Congress, conversely, 
reflect an arguably more accurate evaluation of the legislature's post-1989 role. For 
example, the view, described by Lindsay et al., which assumes congressional 
assertiveness exists in more than binding legislation fits here the cases studied here. 9 
The cases further show that congressional support for UNPE depends on the 
obligation being light. The US is prepared to deploy a large contingent of troops in 
peripheral regions for humanitarian reasons, but the emphasis is on a limited 
engagement. The length of any deployment, the risks and the financial costs must 
remain proportional to the perceived interests at stake. The response to the crises 
suggests that Boot's butcher and bolt conception of small war policing actions 
accurately describes this style foreign policy thinking. Each deployment was outside 
the realms of traditional US interests and was designed as a short-term policing 
8 Hinckley, B, 1994, p. 100. 
9 Lindsay, J, 1992-93, pp. 607-628. Scott, J, 1997, pp. 47-75. 
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action; troops left Somalia after one year, were sent to Haiti as a last resort and only 
despatched to Bosnia after a peace had been secured. The reaction to the crises also 
highlights America's ambivalence towards the UN. While it allowed the UN an 
extensive role in the Somalia mission and looked to it for the long-term stability of 
Haiti, a UNSC Resolution was not sought for the Bosnia deployment. A commitment 
to UN peace operations was pursued by two administrations, but, largely due to less 
cohesive Democratic backing than Republican opposition to action in the three cases, 
UNPE failed as a foreign policy doctrine. 
The thesis further analyses congressional behaviour by considering how decisions 
were reached on the cases. Showing that Congress as an institution impacted on 
foreign policy decision making tells part of the story, but it does not consider how 
lawmakers create collective outcomes. To shed light on how individual legislators 
make voting choices, chapter three considers ways of explaining collective outcomes. 
It describes how the case chapters measure the influence of party, committee, 
ideological and electoral variables on voting behaviour and describes the 
methodological approach used to assess their significance. As well as considering 
controversies regarding the variables, it details the main statistical test used. It argues 
that binary logistic regression (BLR), which predicts voting choices from a subject's 
placing within a series of independent variables, is a reliable model for testing roll call 
decisions. 
The analysis of floor voting in both chambers over the course of the three crises 
shows consistent evidence of partisan and ideological motivations. The BLR tests in 
all three cases find that party membership is the most significant variable in the House 
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and ideology is the most reliable predictor of Senate voting. On every relevant floor 
vote except one (which actually fails the BLR test) ideology or partisanship is the 
most significant predictor of category membership. Also, ideology or partisanship are 
usually the second most significant variable in the House and Senate respectively. 
That these cues influenced floor voting supports the findings in chapter two and 
concurs with those who argue that congressional foreign policy making was partisan 
and ideologically political during this era. 10 
With the size of the chamber and the more stringent rules, the relative prevalence of 
partisanship in the House is often noted in the literature. " Others have also found 
across issue areas that ideology is typically the prime variable within the more 
individualistic Senate. 12 Fewer party rules, larger electoral mandates and richer 
campaign war chests mean senators are more probable than representatives to pursue 
their own ideological preferences free from party constraints. It seems intuitive that 
ideology should impact on congressional decision making and that it was also often a 
significant variable in the House UNPE votes. Lawmakers using ideas from other 
events as a way to reduce informational costs when faced with a new issue is a 
persuasive way of explaining collective action. This assumes that lawmakers decide 
how to vote due to personal views that are largely immune to party, institutional or 
electoral concerns. As lawmakers do not have time to study in depth every issue they 
are expected to vote on, relying on previously-held view helps reduce the costs of 
participation. Put simply, ideology serves as a cognitive shortcut when making voting 
decisions. 
10 Prins, B& Marshall, B, 2001, p. 668. Smith, M, E, 1998. 
11 Lindsay, J& Ripley, R, 1992, p. 430. 
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Empirical evidence of a link between congressional roll calls and lawmakers' 
electoral popularity or Clinton's share of the 1992 presidential vote was not present in 
the cases. The reaction to the three cases shows that the public is not wholly 
isolationist and will support interventions if they are small-scale, relatively risk-free 
and briskly executed. It also prefers multilateral operations, but only if the US has 
command and control. Nevertheless, public interest in the cases was neither broad nor 
intense enough to have a significant bearing on congressional floor voting on UNPE 
issues. The committee variable was also not found to be significant. Foreign policy 
committees were a major source of specialists on the three crises, but committee 
members were not unified in their views on the crises to the extent that their voting 
behaviour was predictably different to non-members. This argument is more difficult 
to sustain with the Senate as a higher proportion of senator than representatives were 
members of foreign policy committees. However, the BLR tests reveal that the foreign 
policy committee members were not extremists who supplied resolutions that 
appealed only to them. Preference outliers, impervious to the partisan and ideological 
variables influencing centrist non-members, did not populate the relevant committees. 
This suggest that the autonomous, distributive committees interpretation of 
congressional behaviour is not appropriate in the crises. In short, in neither chamber 
were electoral majority, Clinton's share of the vote, or committee membership found 
to have a consistent and sizeable effect on voting decisions in any of the cases. 
The president's position was known on almost all the roll calls listed in the cases, 
but, as none produced results in which every lawmaker voted the same way, 
12 Sulfaro, V, 2000. 
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something was preventing many from endorsing the chief executive's preferred result. 
The regression analysis indicates that partisanship and ideology were the main reasons 
for this, but it does not mean that the other variables did not have an indirect impact 
on floor voting. If electorates select candidates who reflect their ideological and 
partisan preferences, members' views and electoral demands may often coincide. For 
example, senators' ideological stances may be based on their worldview or a 
reflection of the ideological preferences of their supportive constituents. As 
lawmakers cannot vote three times (once each for themselves, their party and their 
constituents), it is difficult to be confident that the predominant variables are entirely 
independent. 
Members may not have a universally applicable viewpoint when choosing how to 
vote, and will instead make behavioural decisions regarding the specific issue in hand. 
That any issue could infringe on numerous goals simultaneously is symptomatic of 
how the interaction of partisan, ideological, distributive and informational 
considerations produces a complex legislative environment that cannot be captured 
adequately by a universal explanation. Indeed, that the regression findings of Senate 
voting were not as powerful or consistent as House analysis, underlines how 
lawmakers' behaviour is difficult to simplify. However, although they are complex 
people with myriad motives, the BLR tests show that partisanship and ideology can 
explain much about how representatives and senators decide when voting on the use 
of force for humanitarian purposes. The regressions may not account for every nuance 
of lawmakers' voting decisions, but even simplified assumptions can have value. 
In further explaining how decisions are reached, the research has also considered 
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Hall's claim that the majority of lawmakers are not keenly interested in any given 
subject. Due to the range of complex issues dealt with in Congress, they are unable to 
concentrate on more than a few issues at a time, and so a relatively small proportion of 
issue specialists is responsible for decision making. The congressional reaction to the 
three crises suggests that this is generally the case with issues relating to the 
humanitarian use of force abroad. As the vast majority did little more than vote, Hall's 
claim that very few lawmakers are actively responsible for policy making does apply 
to the cases. Particularly in the House, most lawmakers either did nothing other than 
vote or actively engaged in only a limited fashion in each case. 
There are a few problems with Hall's approach. Hall does not ignore voting as it is 
the link between policy specialists and members, but he underestimates lawmakers' 
ability to make decisions without the aid of fellow members. He argues that the 
intensity of participation impinges on the nature of representation, the quality of 
legislation and Congress's relationship with other branches. 13 Is it thus to be assumed 
that roll calls are affected by how many lawmakers deliver speeches or attend 
hearings? In other words, would chamber decisions be different if seventy-five rather 
than only fifty percent of members did something? Also, how would this impact on 
presidential decision making? Does the president only listen to Congress when 
committee hearings, for example, are well-attended? Hall diminishes the importance 
of floor votes. Just because voting does not take much effort does not mean that it is 
not important. Virtually all lawmakers vote on roll calls. Non-participation would 
impact on outcomes if, say, fifty percent did not attend roll calls, but whether it would 
matter if the same proportion did nothing other than vote is not so convincing? 
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Hall says that to be good representatives lawmakers must invest heavily in issues in 
which constituents have a `clear and abiding interest. '14 If one were to suppose that 
constituents are concerned about the despatching of troops to foreign conflicts, Hall 
would presumably insist that the sizeable proportions of lawmakers who did nothing 
during the thee crises were shirking their representational duties. Hall argues that by 
abdicating the organising of legislation to others, a simple majority vote produces a 
result that does not reflect the preference of the median legislator. This is difficult to 
sustain if legislators were knowledgeable enough about the crises to be confident that 
good public policy was being created by specialists that did not require their input 
beyond floor voting. As such, it does not automatically follow that congressional 
decisions are not genuinely majoritarian. This may be so with esoteric scientific bills, 
for instance, but lawmakers relying on others to make voting choices for them and that 
specialists whose views do not reflect the wider chamber overwhelm the inactive is 
less convincing with matters pertaining to the use of force abroad. Controversies 
surrounding the deployment of troops to operations with ambiguous objectives were 
hardly rare in the post-Vietnam era. The crises involved emotive and widely reported 
issues, and every lawmaker will presumably have been able to recollect similar events 
to be able at least to speak about the cases on the floor. If all but a handful understood 
nothing about the crises then specialists would have had an immense influence. Many 
may have done nothing on the issues, but as each case produced sizeable amounts of 
people who were involved, it is unlikely that specialists with outlying preferences 
overwhelmed the two chambers. The broad criticism of Hall's analysis, then, is that 
13 Hall, R, 1996, p. 5. 
14 Ibid., p. 3. 
Conclusion 293 
attendance registers say only a limited amount about interest and understanding of an 
issue. 
In Hall's version of the gains from exchange model, lawmakers trade how active 
they are prepared to be on issues. Hall does not describe Congress as an institution 
based chiefly on a vote-trading gains from exchange model, and he presumes that 
lawmakers mostly only care about policies for which they have a special 
responsibility. If a lawmaker did none of the activities in the case chapters it does not 
necessarily mean that he or she was not interested in America's response to the crises. 
It seems unlikely that anyone not actively involved with the crises was so ignorant 
about them that they needed a policy specialist to tell them how to vote. The situation 
should be considered more of an efficient division of labour, rather than of ill- 
informed chambers seeking advice from a handful of specialists. 
How much policy specialists influence chamber decisions is debateable, but 
measures of participation are certainly a useful way to identify which groups in 
Congress are the most involved in an issue. Measures can be used, for example, to 
examine whether members of relevant committees were doing most of the work on an 
issue. Consequently, who acts as policy specialists is also addressed in the case 
chapters. Adapting the participation measures uncovers little evidence that the party 
leaders and whips were involved in the cases. Leaders from both parties were 
generally absent from floor and legislative activity, and media articles report little 
leadership or whip involvement. That leaders and whips seemed to be less interested 
in the crises than ordinary members suggests that party leaders did not serve as policy 
specialists, which weakens Cox and McCubbins's argument that central authorities 
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are created by the majority party in the House to encourage unified party voting. 15 
Also, in both the Somalia and Haitian cases, the minimal involvement of majority 
Democratic Party leaders was in fact lower than for minority Republican leaders in 
both chambers. As House party voting in the cases appears to stem from 
representatives choosing to vote with colleagues, Cox and McCubbins are correct 
about parties solving collective dilemmas for members, but their notion of cartels 
hiring agents to coordinate action through punishments and rewards does not apply as 
well to the cases. That they reward or punish rank and file members may be true for 
many issues, but it does not seem that leaders or whips were policing members on the 
UNPE cases. 16 
Recalling the discussion in chapter three on Cooper and Brady's argument that 
leadership styles do not impact on the House, it seems that in the cases there was no 
relationship between the efforts made by party leaders in either chamber and party 
voting on the floor. '? Party government theories, such as Rhodes', that argue that party 
leaders take action when there is widespread agreement among members does not 
neatly fit the cases in this thesis. 18 The research finds that on the humanitarian use of 
force abroad, party as represented by leaders and whips did not play a significant role 
in activating partisan roll calls in the House. Senate party leaders, in contrast, were 
generally more active even though the parties were only somewhat homogenous in the 
roll calls analysed in the thesis. 
15 Cox, G& McCubbins, M, 1993, p. 83. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Cooper, J& Brady, D, 1981. 
18 Rhode, D, 1991. 
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Equating party leaders and whips with central authorities is problematic when they 
do not seem especially interested in an issue or when certain leaders and whips are 
relatively active but have little impact on the voting behaviour of their members. In 
terms of the cases, it is unclear whether House party leaders were simply not 
interested or were so confident of loyalty that they did not need to lobby members to 
support particular bills? Also, some Senate party leaders were heavily involved in 
bills during the crises, but they may not have intended that a majority of their 
colleagues voted against a majority of the opposition party. The fact that senior 
members of both parties jointly introduced a few Senate bills in the cases supports this 
point. 19 
It is not certain from the cases research that central authorities as conceptualised by 
Cox and McCubbins do not exist or are just not present on the issue of humanitarian 
use of force? Regardless of the evidence of their relatively low participation in the 
case chapters, it is also possible that leaders did act as political entrepreneurs during 
the crises. For example, House party leaders may have been acting as a central 
authority by implementing rules to direct the flow of legislation, which renders 
unnecessary such public activities as speech making. However, whether parties are 
really so effective at controlling legislation as Cox and McCubbins claim is 
questionable. Their reliance on latent procedural power such as the allocation of 
committee assignments seems to presume that party members can be clearly divided 
between those who will always support their leaders and those who never will. 
Moreover, this distinction is so apparent at the start of each Congress that party 
loyalists can be given influential assignments on key committees and rebels can be 
19 For example, Sens. Dole and Lieberman introduced the bill to lift the Balkans arms embargo (S. 21). 
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consigned to insignificant seats on minor committees. All members are given 
committee assignments, so how can party leaders be certain that particular committees 
will not deal with important legislation for the next two years? Even allowing for 
leaders' control of the legislative agenda, committee behaviour is impossible to 
predict. Cox and McCubbins focus on the majority party, but the corollary is that 
leaders of both parties sit back for the rest of the Congress satisfied that the flow of 
legislation is both conducive to the majority party's agenda, and, assuming it has also 
carefully placed its members in appropriate seats, is acceptable to the minority party 
as well. However, lawmakers have competing demands, and so it is unlikely either 
that loyalists will always act according to type or that the goals of rebels and their 
parties never converge. 
The party government view that committees are merely panels set up to do the 
party's bidding has a further flaw. Foreign policy committee seats may have been 
allocated to pursue party goals, but it is still possible that members have some 
flexibility in many of the relatively minor issues such as those related to UN 
peacekeeping. By the same token, the committee government view that committees 
are autonomous does not account for a party's ability to influence its members on 
committees. In other words, the creation of committees with people loyal to their party 
does not render redundant the need for continual lobbying by party leaders to ensure 
loyalty on key issues. Latent procedural power is a tool party leaders can use, but it 
often needs to be complemented by more active involvement. 
Each of the case chapters notes that it is feasible that leaders in both chambers were 
lobbying support from party colleagues behind-the-scenes. It is also possible that 
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leaders controlled legislation relating to the crises through, for instance, careful 
scheduling of debates and imposing restrictions on amendments. With this in mind, 
the findings in the thesis should be considered as incomplete. However, the range of 
activities counted in the case chapters should ensure some confidence that 
congressional decision making was not being led by party leaders. Whips do not spend 
all their time behind-the-scenes rallying members, and leaders do not simply allocate 
committee assignments at the start of each Congress and then disappear confident that 
members will produce legislation that is fully supported by party colleagues on the 
floor. Party leaders frequently participate in the same activities as ordinary members if 
legislation is of sufficient personal or party importance. As so few were publicly 
involved in the cases means they were giving their time to other issues. 
Low participation among party leaders in the cases was due to their lack of interest 
in the specific issues, and not because they rarely, regardless of the issue, undertake 
the types of activities measured in the case chapters? One way to demonstrate this is 
to compare participation among party leaders in the cases with involvement in another 
foreign policy-related issue, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As 
one of the most controversial economic foreign policy issues of the 1990s, NAFTA 
prompted considerable interest in Congress. Rather than replicate the method used to 
measure participation in the case chapters, just comparing the number of floor 
statements made during the cases with the number of statements made about NAFTA 
amply illustrates that the involvement of party leaders in the cases was low relative to 
other matters. Counting floor statements admittedly gives no indication of how much 
party leaders were involved behind-the-scenes or if leaders had employed any latent 
powers to affect outcomes. However, as floor statements can serve as an efficient way 
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for whips and leaders to signal their views to large numbers of party colleagues and 
can be useful in picking up a few extra votes, they are a valid measure of 
involvement. 20 
Table 7.1: Statements (in percentages) in Congressional Record of House and Senate 
Republican and Democratic Party Leaders 
Issue (louse 
Reps Dems 
Senate 
Reps Dems 
Somalia 1992-93 32 20 84 47 
Ilaiti 1991-94 42 20 48 40 
Bosnia 1995 37 42 79 78 
NAFTA 1993 100 85 100 100 
N= (NAFTA) Senate Democrats (14), Republicans (18), House Democrats (98), Republicans (22). For 
other totals, see tables 4.11,5.11 and 6.11. Source: Congressional Record (http: //thomas. loc. gol/ 
Table 7.1 reports the percentages of Republicans (Reps) and Democrats (Dems) 
from each chamber who are named in CQ as party leaders and whips who spoke at 
least once on the floor on any of the four issues. For the UNPE cases, the table uses 
the same time periods used throughout the thesis. NAFTA was a prominent issue 
throughout the 1990s, but, because it was the year it was ratified in both congressional 
chambers, table 7.1 counts only statements made on the trade agreement during 
1993.21 Each column gives the percentage of party leaders who spoke at least once on 
the issues in the four rows. Table 7.1 thus shows that higher proportions of leaders 
from each chamber and party spoke on NAFTA than each of the three humanitarian 
crises. For example, every Senate Democrat official gave floor statements on NAFTA 
during 1993, but only forty percent spoke on Haiti between 1991 and 1994. Apart 
from House Democrats, every party official spoke at least once on NAFTA during 
20 Sinclair, B, 1983, p. 161. 
21 In moderately partisan votes, the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 
(HR. 3450) passed in the House (234-200) on November 17 and in the Senate (61-38) on November 20, 
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1993. In fact, even though only eighty-five percent of House Democrats spoke on 
NAFTA, that is still a far greater proportion than spoke on the three other crisis. 
Moreover, senior leaders frequently used the floor to signal their views on NAFTA in 
1993. Rep. David Bonior (D-MI), Majority Whip, and Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-GA), 
Minority Whip, spoke about the issue on thirty-five and twenty-two occasions 
respectively. For the duration of the three UNPE cases, no party official made as many 
floor statements as Reps. Bonior or Gingrich made on NAFTA in 1993. 
Table 7.1 implies that, unlike NAFTA, the UNPE cases were not considered vital 
enough for party leaders to get heavily involved. The analysis in table 7.1 of floor 
speeches on NAFTA made by party leaders shows that leaders do not always sit back 
and expect lawmakers to fall into line. As is argued by Sinclair and Rhode, there are 
some issues that they think are important enough to signal to the rank and file. 22 
Again, speaking on the floor is only one aspect of the power available to party leaders, 
but NAFTA shows that leaders and whips must think it is worth doing for some 
issues. What table 7.1 indicates, then, is that while there may have been considerable 
backroom dealings between party leaders and rank and file during the UNPE crises, 
the relative lack of activity in the public domain compared to the NAFTA issue 
suggests that this is unlikely. It could actually be the case that leaders were so 
confident that voting on the UNPE cases would be along party lines that they thought 
heavy involvement was unnecessary. Even so, this does not alter the fact that party 
leaders were not leading the members on the UNPE cases and were spending their 
time on issues they considered more important. 
1993. 
22 Sinclair, B, 1983,1995. Rhode, D, 1991. 
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Table 7.1 bolsters the claim that any partisan voting in the House occurred 
spontaneously rather than being prompted by leaders or whips. Ideological similarities 
and personal relationships tie party colleagues together in floor voting coalitions. As 
chapter three notes, Cox and McCubbins demonstrate that House party colleagues are 
connected through shared electoral reputations. 23 Despite the regressions in the case 
chapters finding that re-election concerns did not impact on House or Senate voting, a 
sense of shared electoral fates among party colleagues exists in the House. Party 
affiliation, however, is not as prominent a feature of Senate activity. Party rules and 
procedures are more relaxed in the Senate. Strengthened by the prominence of the 
ideology variable in the case chapters, senators are more independently-minded than 
their House colleagues. 
The participation measures presented in this thesis suggest that rather than deciding 
how to vote based on signals from party leaders, lawmakers relied on foreign policy 
committees to supply the relevant legislation. Committees arguably have relatively 
high control over information, and, within their jurisdiction, lead legislative 
consideration of public policy. However, the thesis is less concerned with whether 
committees are autonomous, and is more interested in whether they serve as policy 
specialists. It has found evidence supporting both Hall's notion of policy specialists 
and Krehbiel's uncertainty postulate (that chambers create specialised committees to 
supply them with informed legislation). 'ý Committees did not have a monopoly on 
information as plenty of non-members spoke knowledgably about the crises, but 
policy specialists who framed the majority of the legislation were foreign policy 
23 Cox, G& McCubbins, M, 1993, pp. 107-135. 
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committee members. As noted, Hall thinks that the dependence on policy specialists 
creates a chamber that does not produce genuinely majoritarian decisions. Krehbiel's 
majoritarian and uncertainty postulates argue the opposite: that chambers create 
specialists to supply legislation acceptable to the majority. As access to information is 
not universal, the legislature will reach decisions on committees bills that it may not 
otherwise have made. However, while Hall believes this undermines lawmakers' 
representative role, Krehbiel argues that knowledge of policy issues in chambers is 
intentionally asymmetrical to allow specialised committees to do the work for the 
benefit of the chamber majority. 
Krehbiel backs his claims by showing that committees are not so ideologically 
homogenous that they do not reflect the chamber. 25 The regression analysis in this 
thesis also finds that floor voting behaviour of foreign policy committee members on 
the humanitarian use of force was not significantly different to their chambers. House 
foreign policy committee members voted along the same partisan lines as non- 
members and Senate committee members were seemingly as likely as non-members to 
base voting decisions on ideological preferences. 
As with the criticism of Hall's claim that a majority in a chamber is presumed to 
rely on specialist committees, parts of Krehbiel's uncertainty postulate seems less 
convincing when considering the three cases. Although participation was generally 
low in each chamber, large numbers of non-members of the foreign policy committees 
did contribute to debates on the three crises. Highlighting the less structured policy 
24 Krehbiel, K, 1991. 
25 Ibid., pp. 123-134 
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making environment in the Senate, participation among senators who were not 
members of foreign policy committees in all three cases was higher than for those in 
the House. Also, even though a smaller percentage of senators than representatives 
were not members of the relevant committees, non-members in the Senate were more 
likely to introduce legislation relating to the crises. Republican leader Sen. Bob Dole 
(R-KS), for example, was not on any foreign policy committee, but spoke frequently 
on the crises and introduced key bills. Presumably, then, if the Senate (or even the 
House) had never created a committee system with any special jurisdiction over 
foreign policy, there would have been a sufficient number of lawmakers able to 
produce legislation in response to the crises. 
Krehbiel's majoritarian postulate describes a chamber in which a majority ruling 
reflects the median position, but, as roll calls are not unanimous, how do members 
decide which way to vote? Krehbiel seems to assume that a majority in the chamber 
automatically supports committee legislation. However, as many bills fail at the post- 
committee stage, how mostly non-participating lawmakers decide whose bills to 
support at roll calls should not be overlooked. The analysis in the case chapters tries to 
bridge this gap. The evidence in the cases suggests that lawmakers vote in favour of 
bills introduced by specialists with the same party affiliation or similar ideological 
beliefs. Finally, further emphasising how partisanship is more endemic to the House 
than the Senate, the analysis, in the cases is concluded by showing that when 
lawmakers decide whose bills to endorse on the chamber floor, representatives are 
much more likely than senators to side with party colleagues. 
It is difficult to generalise as the analysis of committee behaviour in this thesis is 
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based on three crises that largely ran concurrently. Relative committee power ebbs and 
flows depending on the issue, chamber and leadership. The party, chamber and 
committee perspectives each have some theoretical value, but one alone cannot offer a 
universal explanation of congressional policy making. Some committee assignments 
are self-selected and some are appointed by parties. Committees may produce 
numerous bills on policies within their jurisdiction, but members are not indifferent to 
whether bills are accepted on the floor. As Deering and Smith point out, 
`None of these perspectives fully captures the nature of the relationship among 
committees, parties, and the parent chambers. Rather, each exaggerates the 
importance of certain features of congressional rules and practices. '26 
The problem of developing a theoretically parsimonious and empirically robust 
perspective on the policy making role of committees endorses Shepsle and Weingast's 
claim that third generation theories of congressional behaviour that include 
informational, committee and party elements offer valuable insights into the 
behaviour of lawmakers. The humanitarian use of force issue demonstrates that both 
Cox and McCubbins's party theory and Krehbiel's informational rationale incorporate 
useful insights into how collective dilemmas are solved. For example, the strength of 
partisanship in the analysis of House behaviour in the case chapters supports the claim 
by Cox and McCubbins that representatives cooperate with party colleagues to capture 
gains. For Krehbiel (and for Hall), individual lawmakers cannot acquire gains without 
creating a system in which they are supplied with expert information. This division of 
labour on the US response to the crises helps explain how the institution was able to 
assert itself with the president when most of its members were not greatly involved. 
26 Deering, C& Smith, S, 1997, p. 4. 
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Summary 
This research has explored the role of Congress in relation to the humanitarian use 
of force in the early 1990s. At the institutional level the thesis has examined 
Congress's relationship with the presidency. Challenging the two presidencies 
argument and supporting the view that Congress was resurgent in post-1989 foreign 
policy, the case chapters highlight the successes lawmakers had in influencing 
executive policy in the humanitarian use of force. To explore how institutions solve 
collective dilemmas through cooperation, the research has looked at how Congress 
made assertive decisions regarding the foreign policy role of the president when most 
members were not actively involved in the issues. More in the House than the Senate, 
the analysis in the cases corroborates Hall's argument that most lawmakers are not 
involved in any given issue, and instead rely on policy specialists to do most of the 
legislative work. The research has also followed Shepsle and Weingast's suggestion 
that congressional research should blend positive analysis of a range of factors such as 
party and committee behaviour. Cox and McCubbins's claim that parties solve 
problems of creating collective outcomes among likeminded legislators helps explain 
how voting majorities were reached on the cases in the House. The participation 
measures reveal that party leaders in both chambers were not especially active, which 
implies that Cox and McCubbins's claim that party leaders police the rank and file 
was not necessarily the case with the humanitarian use of force. The regression 
analysis also finds that while partisanship was somewhat of a factor, senators' voting 
decisions were primarily driven by ideological preferences. The cases also borrow 
from Krehbiel's informational rationale that argues that knowledge of outcomes is 
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asymmetrical and imperfect and that committees are the primary source of 
information. Members of the foreign policy committees were more likely than non- 
members to participate in the cases. And, while not so much the case in the Senate, 
certainly in the House, members of these committees supplied most of the relevant 
legislation. 
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Table 1.2 Use of force Votes on which the presidents position is know: Roll Call 
Numbers 
Compiled from Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1980-2000 
House Senate 
1988 83/84 131/134 
1989 N/A 155/206/214/215/228 
1990 N/A 213/271 
1991 N/A N/A 
1992 155/156/171 N/A 
1993 179/180/417/473/555/556 313/317 
1994 497 172/263 
1995 145/814/856 601/602/603 
1996 404/405 N/A 
1997 233/234 N/A 
1998 58 110/171/249 
1999 100/101/103/119/187/189 145/151 
2000 89/193/202 105 
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1.4 Use of Force: Votes where a majority of either Republicans oppose or Democrats 
support use of force (where president's position is known). 
Bold= Republican majority. Italics=Democrat majority 
Compiled from Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1980-2000 
House 
1988 83/84 
1989 N/A 
1990 N/A 
1991 N/A 
1992 155/156 
1993 179 /18 0 /417/4 73 /5 55 /5 56 
1994 497 
1995145/814/856 
1996 404/405 
1997 233/234 
1998 58 
1999100/101/103/119/187/189 
2000 89/193/202 
Senate 
131/134 
155/214/215/228 
213/271 
N/A 
N/A 
313/317 
172/263 
601/602/603 
N/A 
N/A 
110/171/249 
145/151 
105 
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Binary logistic regression tests were run for every House and Senate roll call in figures 4.1 
and 4.2. Rather than include dozens of tables in chapter four, the key findings are summarised 
here for all the roll calls except the two illustrated in each case chapter. Column one lists the 
roll call number. The second column gives the percentage chance of correctly predicting 
category membership if no regression test is run. The third column lists the variables that 
were entered into the regression. To show the relative strength of the variables, the column 
also includes (in brackets) the change in the -2 log-likelihood if the variable is removed. The 
fourth column- Nagel- is the Nagelkerke R Square which shows what percentage of the 
variance is due to the model. Column five gives the results for the Hosmer and Lemeshow 
goodness of fit test. This examines whether the pattern of results matches a predicted pattern. 
In order for the model to be a good fit, the chi-square should be low and the Sig. column 
needs to be insignificant at P=>0.05. The sixth column gives the percentage chance of 
successfully predicting category membership based on a subject's score that is attained from 
the predictor/s variable/s. Finally, the rows in bold type indicate either that SPSS was either 
unable to run a regression test or that the impact of the variables were so small that the 
findings should be considered as invalid. 
Table 4.3: Binary Logistic Regression results for all 1993 House and Senate 
Somalia Floor Votes (excluding vote 556 and 314) 
Roll Call Original Variables Nagel Hosmer Classification 
Number Prediction Table 
179 (House) 58.6% Party (486.673) 92.1% Chi. 000 97.9% 
Sig. 000 
180 (House) 69% Party (195.724) 73.4% Chi. 3.451 89% 
Clinton (4.725) Sig. 631 
183 (House) 58% Party (56.899) 92% Chi. 16.523 97.6% 
ACU93 (6.469) Sig. 006 
188 (House) 71.7% ACU93 (28.233) 15.5% Chi. 5.812 72.6% 
Committee (21.323) Sig. 668 
319 (House) 59.2% Party (547.187) 98% Chi. 000 99.5% 
Sig. 000 
320 (House) 58.7% Party (73.270) 97.6% Chi. 1.411 99% 
ACU93 (4.480) Sig. 923 
321 (House) 66.3% Party (23.598) 76% Chi. 1.913 90% 
ACU93 (4.762) Sig. 964 
Committee (6.0 10) 
Clinton (4.451) 
463 (House) 94.4% ACU93 (9.414) 6.2% Chi. 10.595 94.4% 
Sig. 060 
472 (House) 95.1% ACU93 (17.591) 16.7% Chi. 2774 95.1% 
Party (7.078) Sig. 735 
555 (House) 52% Party (297.285) 70% Chi. 3.193 88% 
ACU93 (17.967) Sig. 670 
252 (Senate) 92.6% ACU93 (3.922) 92.6% Chi. 3.656 92.6% 
Sig. 600 
313 (Senate) 62.1% ACU93 (2.230) 53.2% Chi. 12.328 76% 
Election (. 53 1) Sig. 090 
Party (0.65) 
318 (Senate). N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Table 5.2., -Haitian roll call votes in the Senate, 1993-1994 
Vote/Date Result Reps Denis PD 
321 19Y-81N 19Y-25N OY-56N 84 
(21/10/93) (58%) (98%) 
322 98Y-2N 43Y-IN 55Y-IN 1 
(21/10/93) (98%) (96%) 
40 19Y-76N 4Y-36N 15Y-40N 27 
(10/2/94) (84%) (70%) 
172 34Y-65N 34Y-ION OY-55N 153 
(29/6/94) (79%) (96%) 
173 93Y-4N 40Y-3N 53Y-1N 8 
(29/6/94) (93%) (93%) 
194 57Y-42N 2Y-41N 55Y-1N 184 
(14/7/94) (95%) (96%) 
263 63Y-31N 13Y-29N 50Y-2N 122 
(5/894) (67%) (88%) 
301 94Y-5N 38Y-5N 56Y-ON 25 
(21/9/94) (88%) (98%) 
323 91Y-8N 40Y-3N 51Y-5N 2 
(6/10/94) (93%) (90%) 
Compiled from Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1993-1994 
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Table 5.3 Binary Logistic Regression results for all 1993 and 1994 House and 
Senate Haiti Floor Votes (excluding vote 500 and 263) 
House Roll Original Variables Nagel Hosmer Classification 
Call Number Prediction Table 
8 62% Committee (17.005) 9% Chi. 5.431 64% 
Clinton (5.671) Sig. 721 
Region (4.620) 
196 55.4% ACU94 (187.542) 48% Chi. 4.885 79.7% 
Sig. 430 
197 52% ACU94 (42.059) 76% Chi. 15.319 89% 
Party (26.848) Sig. 053 
Election (20.644) 
224 54.2% Party (82.790) 88.8% Chi. 4.800 94.7% 
ACU94 (18.645) Sig. 441 
424 89.9% Party (44.983) 43% Chi. 002 89.9% 
Clinton (7.821) Sig. 1.00 
Florida (6.532) 
495 57.5% Party (115.716) 95.1% Chi. 2.458 98.1% 
ACU95 (10.652) Sig. 930 
Committee (5.081) 
497 52.1% Party (55.927) 83.4% Chi. 6.009 91.5% 
ACU95 (9.054) Sig. 646 
Region (7.165) 
Clinton (6.457) 
498 60.8% Party(110.909) 59.3% Chi. 2.822 85.4% 
Clinton (23.609) Sig. 588 
499 94% ACU94 (30.719) 19.7% Chi. 4.610 94% 
Clinton (7.698) Sig. 798 
Senate Roll Original Variables Nagel Hosmer Classification 
Call Number Prediction Table 
321 82% ACU93 (36.421) 52% Chi. 8.238 86% 
Sig. 139 
322 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
40 79% ACU94 (5.850) 18% Chi. 9.166 79% 
Region (4.630) Sig. 328 
172 64% Party (10.029) 83% Chi. 786 92% 
ACU94 (4.911) Sig. 940 
173 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
194 58% Party 89% Chi. 000 97% 
Sig. 000 
301 95% Party 26% Chi. 000 95% 
Sig. 000 
323 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Table 6.1: Bosnia House Deployment and Embargo* Votes, 1995 
Vote No. Date Result Reps Dems PD 
362* 8/6 318y-99n 198-28(86) 120-70(59) 18 
608* 1/8 298y-128n 204-25(88) 93-103(51) 82 
745 30/10 315y-103n 222-2(96) 93-100(49) 91 
813 17/10 239y-181n 226-3(98) 13-177(87) 178 
814 17/10 243y-171n 214-12(93) 28-159(78) 152 
855 13/12 357y-70n 229-3(99) 128-66(63) 68 
856 13/12 210n-218y 190-42(82) 20-175(86) 140 
857 13/12 287y-141n 221-11(96) 65-130(64) 123 
858 13/12 190n-237y 11-219(95) 179-17(88) 170 
Compiled from Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1995 
Table 6.2: Bosnia Senate Deploymnent and Embargo* Votes, 1995 
Vote No. Date Result Reps Denis PD 
329* 26/7 57y-41n 40-13(76) 17-28(60) 74 
330* 26/7 75y-23n 39-23(74) 36-9 (77) 27 
331* 26/7 69y-29n 48-5(91) 21-24(51) 88 
479 29/9 94y-2n 52-0 (98) 42-2 (89) 13 
601 13/12 22y-77n 21-32 (60) 1-45(96) 74 
602 13/12 47y-52n 46-7(88) 1-45 (96) 168 
603 13/12 69y-30n 24-29(55) 45-1(96) 104 
Compiled fron: Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1995 
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Table 6.3 Binary Logistic Regression results for all 1995 House and Senate Bosnia 
Floor Votes (excluding vote 858 and 603) 
House Roll Original Variables Nagel Hosmer Classification 
Call Number Prediction Table 
145 57.9% ACU95 (60.582) 90.75 Chi. 4.031 95.4% 
Party (13.918) Sig. 545 
362 77.6% ACU95 (41.669) 18.5% Chi. 6.030 78.4% 
Committee (5.756) Sig. 644 
Clinton (6.042) 
608 70.2% Party (6.227) 32% Chi. 5.082 75.5% 
Committee (12.340) Sig. 749 
ACU95 (6.227) 
745 76.2% ACU95 (80.693) 64% Chi. 12.794 86.4% 
Clinton (11.505) Sig. 119 
Committee (6.780) 
813 57% Party (40.898) 89.5% Chi. 4.828 95.9% 
ACU95 (20.173) Sig. 437 
814 58.7% ACU95 (40.908) 77% Chi. 6.928 90.2% 
Party (7.985) Sig. 226 
855 83.8% ACU95 (101.542) 36.5% Chi. 7.349 83.8% 
Sig. 290 
856 51% ACU95 (282.387) 65.3% Chi. 15.907 85.6% 
Sig. 014 
857 67% ACU95 (22.201) 56.9% Chi. 5.886 84.2% 
Party (6.305) Sig. 319 
858 55% Party (26.430) 81.9% Chi. 1.276 92.9% 
ACU95 (22.788) Sig. 973 
Senate Roll Original Variables Nagel Hosmer Classification 
Call Number Prediction Table 
329 58.2% Party (11.083) 18.5% Chi.. 000 69.4% 
Sig. 
330 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
331 70.8% Party (25.673) 33.5% Chi. 000 74% 
Sig. 000 
479 97.9% Election (10.445) 56.2% Chi. 000 97.9% 
Sig. 1.0 
601 78.4% ACU95 (27.798) 38.4% Chi. 4.770 80.4% 
Sig. 445 
602 53.6% ACU95 (6.863) 81% Chi. 3.583 92.8% 
Party (4.465) Sig. 465 
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